The deconstruction of the Kantian principle of sufficient reason
Abstract
The paper proposes the Kantian treatment of the principle of sufficient reason in the K.r.V as a certain contribution of this text to the precedent German philosophy, chiefly to the Leibnizian-Wolfian tradition, even to the former Kant’s writings, especially the Nova Dilucidatio. In the first Kritik, the principle of sufficient reason is focused from the transcendental method, starting from the position of the causality principle in the second Analogy of experience. The author keeps close to the process of the Kantian «deconstruction of the principle of sufficient reason» according to a double way: the circumstanced analysis conducted by Kant in respect of the concept of reason and therefore of the concept of the principle of reason in the Nova Dilucidatio, and, on the other hand, the redefinition of all the species of the ratio involved, in the critical period, by the only possible proof of the principle of sufficient reason, namely the proof of the causality principle in the second Analogy of experience.Keywords
principle of sufficient reason, transcendental method, proposition.Published
2004-07-07
How to Cite
Longuenesse, B. (2004). The deconstruction of the Kantian principle of sufficient reason. Enrahonar. An International Journal of Theoretical and Practical Reason, 36, 43–63. https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/enrahonar.366
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Copyright (c) 2004 Béatrice Longuenesse

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