Philia Networks in the Macedonian Court
and the Long Accession of Alexander the Great*

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ABSTRACT This paper revaluates key moments in the court politics of Alexander the Great’s reign through the introduction of philia-networks governed by gift-exchange as a template for explaining the relationships between key participants. This approach makes it clear that Alexander initially held a passive role in the political life of his own court and was dependant on others for his succession. These dynamics shifted in the opening years of the Asian expedition as Alexander sought to break these philia-networks, building his own and surrounding his person with philoi of his own choosing.

KEYWORDS Alexander the Great, philia, Aristotle, court politics, conspiracies.

To be a ruler in the ancient world was to be involved in a never-ending game of political chicanery with the elite. The Argead family of Macedonia, although the ruling house from at least the turn of the sixth into the fifth century, were no exception, and neither was the household’s most famous name: Alexander III the Great.1 Alexander, when his father, Philip II, died in 336 was by no means assured of succession to the Macedonian kingship. That Alexander did succeed was due to his support from prominent men—especially Antipater and Parmenio— who controlled vast networks of philoi. The recognition of the role played by prominent political factions in Alexander’s court is itself nothing new and most recently Waldemar Heckel has argued for the existence of political factions centred on both Antipater and Parmenio at Alexander’s court.2 Furthermore, Heckel’s presentation of the struggles between the two groups and the king has been echoed by Strootman, who in his study of Hellenistic courts ties the culture back to the example of the later Argeads.3 Nonetheless, neither of these two

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1 There has been some debate about the exact origins of the Argead household, for which Herodotus (8.137-8) and Thucydides (2.99.2) in rare alignment are the cause. See: MART 2015, 81; contra HAMMOND 1972, 430-40, who also discusses the roots of the Argeads and Temenids.
2 HECKEL 2003, divides the power at Alexander’s court into Antipatrid, Parmenion-Attalus and Alexander factions, although HECKEL (202-3) underplays the power of Parmenio’s philoi.
3 STROOTMAN 2014, 118-126.

* This paper has had a very long gestation, with the central thesis originally the product of an undergraduate paper written in 2016. My thanks go to Lynette Mitchell, the convenor of that excellent module, not only for starting me on this journey but for her endless encouragement in many endeavours since.
lines of argument can fully explain the deadly struggles that occurred between Alexander’s accession and the death of Parmenio in 330. It is the aim of this paper to provide a new explanation to these struggles through the introduction of philia-networks as a template for understanding what have been termed as political factions by others.

This paper will proceed firstly by outlining that the Greek conception of philia in a political context, most persuasively defined by Aristotle, can be applied to the court of Alexander. Indeed, philia was a core precept of elite Macedonian political life. After establishing this, it will be shown how a new, philia-network approach to the “factional politics” of Alexander’s court allows a more nuanced understanding of the political position of the king when he began his conquest of the Achaemenid Empire in 334, and how this position evolved as power dynamics shifted until a new phase of philia-networking began in 229, when Alexander’s own philoi sought to build their own networks. It shall be argued that at the outset of his rule Alexander was beholden to the power-dynamics which had secured the throne for him and that, demonstrating a great deal of political acumen, Alexander redressed this power balance in order to stem the influence of philia-networks. This was done, largely, by utilising the notion of gift-exchange in both material (land) and immaterial (status, favours) means to create new bonds within the political elite that favoured the king. Naturally, this last element also included promoting and expanding his own network of philoi.

**PHILIA IN MACEDONIAN COURT CULTURE**

It is no great leap to state that the majority of Greek political life was conducted by the elite. Nonetheless, even within this narrow group no elite family could seek to gain political power without the co-option or coercion of fellow elites in order to build a broader base for their dominance⁴. Both the extent and duration of the factional politics which often resulted from tensions between elite families are demonstrated well by a cursory glance at the tensions between the ousters of the Peisistratids: Isagoras and Cleisthenes. Herodotus (5.66) informs us that there was a power struggle between the two men in the vacuum created after the ousting of the Peisistratids tyranny, a power struggle in which Isagoras initially won the upper hand.⁵ However, Isagoras did not hold the archonship at this time having already done so in 525/4, therefore, and as Greg Anderson has noted, the primacy of Isagoras was not from electoral outcomes but from his wider political support⁶. It is this type of factional support, a loose and fluid congregation of men associated with Isagoras, which also prevailed elsewhere, and which can be termed a philia-network.

The relationship through which factions such as those who supported Isagoras and Cleisthenes were united was a bond of philia. Aristotle gives an insight, albeit from a philosophical standpoint, on the role philia played in civic life which demonstrates contemporary awareness the role philia played in politics. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1280b38-9)

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⁴ The relationship between rulers and elites in the Macedonian context has been examined in some detail by CARNEY 2015; KING 2010 and WEBER 2009. For elite-ruler relations more generally see MITCHELL 2013, who notes similarities between Macedonian kingship and others.

⁵ Although Isagoras initially won supremacy over Athens, his period of prominence was short lived. Herodotus (5.69-73.1) goes on to demonstrate how Cleisthenes drove Isagoras’ faction out of Athens and into the hands of Cleomenes I of Sparta. cf. *AP* 20.1-4.

⁶ ANDERSON 2005, 181-2 argues that holding the Archonship was not a way of gaining power but a reflection of who already held power in Athens at that time.
states that *philía* is an essential feature of the polis and forms the bedrock on which civic institutions are built. Of course, not all *philía* were the same and Aristotle categorised *philoi* into three groups: kin, comrades and xenoi. Additionally, *philía* itself could be subdivided into deep-rooted bonds of virtue, bonds of pleasure and, most relevant for this study, bonds of utility. Aristotle (*Nic Eth*. 1156a24-26) states that bonds of utility are most evident in political life and uses the example of sailors who needed to rely on each other to reach their destination safely, but whose bond is then broken upon their return home to emphasise the expedient nature of this kind of relationship. It is likely that the supporters of Isagoras and Cleisthenes would have primarily bound by this utilitarian conception of *philía*, with the supporters of either man to numerous in number to have all been linked by bonds of kinship.

Why the supporters of men such as Isagoras or Cleisthenes should have been *philoi* in the first place is itself a question which must be answered. It is once again Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* 1158b1-5) who illuminates us when he introduces the notion of reciprocal exchange as the core mechanism which governed these *philía*-networks and allowed them to propagate and be retained for the future. Lynette Mitchell has examined the use of gift-giving and exchange in a political context and has argued that there existed two categories of reciprocal relationship. The first, termed the vertical axis of exchange, accounts for the flow of goods and services along the social ladder between *philoi* of unequal social standing. The second, naturally termed the horizontal axis of exchange, is the provision of goods and services by men of roughly equal social rank. The importance of both of these levels of exchange, and the tensions between them, is well elaborated by Xenophon’s (*Mem* 2.3.11-14) tale of a debate between Socrates and Chaerecrates, his brother. Socrates berates his brother for his conduct and points out that the most importance element of *philía* is its reciprocal nature. Even more importantly, it is essential that the man who wishes to make the acquaintance offer his services first; such an action creates a debt which must be repaid.

Of course, both Aristotle and Xenophon were presenting ideal types in their analysis of the role *philía* played in relationships, be they political or social. Nonetheless, the issues at stake in both of their conceptions can be witnessed in the archonship election of 508/7, when Cleisthenes kinsman Alcmeon was appointed, and the events which followed. Herodotus (5.69) is certainly in no doubt as to the supremacy of Cleisthenes at this time despite the fact he was not in office. Cleisthenes influence was a product of his *philía*-network and Alcmeon’s election can be viewed on both horizontal and vertical axes of exchange. The horizontal was naturally Cleisthenes support for Alcmeon, although as a superior partner, with Cleisthenes presumably gaining access to the power that the archonship had to offer through his kin as his end of the bargain. Their kinship should not obscure from the fact that in the political arena they still required a degree of utilitarian benefits from one another, it is merely that as kin we should be less surprised of their alliance. The vertical axis of exchange comes into play when it is considered that we are discussing an election. In exchange for support, Cleisthenes could offer his politically lesser *philoi* some sort of seat at the table of

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8 This distinction is repeated several times but is most notable at Aristot. *Nic Eth*. 8, 1156a6-10
9 The horizontal axis of exchange is described in MITCHELL 1997, 42-6. For the vertical axis see: 46-51.
10 There are numerous other examples of this sort of reciprocal relationship in practice, Homer (*Il*. 6.120-232) provides perhaps the earliest example.
power—in Cleisthenes case this was through a series of reforms to the Athenian tribal structure12.

