An Ill-defined Rule: Cassander’s Consolidation of Power

by Evan Pitt
University of Tasmania
evan.pitt@utas.edu.au

ABSTRACT Cassander’s implementation of power during the early stages of his rule of Macedonia was wide ranging and multifaceted. He employed numerous different strategies to gain support from a variety of influential groups within the Macedonian homeland and adjacent areas to secure his position. Much of the discussion surrounding Cassander’s actions to accomplish control over Macedonia has focussed on his desire to become the next king in Macedonia as demonstrated by overt public actions, a feat he achieved after the Peace of 311. However, when one considers the coinage issued by Cassander prior to 311, this single-minded monarchic aim appears less evident, calling into question the strength of this understanding of his actions.

KEYWORDS Cassander, Antipatrid, Hellenistic monarchy, coins, Diadochi, governor.

The winter of 317/316 BCE was a watershed moment for the Macedonian Empire and for the political landscape of the Macedonian homeland. Cassander, son of the former regent Antipater, had launched a successful invasion of Macedonia, ousting the incumbent regent, Polperchon from power. From this point Cassander would embark on an ambitious plan to control the region. Over the following years he put in place a wide ranging and multifaceted strategy that drew upon many and varied avenues of support to cement his position. This period of time would see Cassander marry into the Argead family, initiate a significant building program in northern and southern Greece, remove the young Alexander IV from court, and bury the royal couple, Philip III Arrhidaeus and Adea-Eurydice at the traditional Argead burial ground at Aegae. For good reason, this series of events has drawn the attention of both ancient and modern writers, who have focused primarily on the monarchical aspects of Cassander’s actions, interpreting them as the first steps in his eventual ascension to the Macedonian throne and resulting in the foundation of the short-lived Antipatrid dynasty. While it is true that there are overt monarchic overtones to many of Cassander’s actions, these can overshadow the precarious position he faced during the early stages of his control over Macedonia. In particular, the records of his actions have led to overly simplistic depictions of the political situation in Macedonia. An evaluation of both the accounts of Cassander’s consolidation of power in Macedonia and of his numismatic self-representation, which leads us to an interpretation of Cassander as less certainly intent on monarchy. This stands in contrast to the views found in the ancient literary sources and calls into question both the strength of Cassander’s position and the previous understandings of the inevitability of his cementing power. This discussion first considers Cassander’s actions during this period and then moves to exploration of the
ways in which he represented himself, with particular attention to the numismatic evidence from the early period of his control.

Our most detailed account of Cassander’s actions following his invasion of Macedonia in late-317/early-316 is found within the history of Diodorus Siculus. His account likely draws upon the work of Hieronymus of Cardia, allowing Diodorus strong authority to outline each of Cassander’s approaches to power following the defeat of Polyperchon. By cross-referencing Diodorus’ account with that of other available literary evidence, it is possible to separate Cassander’s approach to power into four distinct aspects: his marriage to Thessalonice, the foundation of Cassandrea on the site of Potidæa and the reconstruction of Thebes, the removal of Alexander IV from public life to Amphipolis, and the burial of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice at Aegae. Diodorus provides the greatest level of detail in discussion of Cassander’s actions, devoting nearly an entire section of his Book 19 to these events. This is the only source that records all four of these endeavours; the majority of other accounts recording Cassander’s actions exist in highly compressed states, or do not record all of his actions. Despite the seeming abundance of accounts, the detail that can be drawn from them is surprisingly limited.

What can be said is that Cassander’s implementation of power bears the hallmarks of a clinical and well-calculated strategy to effect control over Macedonia, each facet working in a different way to create and consolidate his powerbase. From these, a common thread that emerges is how each of these actions engages with those that have, working in a different way to create and consolidate each powerbase. From them is surprisingly limited.

