Theories of causation and explanation: necessarily true or domain-specific?

Abstract

In Humphreys [2000], I argued that as they are based on conserved quantities, Salmon’s latesttheories of causation and explanation require a commitment with a quite radical formof»physicalism, making the theory difficult to apply to social, economic and psychologicalphenomena. This commitment would seem to curtail the scope of the theories considerablyunless a vast reduction in the social sciences and psychological to physics can beachieved. In the present study, I argue that the empirical content inherent in Salmon’s theories,though still present, is less problematic than what I thought in [2000]. This, in turn,makes the philosophical problems involved in evaluating it less severe than what they mightseem. What is more, the degree of commitment to physicalism required by Salmon’s moremature theories is minimal. The combination of realism and empiricism in Salmon’s theoriesrequires fewer changes in philosophical methods than what might be expected.