The utilisation of philia-networks witnessed in late sixth-century Athens can be translated into the distinct context of the Macedonian court, albeit complicated by the presence of the king at the centre of all political activity13. The complication implicit in monarchy comes from the unequal status between the monarch and his (or occasionally her) philos which sits in direct contrast to equality, which was the concept at the very centre of Aristotelian philia14. Nonetheless the problem of inequality between philoi is dealt with by Aristotle himself, who was aware that not all relationships could be equal in practice. Furthermore, Aristotle explicitly cites the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in his discussion of how unequal relationships worked (Nic. Eth. 1158b7-1159b25). Aristotle (Nic. Eth. 1161a10-22) later takes this point further, likening the relationship between a ruler and those he rules to that between a shepherd and his flock and a father and his children. In both cases, Aristotle is keen to point out that the benefits for the ruled outweigh the benefits for the ruler, who is honoured and held in esteem in exchange for offering the benefits of his philia.

Aristotle’s view of unequal relationships is to a degree typical of the view of the ruler put forward by Xenophon, who in his Hiero (most explicitly: 11.14-15) stresses that a good ruler should aim to be loved by his people for his generosity. Aristotle’s view, however, is more practically applicable than this. Aristotle notes (Nic. Eth. 1161a33-34) that if the inferior philos has nothing to offer, no philia can hope to exist between them. This statement is an acknowledgement of the practicalities of ruling and demonstrates that philia has a place in the court politics of a king in the fifth and early fourth centuries. Indeed, the practical nature of philiai between rulers and their philoi can be seen in the tempestuous rivalry for the ear of Xerxes between Artabanus, his uncle, and Mardonius, son of Gobyras, a leading proponent of the invasion of Greece15. Xerxes relationship with his uncle is continually challenged due to the failure of Artabanus to provide a useful service to him—although, Herodotus is being ironic here and much of Artabanus’ advice is sound and therefore mistakenly ignored by a bad king Xerxes—and, therefore, Artabanus’ philia with Xerxes inevitably breaks down.

Precisely the role philia networks played in the unique Macedonian context can only be guessed at prior to the death of Philip II, due to the dearth of evidence16. However, an analysis of the movements of various individuals in the wake of Philip’s murder reveals clear patterns that demonstrate philia networks did indeed have a major role in the Macedonian court17. This is not the place at attempt a fresh answer to the question

12 On the reforms of Cleisthenes see DESTE. CROIIX 2004a; 2004b.
13 The nature of the Macedonian monarchy continues to be the subject of a debate between the followers of either DEFRANCISCI 1948, who believed the Argeads to be highly autocratic, versus the followers of GRANIER 1931, who invented the constitutionalist stance. More recently, HATZOPoulos 1996 has provided a compelling version of Macedonian monarchy as a national monarchy. See also: MITCHELL 2013.
14 Aristotle (1157b35) makes the importance of equality in reciprocal exchange clear: “λέγετα γάρ φιλότης ισότης,” cf. MITCHELL 1997, 8-9.
15 The pro-war and anti-war factions which these two men represent in Herodotus seems entirely legitimate, even if the speeches and the intense nature of the rivalry between them has the potential to be exaggerated. Their quarrel begins immediately upon Xerxes accession at 7.5 and continues through to 7.53 when Artabanus is sent back to Susa.
16 RHODES 2010 provides a good summary of the problems relating to the evidence of the period. Cf. MARI 2011.
17 STROOTMAN 2014 has argued that gift-exchange prevailed as the primary currency between the king and his philoi in the context of Hellenistic royal courts. This can certainly be projected back.
of who killed Philip II, however, it is Philip’s murder which illuminates two important roles that these philia networks held. Firstly, the immediate aftermath of Philip’s murder demonstrates that the primary aim of philia networks amongst the Macedonian elite was to gain access to the person of the king and in doing so to exert influence over the core decision making centre of the Macedonian political system. The second, more specific to Alexander III, is that Alexander does not appear to have controlled, but was controlled by, these powerful political forces in the earliest phase of his reign. Additionally, both patterns remained prevalent throughout Alexander’s later rule as new groups of philoi emerged to compete for the king’s ear (dealt with in the second half of this paper).

The first of these two points, the desire to be at the heart of the decision-making process, is evidenced in the movements and the formations of the philia-networks existing in 336. In the year prior to his murder Philip II had made a conscious decision to publicly expand his network of philoi through marriage to Cleopatra, daughter of Attalus. As Carney has correctly noted, whilst this decision would have caused natural angst amongst Alexander’s supporters, it was nothing out of the ordinary in a polygamous ruling family such as the Argeads. However, this is not the entire story. Curtius (6.19.6) informs us that Attalus had married the daughter of Parmenio, a wedding which must pre-date Philip’s death only on account of Attalus’ position as one of the two commanders (the other Parmenio himself) leading the advanced guard in Asia Minor at the time Philip was murdered. The unification of these two families through a formal bond of marriage, making them kin, transformed two already powerful individuals with their own philia-networks into an extremely potent bloc within Macedonian elite society (see Figure 1 and Appendix A). Furthermore, this horizontal exchange had a lot to offer each of its participants in the long term and, therefore, must have appeared particularly potent with the potential for the philia to extend for a lengthy duration.

The majority of the events discussed here occurred after Philip was murdered. Whoever killed Philip II either kept their role in the murder private, aside from the assailant Pausanias himself, or as Bosworth 1971, 102 has suggested, Alexander suppressed the identity of the killer for political purposes. Of course, the murderer(s) had the advantage of knowing Philip’s death was imminent and, therefore, had an advantage in the factional infighting that followed. Nonetheless, the murderer(s) had no guarantee that their plot would succeed and, if their role(s) was indeed kept private then, they could not openly benefit from them. Excellent discussions of Philip’s death include Badian 1963 [2012]; 2000 [2012], who views Alexander III as the likely culprit. Carney 2015, who discards the notion of Olympias’ involvement in detail. Additionally, Carney 2015 has discussed the possible role of the Lyncestian Alexander, who she states must have played a more dominant role than is often assumed. This view can be seen in tandem with Bosworth 1971, who places tensions between Upper and Lower Macedonians at the root of the matter. Antela-Bernardez 2012 has made note of Attalus’ involvement. All arguments have merits. Heckel 2003, 206-7 in particular, notes the importance of proximity to the king. For this reason, Heckel places the somatophylakes as the position of highest status in the court. Additionally, see Spawforth 2007, 87-8 who highlights the importance of proximity to the king for influence and Briant 1996, 200-4, who notes how the nature of Alexander’s mobile court system effected such matters.

D.S. 17.2.3; Ath 13.560c. Carney 2015, 170 has noted that Philip probably wished to take Alexander and Amyntas to Asia and it was therefore expedient to re-marry prior to departure. However, Philip could well have produced a successor with one of his pre-existing wives instead and therefore the marriage must have been political.

Carney 2015, 167. Cf. Lane Fox 2011, 386 who believes Just. 9.7.3 and 11.2.3 can be used to provide evidence that Cleopatra did indeed have a son named Caranos. Ogden 1999 discussed the implications of polygamy in more general terms.

D.S. 16.93.8-9 and Justin 9.5.8-9 inform us of Attalus’ role in the campaign.

If claims that Attalus wished to rule as regent are to have any substance to them, then Attalus surely needed Parmenio’s prestige amongst the troops to stabilise the situation. Parmenio also had friends.
Much like his long-time acquaintance Parmenio, Antipater, son of Iolus, was equally involved in the internecine struggles of the Macedonian elite to secure their preferred candidate on the throne after Philip’s death. The ‘Antipatrid-Antigonid Group’, as it has been coined by Waldermar Heckel, appears to have played an equally significant role in the politics of Alexander’s succession. In this case, the links between the group appear more difficult to draw out due to the deaths of many potential protagonists. Nonetheless, it can be said with relative certainty that Antipater’s philoi included amongst their number: the Lyncestian Alexander, who was related through marriage to Antipater’s daughter and whose role shall be elaborated further below; Alexander of Lyncestis’ brothers; Balagros, one of Philip’s somatophylakes and Antigonus, who was much closer in age to Antipater than Alexander.