1 D.S. 19.52.1-5.
3 For an overview of the continuing war between Cassander and Polyperchon, see Carney 2014.
4 D.S. 19.52.1; Just. 14.6.13; Paus. 9.7.3, (cf. 8.7.7); Porph. FGrH 260. F. 3.4; Syncellus Chron. 320.
5 D.S. 19.52.2-3; Heidel. Epit. FGrH 155. F. 2; Marmor Parium. FGrH 239. B. 14; Plu. Alex. 11.10
6 D.S. 19.52.4; Just. 14.6.13.
7 D.S. 19.52.5; cf. Dyll. FGrH. 73. F. 1.
8 Dyll. FGrH 73. F. 1; Heidel. Epit. FGrH 155. F. 2.3; Just. 14.6.13; Porph. FGrH. 260. F. 3.3-5; Syncellus. Chron. 320.
9 Fortina 1965, 40; Carney 1988, 388; 2000, 145; Landucci Gattinoni 2003, 79-80; Heckel 2006, 80, 265; Boy 2007, 142; Carney 2006, 108; Caroli 2007, 49; Palagia 2008, 207; Landucci Gattinoni 2009, 261-263; Meeus 2009a, 249; Wallace 2012-2013, 135. There is a possibility that Cassander may previously have been wed to another daughter of Philip II, Cynnane (Greenwalt 1988, 94; Carney 2000, 69-70; Heckel 2006, 64, 100-101; Palagia 2008, 196). For the possibility of Cassander’s previously Argead marriage, see Palagia, 2008.
10 The first city reported in this programme was one that would take on Cassander’s own name, Cassandreia and which was incorporated into the previous site of Potidæa in Chalcidice, towards Cassander’s eastern boarders with Lysimachus (D.S. 19.52.2-3; cf. Heidel. Epit. FGrH 155. F. 2; Marmor Parium. FGrH 239. B. 14; Str. 7. fr. 25; Livy. 44.11.2). The second half of Cassander’s building programme would be situated in Boeotia, far to the south of Macedonia, with the reconstruction of Thebes in 315 (D.S. 19.54.1). Until Cassander’s programme, the establishment of eponymous cities had been an Argead institution, pioneered by Philip II within the renaming of Thracian cities of Crenidas to Philippopolis in 356 (D.S. 16.3.7, 16.8.6, 16.86; Pliny. HN. 4.18 cf. App. B Civ. 4.105; IG 21 127) and Eumolpias to Philippi in 342 (Plin. HN. 4.18 cf. Ptol. Geog. 3.11, and possibly alluded to in D.S. 16.71.2 and Str. 7.6.2; Gardiner 1918, 425; Velkov 1979). Later, Alexander III would further expand upon his father’s actions with around fifteen Alexandrias founded throughout the expanding Macedonian Empire. The controversy surrounding the cities to which Alexander gave his name throughout his reign is outside the scope of this discussion, but for comments and discussion see: Tarn 1950, 233-249; Fraser 1996 esp. 191-201; esp. Hammond 1998, for an overview and critique of the ancient evidence.
from public life\textsuperscript{11}, and the burial of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice at Aegae\textsuperscript{12}, can each be tied to the actions of the Macedonian monarchy and, collectively, can be seen as explicit acts by Cassander to signal his royal succession.

The monarchic connotations have not been lost on the ancient writers. They interpreted these actions as a deliberate attempt by Cassander to seize the Macedonian throne following the invasion of winter 317/316. Diodorus’ history provides the most explicit statement of this view, stating that Cassander had already set his desire on the kingship\textsuperscript{13}. This sentiment is to be found in the works of both Porphyry and Syncellus\textsuperscript{14}, further emphasising Cassander’s monarchic intentions immediately after the invasion. This position has, for good reason, permeated through modern scholarship\textsuperscript{15}. Through the core actions described by Diodorus, it seems obvious that Cassander’s intention was to position himself as the next basileus\textsuperscript{16} of Macedonia.

Some uncertainty, however, still exists regarding how Cassander implemented his strategies to control the region as well as the inevitability of the eventual foundation of the Antipatrid dynasty. As previously mentioned, there are limitations to the understandings that can be drawn from the ancient accounts, and in particular, Diodorus’ record of Cassander’s actions. More specifically, we do not know in what order these events took place beyond Diodorus’ sequencing. For example, it is not known whether these actions ran consecutively or simultaneously and how long each aspect of Cassander’s strategy took to implement. There are, however, two rough time markers within which his actions can be placed: the period following the execution of Olympias in the spring of 316\textsuperscript{17}, and monarchic accusations against Cassander made by Antigonus at Tyre, along with the proclamation of freedom for the Greeks in the spring of 315\textsuperscript{18}, thereby providing a time frame for Cassander’s takeover of Macedonia.

