De la biomillora moral a la IA per a la millora moral: assistents morals artificials a l'era dels riscos globals
Resum
En aquest article argumento que l'ús de tecnologies biomèdiques per a la millora moral és inadequat per evitar riscos globals, pel fet que pot provocar problemes similars als que es pretenen resoldre per mitjà del seu ús. Per aquest motiu, defenso la conveniència d'explorar altres tecnologies per a la millora moral que no suposin tants perills i argumento a favor d'un model de millora moral per mitjà de la intel·ligència artificial. En concret, defenso l'ús de SocrAI, un assistent moral artificial dissenyat per millorar la nostra deliberació moral. Per fer-ho, proposo tres criteris que permetin avaluar i augmentar la seva seguretat i eficàcia. Així mateix, assenyalo la importància de tenir en compte les qüestions estructurals i institucionals —i. e., les normes o els incentius polítics, econòmics, socials i culturals— en les propostes de millora moral, i mostro com SocrAI pot tenir impacte en aquestes.
Paraules clau
millora moral, SocrAI, assistents virtuals, deliberació moralReferències
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