In the middle of this political web was Alexander, who appears to have been at the mercy of those greater forces around him. Even though Alexander’s previous actions at Chaeronea (Plu. Alex. 9.2-3) had proven his right to rule by dint of his charisma, certainly vis-à-vis the other candidates, and despite Alexander being surrounded by his own web of philoi, his position was precarious. Olympias, being brother to Alexander of Molossia and having been involved in the politics of Philip’s court for considerable time, was probably the best placed of Alexander’s allies to press his claim.

![Diagram](image-url)

**Fig. 1:** The philiai of Parmenio and Attalus.

The accession of Alexander as king of Macedonia was a result of the power struggle between the Antipater and Parmenio philia-networks, and brings discussion to point two: Alexander was controlled by these networks in the earliest parts of his reign. When Philip was murdered, whoever murdered him, there was an immediate scramble amongst the Upper Macedonians, appearing to have links with the sons of Andromenes, eg. Arr. An. 3.27.1.

24 **HECKEL** 2003, 200 has gone further and stated that Antipater’s political involvement at this time was in reaction to the Parmenio-Attalus faction. However, the swiftness of political action after Philip’s death and the large scale of these philia networks must have required some bonds to already have been in place. Antipater was to important to have been politically unaligned. **CARNEY** 2015, 127-140 has argued that Antipater was but one player in a wider group led instead by the Lyncestian sons of Aëropus. There was clearly a bond between these men, yet, to say which was the more important prior to Alexander’s accession is difficult. What can be said is that Antipater emerged as the dominant force.

25 **HECKEL** 2003, 196.

26 On the relationship between Antigonus and Antipater see **HECKEL** 2006, 32-33. Much of the evidence for their philia post-dates Alexander, nonetheless, the treatment of Antigonus by Alexander is suggestive of a philia existing between the two at this time – see below.

27 Little can be said of Alexander’s hetairoi at this time.
amongst the elite to ensure that their preferred candidate ended up on the throne.\textsuperscript{28} Clearly, the Parmenio-Attalus *philia* network would have supported the claims of any child born to Cleopatra. Even if the child were a girl, a suitable match could have been found or Cleopatra remarried to a suitable candidate.\textsuperscript{29} Furthermore, and as argued by Bosworth, the comments placed into the mouth of Alexander by Curtius (6.8.16) that Philotas had supported the claims of Amyntas cannot be ruled out entirely. It is possible that after the murder of Cleopatra Parmenio switched his support to Amyntas before ultimately falling on the side of Alexander. The ambitions of the Parmenio-Attalus *philia* had ramifications also for those on the other side. For someone like Antipater, whose status surely demanded a seat at the highest table, allowing Parmenio and Attalus such influence could only come at his own expense. In this situation Antipater’s options were limited; Alexander, eldest son and certainly the only candidate to have conclusively proven his aretē on the field of battle or Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III, who appears to have either seized the opportunity or, as is suggested by Plutarch (*Mor*. 327c), to have been nominated as a figurehead by others with ambition.\textsuperscript{30} That Antipater chose the former over the latter may have come down to a combination of Antipater’s personal experiences with Alexander and Alexander’s relative youth vis-à-vis the other candidates.\textsuperscript{31} Alongside this, Alexander may have had the benefit of being the only candidate present (excluding Philip Arrhidaeus). It is far from a leap to assume that Antipater would prefer a king he could influence over one he could not, that was, after all, the point of all infighting amongst the elites after Philip’s death.

Alexander’s greatest debt to Antipater was not merely Antipater’s support for his claim, but Antipater’s ability persuade the Lyncestian Alexander to join his cause at the detriment of his brothers. Carney has made note of the power that the Lyncestian sons of Aëropus may have held at court and has speculated that it was the sons of Aëropus who had pushed the claim of Amyntas as a rival to the throne.\textsuperscript{32} The case for Lyncestian involvement is compelling and if the sons of Aëropus did indeed back Amyntas over Alexander it would have created a formidable power-bloc comprising of Amyntas himself, the three Lyncestian brothers and their adherents in Upper Macedonia (from which many military units came) and any of Amyntas’ own *philoi*.\textsuperscript{33} Nonetheless, the decision of Lyncestian Alexander to publicly declare for Alexander III still warrants

\textsuperscript{28} The death of Philip II and its aftermath has been the subject of numerous debates, see: *Badian* 1963 [2012]; 2007 [2012], who has placed Alexander III as the chief culprit; *Bosworth* 1971, has highlighted the role of the Lyncestian faction; *Carney* 2015, 167-178 examines the death of Philip from a polygamous perspective and points out the difficulties with providing a credible reason for any to commit the murder – all had motive but all had much to lose. In addition: *Lane Fox* 1973, 17-25 and 503-505 who builds on Diodorus; *contra Hatzopoulos* 2005, 43-65 who doubts Diodorus as a source.

\textsuperscript{29} D.S. 17.2.3 explicitly refers to Attalus as a rival for the throne. *Heckel* 1991, 5 rightly notes that he had no obvious legal claim to be king and it seems likely that Diodorus’ meaning here is his implied rule through his niece. The remarriage of Cleopatra would have been perfectly acceptable, fitting the model of levirate marriage followed by Macedonian successor states and already in operation as early as 478 in Sicily where Polyzalus married his brother’s wife Demarete in a bid to further his claims for the rule of Syracuse. For levirate marriage generally, see *Ogden* 1999, xix-xxv.

\textsuperscript{30} That Amyntas was not behind Philip’s murder has been argued convincingly by *Carney* 2015, 177 who notes that Amyntas had little to gain and a lot to lose by committing such a crime. Nonetheless, a group must have supported him.

\textsuperscript{31} Just. 9.4.3 informs us that Antipater had accompanied Alexander to Athens after Chaeronea. Additionally, Isocrates (*Ep*. 4) and Plutarch (*Alex*. 9.1) both inform us that Antipater had been regent in Macedonia during Philip’s absences. That Antipater and Alexander had a form of *philia* is thus highly likely.


\textsuperscript{33} *Worthington* 2003 offers the best overview of Amyntas’ role.
fresh assessment through the model of *philia*-networks. Lyncestian Alexander had married the daughter of Antipater which, if pre-dating the events of 366, demonstrates that both men already had a strong political relationship. The horizontal exchange here is also clear to see, with Alexander, son of Aëropus, married into a distinguished family with influence at the centre of Philip’s court. In return Antipater widened his *philia*-network to encompass a man with influence in the less-securely controlled regions to the north. Such a marriage was all the more pertinent if it is also accepted that Parmenio had friends in the regions of Upper Macedonia and, therefore, Antipater was seeking to redress the political imbalance in that region. In any case, what had begun as a relatively typical political marriage in Philip’s lifetime became a vital relationship after his death. Antipater needed to ensure his own position was stable and supporting Alexander appears to have been his preferred choice. Lyncestian Alexander, whose brothers had chosen to back another, was forced to break one of the two competing bonds of *philia*. That he chose to side with Antipater can be explained, once again, in terms of a horizontal exchange of services: Alexander, son of Aëropus, declares for Alexander, son of Philip and splits the Lyncestian support for Amyntas. In return Antipater ensures that Alexander III appropriately rewards his namesake, who was in a stroke uncontested as the leading Lyncestian at court.

Whatever support remained for Amyntas quickly crumbled and Justin (12.6.14; cf. Arr. An. 1.5.4) informs us that Alexander was able to dispose of his challenger permanently in 335. However, is turn of events was not as assured as it now appears. Even with support amongst Upper Macedonia split Amyntas remained a perfectly viable candidate for the throne and his claim should have been strengthened further when Cleopatra, daughter of Attalus, was murdered by Alexander’s *philoi*, severing Attalus’ connection with the royal household and effectively ending his *philia* with Parmenio. Parmenio now had to choose a new side. That he entertained the notion of supporting Amyntas comes from a comment put into the mouth of Alexander by Curtius (6.9.16) where it is stated that Philotas had supported Amyntas against Alexander. The only way to reconcile this comment with the *philia*-networks that had developed at this time is to assume that after Cleopatra was killed, Philotas had been in discussion with Amyntas about supporting his claim. The reason why the support for Amyntas crumbled quickly after this point can be placed at a decision by Parmenio to instead lend his support to Alexander, concluding, for various reasons but likely due to a lack of military support for Amyntas, that Alexander was the better option for his own future. Parmenio’s later assassination of Attalus was surely a bid to provide a service to Alexander in exchange for his own exoneration in Attalus’ plotting and a continuation of his status as the leading commander in Macedonia. To some extent this was also an inevitable outcome, Parmenio was at that time at the head of a large

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34 The marriage of Alexander and Antipater’s daughter is attested in Curt 7.1.7; Justin 11.7.1; 12.14.1.  
35 This is easy to understand if it is accepted that Antipater served in the capacity of a mentor while Alexander was left as regent of Macedonia during Philip’s campaigns.  
36 Carney 2015, 130 is quite right to state that Alexander of Lyncestis was too important to be killed. His pardon was not a gift, but merely part of the exchange of services between the two Alexanders. The killing of the rest of Aëropus’ sons was adequate public action for the death of or the support of a rival claimant to the throne.  
37 Just. 9.7.8-9 claims that the murder was committed by Olympias. While she was surely capable of such action, Justin’s narrative of the episode is part of a wider attempt to portray Olympias as the murderer of Philip and should not be taken at face value. It was politically expedient to murder Cleopatra and any among Alexander’s adherents could have done so; Alexander certainly did not intervene.
advanced force with very little to tie it to the new king, it was mutually beneficial for Parmenio to retain his prominence.

The power of philia-networks was not broken, but rather strengthened in the events which followed Philip’s death and continued to retain its importance in the years leading up to the invasion of Asia Minor in 334. When Alexander marched against the Triballians he did so with Philotas in command of his cavalry (Arr. An. 1.2.5). Even with Alexander’s great displays of martial prowess both in the north and south in Greece, the makeup of Alexander’s forces travelling into Asia Minor in 334 were tribute to his continued embroilment in the philia-networks that had secured his succession. The philoi of Antipater had been greatly rewarded in the composition of the command structure (Appendix B): Lyncestian Alexander was a hipparch, and moreover in command of the formidable and important Thessalian cavalry; Antigonus commanded some 7,000 Greek mercenaries and Balagros remained a somatophylax, the most intimate of positions. Antipater himself was to stay behind, but in the unprecedented role of Strategos Autocrator which appears to have allowed great freedom of action38. Likewise, the high-status roles given to the philoi of Parmenio (Appendix A) also demonstrated the dominance of these political groupings at court: Amyntas, son of Andromenes was a taxiarch; Calas, son of Harpalus was a hippoc; Cleander clearly held a military posting, but its nature in 334 is unclear; Hegelochus commanded the hippede prodromoi; Nicanor commanded in the hypaspists; Philotas was hippoc of the Companions; Polyperchon was a taxiarach and Parmenio himself was Alexander’s senior commander. The positions held by each of these men were more prominent than the roles assumed by men who could be called members of Alexander’s own philia-network with the exceptions of Cleitus, son of Dropides, and Craterus (see Appendix C).

In addition to holding prestigious commands, the philoi of Antipater and Parmenio clearly had a great deal of access to the king which, as outlined previously, was itself a marker of distinction and the aim of court politics in the first place. Particularly well placed amongst Antipater’s philoi were Balagros and Lyncestian Alexander, whom Arrian (An. 1.25.1) makes it clear enjoyed personal access to the king. In the case of Parmenio’s grouping, personal access was the privilege of Parmenio himself, of Philotas whose physical closeness to the king is encapsulated by Curtius’ (6.9.26-7) statement at the moment of Philotas’ downfall that the troops were shocked to see a man usually by the kings side in a feast now on trial before them, and of Demetrius, a somatophylax about whom little is known39.

PHILIA POLITICS IN THE PERSIAN CAMPAIGN

Alexander’s attempts to break his political encirclement will form the basis of the rest of this paper. That Alexander was politically astute has not always been taken for granted and his attempts to play at politics in the court of Philip II, most notably through his attempts to sabotage the marriage of his half-brother to the daughter of Pixodarus

38 Antipater’s dealing with the Spartan revolt of 331 displayed the widespread nature of his authority and is attested by Arr. An. 1.11.3 and D.S. 17.62-3.
39 HECKEL 2006, 108 correctly resists conflating this Demetrius the brother of Antigonus Monophthalmus. If the two men were indeed kin it is odd that Antigonus’ career suffers no detriment post-Philotas’ murder. The only references to this Demetrius come when he is removed from office and Arrian’s suspicion (An. 3.27.3) that he was executed for his association with Philotas appears to hold cf. Curt. 6.7.15.
of Caria, have often been held as evidence that Alexander was naive in the political arena. Nonetheless, Alexander had grown up at the court of the most powerful man of his generation and had personally experienced the benefits of being in the king’s presence and the detriments of exile. It is foolish to assume that Alexander did not gain some nous from his experiences, even if he had made mistakes in earlier life. Furthermore, the exile of Erygius, Harpalus, Nearchus and Ptolemy for their parts in the Pixadarus affair demonstrates that Alexander had his own philoi and was himself playing at philia politics. As could be expected when your philos is the king, each of these men was hastily recalled when Philip died and would go on to prominence (see Appendix C and discussion below).

Alexander had also shown that he was far from naïve in what it meant to be a king. Although he certainly remained constricted in his scope for political action by the philia-networks that surrounded him, Alexander had already begun to show his awareness of self-representation as a crucial facet of his rule. The one moment of Alexander’s accession which was conclusively of his own making had been his speech to the assembled troops pledging his loyalty to them, to his father’s mode of rule and abolishing taxes for them. Furthermore, after his crushing of the Theban-led rebellion to his rule in Greece, Alexander had utilised the festival at Diom to put on a demonstration of his power. Diodorus (17.17.3-4) gives an account of the events which make the festival sound distinctly similar to that of a Hellenistic king, nonetheless there is no reason suggest that Diodorus is incorrect about the events, especially given Philip’s increasingly lavish self-representation prior to his death. Additionally, as Spawforth has noted, Alexander made use of similar displays at Ephesus, Soli and Memphis later in his rule to display his power. Alexander understood kingship well, he merely had to reshape the politics of his court in order to pursue it as he wished.

This process of reclaiming the power at court began immediately for Alexander, although almost certainly unintentionally, with the removal of Antipater from Alexander’s presence through Antipater’s own advancement to Strategos Autocrator. Nonetheless, what had happened to Antipater was to happen to, although with far less prestige, his philoi serving Alexander in 334. It was not a coincidence that many of the earliest Achaemenid satrapies captured by Alexander were given to philoi of Antipater. Arrian (An. 1.29.3) informs us that Phrygia was given to Antigonus, Lydia to Asander (An. 1.17.7) and Cilicia to Balagros in 333/2 (An. 2.12). Playing upon the vertical axis of exchange and the desire amongst the elite to gain prestige, Alexander systematically promoted Antipater’s philoi to the command of satrapies. The exchange was prestige in return for loyalty, with the bonus of separation from court of those Alexander did not want in his inner circle and men desperate to prove their worth placed into strategic positions. Ultimately, the reward of a satrapy placed the office-holder into a debt they were unlikely to repay without exceptional conduct and the efficacy of this

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40 Eg. Ruzicka 2010, 9-10.
41 D.S. 17.2.2-3. Only Alexander could have made the speech, therefore, his agency is clear at this time.
42 P. Oxy 15. 1798 cf. Spawforth 2007, 90; contra Frericksmeier 2000, 191. Other instances include Philip’s statue: D.S. 15.92.5, and more generally his hospitality at Aeschin. 2.41-2; 47; 51-2.
43 Spawforth 2007, 92-3.
44 The unprecedented power of the position suggests Antipater was not being removed from influence, rather this was a genuine reward for services rendered and, even if Alexander felt constrained by Antipater’s presence and that of his philoi, Alexander must have trusted Antipater’s ability to carry out the role.
45 Heckel 2003, 210 has made passing reference to the use of promotion for political reasons with regards to Antipater’s philoi.
arrangement was shown by the success of Antigonus’ wars in the Taurus Mountains\footnote{Curt. 3.1.22, cf. Curt. 4.5.13 for Balagros’ role.}. Alexander’s later willingness to punish ineffective or openly abusive satraps, if already the case, certainly would have encouraged such behaviour\footnote{Alexander was not beyond punishing his satraps for misconduct eg. Arr. An. 6.27.4.}

Alexander’s desire to remove those he did not fully trust from positions of privilege is also evidenced in the changing composition of the *somatophylakes*. To be a *somatophylax* was to have access and, better still, public acknowledgement of your elevated status. It is then less a surprise than an inevitability that almost all of Alexander’s closest *philoi*, his *hetairoi*, were appointed (see also Appendix C). By 329, the *somatophylakes* were: Aristonus, Hephaestion, Leonnatus, Lysimachus, Peithon, Perdicas and Ptolemy. Alexander’s bodyguard had become a reflection of who he trusted and had given official status to go with the informal influence that many of these men must already have held; membership of the *somatophylakes* served as a mark of the king favour and trust. The changes to the *somatophylakes* provide a stark contrast to the movements of Antipater’s *philoi*.

Of course, there are always exceptions and the exception amongst the philoi of Antipater was Alexander, son of Aëropus. Nonetheless, when viewed through the prism of *philia*-networks Alexander’s grizzly demise must be understood as a product of the rivalries between the *philia*-networks of Alexander’s court. Alexander owed, at least in part, his position as king to the acceptance of his Lyncestian namesake and Alexander had rewarded him with command of the Thessalian Cavalry and a prominent position at court. Nonetheless, there remains two important features regarding Alexander, son of Aëropus, and his relationship with Alexander, the king. The first, is that Lyncestian Alexander cannot have been above suspicion for his role in the bid of Amyntas for the throne in 336/5. He may have been able to rehabilitate his standing with the king, but he the actions of his brothers and his potential to have been involved was a mark he would have to carry forward. Secondly, Lyncestian Alexander’s most prominent political ally was Antipater, who was not only increasingly at odds with Alexander, but was also geographically distant\footnote{The importance of geographical distance in this affair has been noted by CARNEY 2015, 131f. Carney also makes note of the potential involvement of Olympias and Parmenio, both of whom had motives to see Lyncestian Alexander removed. BADIAN 2000 [2012], 434 blames Alexander himself and calls it a false conspiracy.}. In the game of court politics, Lyncestian Alexander was an easy target.

The declining position of Lyncestian Alexander was exacerbated and made considerably worse by the choices Alexander (the king) had made to fill the void left by the removal of Antipater’s other *philoi*. Alexander’s own close adherents, men such as Hephaestion, were attaining prominence at this time and beginning to receive official positions. The decision to allow Hephaestion to choose the king of the Sidonians in the winter of 333/2 and his appointment as a *somatophylax* are both evidence of his increasingly public political role at the time\footnote{Hephaestion’s role in the appointment of the king is recorded in Curt. 4.1.15-26; Plu. Mor. 340c-d and D.S. 17.46.6. His first official position was to ferry goods between Tyre and Gaza as attested by Curt. 4.5.10.}. In tandem with the rise of Alexander’s own *philoi* was the continuing power of Parmenio. Alexander had split his forces in the early stages of the campaign, with himself leading half and Parmenio trusted to lead the other half. Such responsibility was not awarded lightly and, whilst the two were to grow estranged later, what the two men had to offer each at this stage far outweighed any
enmity. In this case the horizontal axis of exchange can be witnessed in operation, with a service bound relationship flourishing.

This leads to the supposed plot itself. Arrian states (An. 1.25.3; cf. Curt. 3.7.12, who names Nabazanes in place of Darius) Lyncestian Alexander had been in negotiation with Darius III about assassinating King Alexander. The messenger who was bringing the terms of the agreement to Lyncestian Alexander, Sisines, was caught and interrogated by Parmenio, who established Lyncestian Alexander’s guilt. Next, Alexander, having arrested his namesake, called a council (An. 1.25.5) at which it was decided that Lyncestian Alexander was not only untrustworthy, but that he was too popular with the Thessalians whom he commanded to be left in control.

Ernst Badian has claimed that this entire plot was invented by Alexander to remove his namesake for political reasons; he was not trusted, and he was in Alexander’s way. In contrast, Waldemar Heckel has argued that the plot must in fact have been real. Heckel makes the case that the year in which the plot occurred, 333 (following the dating from Arr. An 1.25.1-10), was the year in which Alexander appears to have been at his most dependent on the philoi of Antipater; this was the year of Antigonus’ and Balagros’ campaigns in the Taurus Mountains and the year in which Agis III of Sparta began his open revolt against Macedonian hegemony in Greece. However, this explanation is incomplete and does not give credence enough to the role of gift-exchange in reshaping philia-networks continually. That Alexander had a dependence on men such as Antigonus at that moment is indisputable, however, to call these men philoi of Antipater at that same moment is to miss the subtleties of philia-networking. The bond between Antipater and his philoi had not been broken, however, these same men now had a debt to repay for Alexander, who had given them their newly acquired status. Furthermore, men such as Antigonus may have been philoi of Antipater, but that did not require them to have the same relationship with each other. Philia politics was not so neat: what did Antigonus care of the fate of Alexander, son of Aëropus? Those among Antipater’s philoi who had been rewarded with satrapies were expected to carry out their roles as functionaries of the king and it was in their interests to do so. The next key moment is recorded by Arrian (1.25.5), who states that Alexander consulted a council before coming to his decision. Arrian gives us no hint of who was included in this meeting; however, Hephaestion was almost certainly present in his new capacity as a somatophylax and it seems likely that Craterus, another ambitious philos of the king was present, as it was his brother who took the verbal message to arrest Lyncestian Alexander to the guard (An. 1.25.9-10). In addition, Parmenio had sent Sisines to Alexander for questioning (1.25.4) and, it seems likely, that Philotas would have played some role if he were not with his father at this time, although this cannot be proven.

Charting the philiai of those involved suggests that Lyncestian Alexander was probably the victim of the dynamics of a violent court in which he had few philoi. The entire affair appears to have occurred very swiftly, Arrian makes no comment of Lyncestian Alexander being given the opportunity to defend himself, and Curtius’ account (7.1.6-10) suggests that he was only given the opportunity some three years

50 Badian 2000 [2012], 56-60.
51 Heckel 2003 [2012], 213 n.68. However, the individual Alexander most relied upon, Antigonus, had no reason not to serve Alexander well in this year regardless of any personal convictions. Alexander had given him his position and if Alexander’s campaign was to prove unsuccessful, Antigonus would certainly have lost his satrapy, and the wealth and status it came with, to the advancing army of Darius. Additionally, Alexander remained sufficiently close and sufficiently powerful to extract revenge.
52 Heckel 2003, 213 n. 68. For Antigonus’ war in Cilicia see: Curt. 4.1.35. For Balagros: Curt. 4.5.13-4. For Agis III: D.S. 17.48.1; 62.8-63.4; Arr. An. 1.11.3.
later, prior to his long-delayed execution. Ultimately, the truth of the tale, as with the death of Philip, is less important than the role it played in the power dynamics between the competing philia-networks of Alexander’s court. Antipater’s philoi suffered from their patron’s absence and their lack of connections with other networks. The pattern of Alexander’s reign had been set firmly, the king would do what was necessary to break his political fetters.

Of course, Alexander’s engagement with philia-networks was not restricted to a systematic removal of Antipater’s philoi, but extended to philoi of Parmenio also. Understandably, much of the focus regarding the downfall of Parmenio has related to the “Philotas Affair” of 330, however, Parmenio’s philia-network was vast and the “Philotas Affair” must be contextualised as the culmination of a process which, as noted by Badian, had begun much earlier. The philia between Alexander and Parmenio had begun as one of utility. Parmenio had killed Attalus, both exonerating himself of conspiracy and removing Alexander’s remaining adversary in a demonstration of loyalty by Parmenio. Alexander, in turn, needed both Parmenio’s generalship and his political presence as a counter-weight to Antipater at a time when he simply could not promote his own philoi without overt nepotism and neglecting the man to whom he was indebted. Nonetheless, with each satrapy awarded to a philos of Antipater, Alexander’s political reliance on Parmenio was reduced and with each military victory, his own increasing status made Parmenio’s popularity amongst the men a hindrance rather than a help.

Several flashpoints between Alexander and Parmenio, as well as their respective philoi, demonstrated the growing tensions that would eventually break their philia. The earliest attested incident was at Granicus in 334, where Parmenio attempted to dissuade Alexander from launching his assault late in the day (Arr. An. 1.13.2-13; Plu. Alex. 16.3) and, although this confrontation was hardly a major incident, it remains a useful marker from which to chart the growing disconnect between a youthful and impetuous king and his conservatively minded general. The next episode occurred in Egypt, where Arrian (An. 3.26.1) states that Philotas was saved by his father from charges of treason. This episode, far more serious than the first, showed how the tension between Alexander and Parmenio was paralleled in the tensions between Alexander’s and Parmenio’s philoi, who were undoubtedly competing factions by this time. Philotas had probably always been unpopular. Certainly, the plot to oust him in Egypt appears to have been orchestrated by Craterus, who was in political ascendancy at that time. Nonetheless, the basis of Craterus’ accusations—the notion that Philotas had spoken ill of Alexander and his divine pretensions post-Siwa—were certainly in keeping with the conservative Macedonian outlook espoused by Philotas’ father, Parmenio, and thus the root of the tale is believable. Additionally, if Curtius’ Hegelochus conspiracy (Curt. 6.11.22-29) is indeed historical, Philotas’ views appear even more typical of the philoi

53 Badian 1960 [2012], 327. However, Badian’s argument, based on Arr. An. 3.11.10 that Parmenio was disgraced through inglorious roles on the battlefield is an oversimplification. Parmenio’s role in the infantry can just as easily be placed as a tactical necessity on account of Parmenio’s brilliance as a general coupled with Alexander’s own preference for cavalry command.

54 Popularity demonstrated when the troops revolted upon Parmenio’s death: D.S 17.80 cf. Curt. 7.2.35. Alexander’s desire to change the character of his rule was also important in the shaping his relationship with Parmenio. These matters have been discussed numerous: for the visit to the Zeus Ammon oracle at Siwa see Badian 1981 [2012], 27-71; Fredricksmeier 2003, 270-78; Lane Fox 1973, 200-18.

55 The notion of Alexander’s philoi seeing Parmenio’s faction, and Philotas in particular, as a block to their own advancement has already been well established: Hecksch 2003, 98-99.

56 See Plu. Alex. 59; Curt. 6.8.2.
of Parmenio and thus Craterus’ accusations even more believable. It is not difficult to understand why the continued presence of Philotas at the highest level of Alexander’s court frustrated his own philoi.

In addition to these two major incidents several other moments of tension are recorded in the sources: Parmenio’s desire to accept peace (Plu. Alex 29.7-9; Arr. An. 2.25.1; D.S. 17.54; Curt. 4.11.1-14 and Justin 11.12.1-10); Parmenio’s attempts to persuade Alexander to fight by night at Gaugamela (Arr. An. 3.10.1-2 cf. Curt. 4.13.4) and most famously Parmenio’s recall of Alexander at Gaugamela (Arr. An. 3.15.1-2) Despite the fact that all these incidents, as Heckel has noted, appear to fit within a tradition set against Parmenio, it is clear that he and Alexander were at a crossroads in their relationship by 33057.

The events of 330, in which Parmenio and Philotas both lost their lives, serve to demonstrate the lethal nature of philia politics and the depth of the rivalry between Alexander’s and Parmenio’s philoi. The first major moment was Alexander’s decision to leave Parmenio in Ecbatana before advancing east. Viewed as a gift-exchange, the position in Ecbatana served as a suitable reward for the services that Parmenio had rendered for Alexander in the campaign to that point58. Indeed, if the station were to be permanent, such a vital position could be represented as an adequate match for the role Antipater was performing in Europe, with Alexander due to continue east. Nonetheless, it cannot escape notice that the decision to leave Parmenio in Ecbatana at the point where the philia between himself and Alexander was at its most stretched appears very similar to Alexander’s use to satrapal appointments to separate himself from the philoi of Antipater in Asia Minor.

The removal of Parmenio from court was to be followed by the execution of Philotas on charges of treason, and by Parmenio’s own demise later that year. Both deaths were the result of changing balances of power among philia-networks in a highly charged and militarised environment, and both occurred with Alexander’s blessing. The philoi of Parmenio lost a great deal of security with the removal of their chief benefactor from court. Men such as Coenus, the sons of Andromenes and most importantly Philotas were outside of the direct favour of Alexander and clearly set against the rising political power of men such as Hephaestion, Leonnatus, Craterus and Ptolemy. The increasing status of Alexander’s own philoi had been never more apparent, with the appointment of Hephaestion (Arr. An. 1.22.4) and Leonnatus (3.5.5) as somatophylakes and Craterus’ command of a substantial body of infantry at Issus (2.8.4). Importantly, the appointment of Hephaestion and Leonnatus as somatophylakes must have had the important effect of controlling access to the king, at the very least ensuring their own access to the king, to the detriment of Parmenio’s philoi. Such a situation emboldened Alexander’s philoi and could only lead to infighting.

These were the politics that led to Philotas’ downfall. The “Philotas Affair”, as the incident is commonly known, must have been the result of a real conspiracy59. Nonetheless, the downfall of Philotas as a collaborator in the conspiracy was certainly the work of Alexander’s philoi. It is impossible, as with the murder of Philip, to come

57 Heckel 2006, 191 and n. 516 where it is noted that the tradition likely originates in the immediate aftermath of Alexander’s death with one of the first historians of events.

58 That Parmenio was never supposed to join the expedition again cannot be known for certain, however, Alexander had proceeded as far as Phrada, which was a considerable distance from Ecbatana, and this does not suggest that Alexander had any intention to waiting for his general to catch up. Additionally, the fact that Alexander and Parmenio’s relationship had soured does not mean Parmenio could not be trusted to play his part at Ecbatana; any suggestion Parmenio would commit treason is surely overblown.

to a clear conclusion of the actual events that occurred due to the contrary nature of the source material. Nonetheless, the evidence from the aftermath of the conspiracy reveals a conspiracy of its own, hatched by philoi of the king to remove a rival for their own benefit. Curtius (6.2.8) places the decision to execute Philotas into the mouth of Craterus, and whilst the tale itself cannot be corroborated Curtius’ version of events sits neatly with the philia politics of the moment. As noted above, the enmity between Craterus and Philotas was evident as early as Egypt and can only have grown since. Alongside this, the chief beneficiaries of the execution of Philotas were Hephaestion and Cleitus, son of Dropides, who attain joint leadership of the Companion Cavalry (Arr. An. 3.27.4), two of Alexander’s closest philoi and certainly not men who appear to have openly rivalled Craterus at this time.\footnote{Although later Hephaestion and Craterus were to come to blows, most famously being separated by Alexander himself.}

Alongside the trial of Philotas himself a number of other men were either prosecuted or put on trial by Alexander for their roles in the supposed conspiracy against him. Once again, the connections of the majority of those involved suggests that the prime motivator for these trials was court politics rather than the conspiracy of Dimnus. Arrian (An. 3.27.1-3) states that the sons of Andromenes—Amyntas, Attalus, Polemon and Simmias—were tried, but Amyntas, Attalus and Simmias were found to be innocent and Polemon, who had fled the scene, was acquitted upon his return. The decision to attempt prosecution of the sons of Andromenes was itself the result of philia-networking, with all those closely associated with Philotas, and by extension Parmenio, being bought to trial.\footnote{Arrian’s statement (An. 3.27.2) that the flight of Polemon added credence to the theory that a plot had taken place and, presumably also adding weight to the charges that the sons of Andromenes could have had supporters from as many as one-third of the Macedonian infantry is intriguing and probably reflects how the incident of Polemon’s flight must have appeared. However, it is just as likely that Polemon, much like Coenus (see below), could sense the way that the wind was blowing and took the opportunity to flee. If Polemon were guilty of the plot itself it seems unlikely he would have been acquitted, Alexander had been content to remove the brothers of Alexander, son of Aëropus, whilst leaving Alexander himself untouched to maintain the balance of power required at court in 336.}

In particular, the trial of Amyntas—who appears closest to Philotas—discredited any potential defence of Philotas through besmirching Amyntas’ name. Nonetheless, that the sons of Andromenes were bound to escape prosecution has been alluded to by Waldemar Heckel, who notes the link between Andromenes and Polyperchon, son of Simias, meant that the sons of Andromenes could have had supporters from as many as one-third of the Macedonian infantry.\footnote{See HECKEL 2006, 25.} Once again the intertangled webs caused by philia-networking can be seen at play. The sons of Andromenes may have been connected with Philotas on one side, but they also had support and loyalty amongst entirely different networks who were sufficiently important to ensure their survival. Alexander may have been content to sanction murder of Philotas as it gave him an excuse to be rid of Parmenio, but this would have been a dangerous moment to test further the loyalty of the army. Whilst the politics of philia had resulted in the death of Philotas and Parmenio, it had also saved the sons of Andromenes.

The political ramifications of the Dimnus Plot did not end here. Parmenio and Philotas both counted amongst their philoi the brothers Coenus and Cleander, with the former married to Parmenio’s daughter.\footnote{HECKEL 1991, 15; Curt. 6.8.17.} It is telling that neither brother spoke in defence of their philos and both appear to have benefited from his downfall. In Arrian’s (An. 4.17.3) narrative Coenus emerges next in the historical record as the commander of a detachment subjugating Sogdiana and continues to hold prominent positions within...
the army throughout the rest of his life, eventually dying on the return of India (Arr. An. 6.1.1, 2.1; cf. 5.29.5; Curt 9.3.20).64 Meanwhile, Arrian (An. 3.26.3) directly implicates Cleander in the murder of Parmenio, stating that he orchestrated events in Ecbatana. When Cleander next surfaces, it is to face charges of maladministration for which he faced execution (Arr. An. 6.27.4; Curt 10.1.1-7), having remained in Media when Alexander continued to India. The success of the sons of Polemocrates after a plot in which they were likely to have been implicated must be the result of an exchange of services between the brothers and Alexander, or the brothers and Alexander’s philoi; likely both. Cleander was, ironically, in a similar position to Parmenio in 336, turning his back on his philos in order to save his own life and position. In return for his part in the murder, he was exonerated for his previous association. Coenus’ position was even more tenuous in 330. He was physically at court and implicating him in the murder would have been the simple solution to be rid of him. Additionally, due to his kinship with Philotas his involvement would have been believable. In return for his life, he could be expected to remain loyal to the king and in return for that loyalty status would steadily follow. Alexander had repositioned the loyalty of the sons of Polemocrates, placing them into his ever increasing philia-network.

The extent to which the conviction of Philotas was also a turning point in the philia politics of Alexander’s court cannot be overstated. It comes as no surprise that the members of Alexander’s council –Coenus, Craterus, Erigyius, Hephaestion and Leonnatus– almost all attained great success in the years that followed (See Appendix C). For example, Hephaestion was not only a somatophylax but had become a hipparch of the Companion Cavalry after the execution of Philotas (Arr. An. 2.27.4). Prior to this, Hephaestion’s only military role is given to us by Curtius (4.5.10) who states that Hephaestion had been given command of the supply fleet sending siege equipment from Tyre to Gaza. Nonetheless, even this early command demonstrates philia politics in action. At the time, Alexander’s chief naval officer appears to have been Hegelochus, a philos of Parmenio. Nonetheless, the substantial gap between Hephaestion’s command in the Mediterranean and his command of the Companions is testament to the hold on offices Parmenio’s philoi held. Later, Hephaestion would become chiliarch (Arr. An. 7.14.10) and the most powerful of Alexander’s philoi completing the process of surrounding himself with men he trusted.

Much like Hephaestion, Craterus owed his great position in Macedonian society to Alexander. A commander of the pezhetairoi at Granicus in 334, by 332 Craterus had an independent command—overseeing the siege of Tyre in the absence of Alexander.65 Additionally, both Arrian (An. 3.18.4-8) and Curtius (5.4.14-34) place Craterus as the commander who led an entire portion (the greater portion) of the army whilst Alexander outflanked Ariobarzanes at the Persian Gates. This was a command which could quite conceivably have been given to Parmenio and as such the decision to give it to Craterus was political as much as it was military; the decision to promote Craterus to the role and leave Parmenio in Ecbatana was not the same as leaving Craterus in command of the siege of Tyre. Alexander had not begun the project and left to settle other affairs, taking Parmenio with him in the process and thus denying him command through having need of him elsewhere. In this instance, Alexander was sending a clear statement about the future roles of the two men in his forces: Parmenio’s time on the battlefield

64 Of course, the death of Coenus has been viewed with suspicion on account of its convenient timing, once again demonstrating that the political networks in Alexander’s court were extremely fluid. See BADIAN 1961 [2012], 22-3 who casts doubts on the death not only of Coenus, but also of Cleander.  
65 Curt. 4.3.1.
was over and Craterus’ time to lead had arrived. It was time for one of Alexander’s own philoi to occupy the role. The reciprocal exchange between Alexander and Craterus is also clear: Alexander had given Craterus everything, loyalty was what he expected in return. Craterus’ desire to demonstrate this loyalty may also have played a part in his longing to see Philotas, whom he had suspected since Egypt, to be removed from the king’s presence. There is nothing to suggest that his own hatred of Philotas and his sense of duty to Alexander were mutually exclusive, both could have been motivators.

Alexander may have promoted the interests of his philoi more vigorously than was necessary of a king, perhaps due to the insecurity that the early parts of his life and reign had imbedded in him, but Alexander always acted with a high degree of political acumen in the period until 328. For example, Hephaestion was promoted to command the Companions, but Cleitus was promoted alongside him and presumably carried out the role in practice. In the shadow of Alexander’s calculated treatment of others, the peculiar career of Harpalus, son of Machatas, becomes even more curious. Harpalus had been a philos of Alexander since youth and had evidently supported his philos in his bid to claim the daughter of Pixodarus in marriage in 336 (Arr. An. 3.6.5; Plu. Alex. 10.4). Harpalus’ support for Alexander at this early stage in his life was not forgotten, with Harpalus returning to accompany Alexander into Asia before fleeing prior to the Battle of Issus with a large bulk of money. Harpalus then returned to Alexander, apparently forgiven, and was instated as treasurer to the king at Ecbatana. Harpalus must also have played a role in carrying out the murder of Parmenio, once again lending his support to Alexander in a difficult moment. Events after this are not of concern here, but the fact that Harpalus’ behaviour in his second stint as treasurer was even worse can surely not have surprised Alexander. Yet, Alexander was willing to continue to promote Harpalus’ interests even when it was clearly to the detriment of his own rule.

Harpalus, and his deviant behaviour, is testament to the weakness of philia-networks as a method of conducting court politics. As Aristotle (eg. 1161a33-34) makes clear, bonds of philia were nearly always fluid, especially if they were philiai of utility. It appears that the bond between Alexander and Harpalus ran much deeper, although the sources do not reveal any details to substantiate the claim beyond the fact that Harpalus was involved in the ‘P狄odarus affair’ and Alexander forgave him for fleeing prior to Issus. Nonetheless, this is the only explanation that accounts for Alexander’s actions. Harpalus was the exception that proved the rule when it came to Alexander’s careful utilisation of philia-networks, and simultaneously a portent of what was to come later in Alexander’s reign as the king’s struggles with his own ambitious philoi grew.

By the time Alexander defeated Satibarzanes in early 329 the makeup of his military command and court was radically different to the one which had set out in 334. In 334

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66 328 saw the murder of Cleitus, perhaps the first sign of Alexander losing firm control over his own philoi. The politics of the period from 328-323 were marked by power-struggles between Craterus and Hephaestion, attempts to reorganise the empire, revolts and attempts by Alexander to fuse the Argead and Achaemenid models of rule. On the murder of Cleitus see TRITLE 2000, 56-61; Badian 2000 [2012], 69-71.
67 See Arr. An. 3.27.4.
68 Arr. An. 3.6.4-7.
69 A detailed analysis of Harpalus’ role in Alexander’s court is given by Badian 1961 [2012], 23-4.
70 Events later than the immediate fallout of the Dinmus plot are outside of the scope of this article. Alexander’s control of his philoi was to eventually disintegrate, perhaps due to his failure to balance them against each other and his desire to support those who supported his more Achaemenid presentation. This was to lead to a confrontation between Hephaestion and Craterus in India where the king himself had to intervene: cf. Plu. Alex. 47.11-12.
Alexander was a king who had proven himself to be charismatic on the field of battle, but also a king who was indebted to key figures of his father’s reign who had chosen to support him. By the time the dust had settled on the plot of Dimnus Alexander’s court reflected the desires and prejudices of the king himself, who now firmly sat atop the political ladder. *Philia*-networks based upon reciprocal relationships were key to the political life of the Macedonian court in Alexander’s reign. The elite could only hope to exercise power through the king, which required proximity to his person. This could only be attained through advancement, especially in Alexander’s highly militarised court-on-the-move, and advancement only came from Alexander. Therefore, to advance was to have *philoi* in high places who could make a case for your own progress and in return a philos must do a favour. Alexander’s success at manipulating this social mechanism and placing his own *philoi* in power can be summarised through listing the names of the men still surviving when the king died who had also been present for either the ‘Pixodarus Affair’ or were on Alexander’s council in the trial of Philotas: Craterus, Leonnatus, Nearchus and Ptolemy; all four were to be major players in the aftermath of the king’s demise, a suitable exchange in return for their loyalty?
## Appendix A: Philoi of Parmenio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position(s) Spring 334, Initial Expeditionary Force</th>
<th>Position(s) 331, Prior to Gaugamela</th>
<th>Position(s) 329, End of Summer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parmenio</td>
<td>Conducted operations in Asia Minor (e.g. Siege of Pitane; D.S. 17.17.9). Commander of the Infantry (Arr. An. 1.11.6; D.S. 17.17.3).</td>
<td>Commanded the left wing at Granicus (Arr. An. 1.14.1). Again, at Issus (Arr. An. 2.8.9-10; Curt. 3.9.8-10) and at Gaugamela (Arr. An. 3.11.10)</td>
<td>Placed in charge of Media and then murdered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amyntas, son of Andromenes</td>
<td>Taxiarch (Arr. An. 1.8.2.).</td>
<td>Sent for reinforcements in Macedonia (D.S. 17.49.1; Curt. 7.1.15; 37-8).</td>
<td>Killed in action (Arr. An. 3.27.3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attalus (Patronymic unknown)</td>
<td>Killed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attalus, son of Andromenes</td>
<td>somatophylax? (D.S. 16.94.4).</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown (would later serve as taxiarch).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleander, son of Polemocrates</td>
<td>Assumed to have a military role.</td>
<td>Recruiting mission (Arr. An. 1.24.2; Curt. 3.1.1.).</td>
<td>Unknown (later executed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coenus, son of Polemocrates</td>
<td>Commander as early as 335 (Arr. An. 1.6.9).</td>
<td>Sent on a recruiting mission (Arr. An. 1.24.1-2).</td>
<td>One of the commanders at the Persian Gates (Arr. An. 3.18.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hector, son of Parmenio</td>
<td>No office.</td>
<td>Drowned in the Nile (Curt. 4.8.7-8; 6.9.27).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegelocho, son of Hippostratus</td>
<td>Commanded in the hippeis prodromoi (Arr. An. 1.12.7).</td>
<td>Joint commander of the fleet (Arr. An. 3.2.6). Died at Gaugamela (Arr. An. 3.11.8).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicanor, son of Parmenio</td>
<td>Commanded the hypaspists in the Getic war (Arr. An. 1.4.2).</td>
<td>No change. (continued role attested in Arr. An. 1.14.2; 2.8.3; 3.11.9; cf. Curt. 3.9.7; 4.13.27).</td>
<td>Died of illness (Arr. An. 3.25.4; Curt. 6.6.18).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Fate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phirotas, son of Parmenio</td>
<td>Cavalry Command in the Triballian campaign</td>
<td>Commanded the Companions at Gaugamela</td>
<td>Executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commander of the Companion Cavalry</td>
<td>(Arr. An. 1.2.5; Curt. 6.9.21; D.S. 17.17.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polemon, son of Andromenes</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Member of the Paides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Basilikoi (Curt. 7.2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyperchon, son of Simmiias</td>
<td>Unknown.</td>
<td>Taxiarch (D.S. 17.57.2)</td>
<td>No change attested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simmias, son of Andromenes</td>
<td>Unknown.</td>
<td>Likely commanded Amyntas’ troops at Gaugamela</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Arr. An. 3.11.9; D.S. 17.57.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**APPENDIX B: PHILOI OF ANTIPATER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION(S) SPRING 334, INITIAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE</th>
<th>POSITION(S) 331 PRIOR TO GUAGAMELA</th>
<th>POSITION(S) 329, END OF SUMMER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANTIPATER, SON OF IOLAS</strong></td>
<td>Strategos in Europe (Arr. An. 1.11.3; Curt 4.1.39; Justin. 11.7.1; D.S. 18.12.1).</td>
<td>No change.</td>
<td>No change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALEXANDER, SON OF AEROPUS</strong></td>
<td>Hipparch, Thessalian Cavalry (Arr. An. 1.25.2).</td>
<td>Imprisoned (Arr. An. 1.25.3-10; Diod. 17.32).</td>
<td>Executed. (Curt. 7.1.5-9; D.S. 17.80.2; Just. 12.14.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMYNTAS, SON OF ARRHEBAEUS</strong></td>
<td>Commanded a scouting party of from the hippéis prodromoi (Arr. An. 1.12.7).</td>
<td>Command the left-wing at Sagalassus (Arr. An. 1.28.4)</td>
<td>Unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANTIGONUS MONOPHTHALMUS, SON OF PHILIP</strong></td>
<td>Commanded 7,000 Greek mercenaries (D.S. 17.17.3).</td>
<td>Satrap of Phrygia. (Arr. An. 1.29.3; Curt. 4.1.35 states Lydia).</td>
<td>No Change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BALAGROS (BALACRUS) SON OF NICANOR</strong></td>
<td>somatophylax</td>
<td>Satrap of Cilicia (Arr. An. 2.12.2; D.S. 18.22.1).</td>
<td>Either no change or perished in Lycaonia (Curt. 4.5.13).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CASSANDER, SON OF ANTIPATER</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IOLUS, SON OF ANTIPATER</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Paides Basilikoi (Justin. 12.14.6-9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHILIP, SON OF ANTIPATER</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Paides Basilikoi (Justin. 12.14.6-9).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX C: PHILOI OF ALEXANDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME.</th>
<th>POSITION(S) SPRING 334, INITIAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE</th>
<th>POSITION(S) 331, PRIOR TO GAUGAMELA</th>
<th>POSITION(S) 329, END OF SUMMER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CRATERUS, SON OF ALEXANDER</strong></td>
<td>Commander of the <em>pezhetairoi</em> (Arr. An. 1.14).</td>
<td>Commander of infantry at Issus (Arr. An. 2.8.4).</td>
<td>Held a string of independent commands (e.g. Oversaw a siege: Arr. An. 4.2.2; Curt. 7.6.16).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEMETRIUS, SON OF ALTHAEMENES</strong></td>
<td>Ilarch?</td>
<td>Ilarch (Arr. An. 3.11.8).</td>
<td>Unknown, next seen as a hipparch in 327 (Arr. An. 4.27.5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ERIGYIUS, SON OF LARICUS</strong></td>
<td>Possibly commanded a cavalry force (D.S. 17.17.4).</td>
<td>Commander of the Thessalian Cavalry and then Peloponnesian allies (Arr. An. 3.11.10; Curt. 4.13.29; D.S. 17.57.4).</td>
<td>Command against Satibarzanes (Arr. An. 3.28.2-3; Curt. 7.4.32-4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HARPALUS, SON OF MACHATAS</strong></td>
<td>Treasurer (Arr. An. 3.6.4-7).</td>
<td>Absconded and returned (Arr. An. 3.6.4).</td>
<td>Left in Ecbatana with Parmenio, exact role undefined (Arr. An. 3.19.7; cf. Curt. 10.1.1f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEPHAESTION, SON OF AMYNTOR</strong></td>
<td>No formal role attested.</td>
<td>Asked to choose a king for the Sidonians (Curt. 4.1.15-26; Plu. Mor. 340c-d; D.S. 17.46.6). Oversaw logistics of the siege of Gaza (Curt. 4.5.10). <em>somatophylax</em> (Arr. An. 1.22.4,7 informs us of the death of Ptolemy, a <em>somatophylax</em>, and provides a likely date.)</td>
<td>Commander of the Companion Cavalry (Arr. An. 3.27.4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LEONNATUS, SON OF ANTEAS</strong></td>
<td><em>somatophylax</em> to Philip II (D.S. 16.94.4).</td>
<td>Appointed a <em>somatophylax</em> to Alexander (Arr. An. 3.5.5).</td>
<td>No commands, prominent later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NEARCHUS, SON OF ANDROTIMUS</strong></td>
<td>No Role.</td>
<td>Satrap of Lycia and Pamphylia (Arr. An. 3.6.6; Just. 13.4.15).</td>
<td>No change, prominent later.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PERDICCAS, SON OF ORONTES  
Commanded a taxis in the European conflicts (Arr. 1.6.9, 1.8.1-3; D.S. 17.12.3).

Commanded a taxis at both Issus and Gaugamela (Arr. An. 2.8.3; 3.11.9; Curt. 3.9.7; 4.13.28). somatophylax (Arr. An. 3.16.9; cf. Curt. 6.8.16).

No change, hipparch shortly after.

PEUCESTAS, SON OF ALEXANDER  
Prominence out of period.

PTOLEMY, SON OF LAGUS  
Unknown.  
Unknown.  
First command (Arr. An. 3.18.9).

Appointed somatophylax (Arr. An. 3.27.5).

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