One year allows time, for a multitude of conceivable events to have occurred, but reflection on at least some possible sequencing in worthwhile. Though there is no

\textsuperscript{11} D.S. 19.52.5; Just. 14.6.13. The removal of Alexander IV and his mother Roxane from the court and relocation to Amphipolis, deprived of royal treatment (тήν ἀγωγὴν οἰκεῖτι βασιλικήν), and in the custody of his officer Glauicas, would give Cassander complete control over the young Argead, minimising the effect that he, or his heritage, could have on Cassander’s hope to seize power in Macedonia. Such control over a young king is similar to the regency, so much as it can be defined given the brevity of accounts, to Philip II’s and Amyntas IV (Just. 7.5.9; cf. D.S. 16.2.3; It must be said that Diodorus makes no reference to Philip II’s regency. Instead, Diodorus records an immediate succession to the throne by Philip. For remarks on the inconsistency of Diodorus’ account with that of Justin and Athenaeus, see: HAMMOND – GRIFFITH 1979, 208-209; HECKEL 2006, 208 n. 44, 288. For further discussion on Diodorus’ tendency for early monarchic readings, see below.

\textsuperscript{12} Reflecting the royal burials of Philip II (D.S. 17.2.1; Just. 11.2.1; cf. ALONSO 2009, 277) and Alexander III (Curt. 10.8.18; ALONSO 2009, 282). See TARN 1927, 482; BOSWORTH 2002, 41; ALONSO 2009, 287-288; LANDUCCI GATTINONI 2017, 130.

\textsuperscript{13} D.S. 19.52.1: “…Κάσανδρος δέ, κατά νοῦν αὐτῷ τῶν πραγμάτων προχωρούντων, περιελάμβανε ταῖς ἐξής τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλείαις.”

\textsuperscript{14} Porph. FGrH, 260. F. 3.4; Syncellus. Chron. 320. For general points on the representation of the Antipatrids within the literary sources, see WALSH 2012.


\textsuperscript{16} For the most part and due to problems of strict definitions of Macedonian political offices as they appear in the literary records, I have avoided terminology such as strategos and basileus. This discussion focuses in any case on Cassander’s actions, rather than the legal extent of his office. For more on the difficulties of defining Macedonian offices that result from its treatment by the literary sources, see MEUES 2009b, 289 n. 9.

\textsuperscript{17} D.S. 19.51.1-2; Just. 14.6.6-9; PAS 9.7.2; BOY 2007, 142, 149.

\textsuperscript{18} D.S. 19.61.1-5; BOY 2007, 143, 149; LANDUCCI GATTINONI 2017, 272.
particular reason to doubt Diodorus’ order of Cassander’s approach to power as he records it, it seems reasonable to suggest that events did not occur as a neat linear progression, but that there may have been a level of overlap between them. As ready examples, it is not unreasonable to assume that Cassander married Thessalonice, removed Alexander IV to Amphipolis and buried Philip III and Adea-Eurydice at Aegae during the process of founding Cassandreia and reconstructing Thebes. As another possibility, it may have been that Alexander IV’s relocation to Amphipolis took place after the burial of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice. While there is limited value in investigating each possible permutation and the implications thereof, it is important to acknowledge that the sequencing supplied by Diodorus may not, in and of, itself correlate to Cassander’s implementation of power.19

Access into this shadowy period of time in Macedonia is difficult. The near uniform understanding of Cassander’s implementation of power during this time is limited to our literary evidence, which explicitly states that Cassander aspired to monarchy, and implies that he was secure in his position as governor of Europe. This in turn suggests that he was able to act with near impunity and that the throne of Macedonia was within his grasp at this time. Contrary to this view, however, there were very real internal problems facing Cassander in Macedonia following that invasion. As Goukowsky and Landucci Gattinoni have both identified, Cassander had a formidable task ahead of him in securing military control over the Macedonian homeland20, and gaining political control over it. Much of this internal support base would rest in the hands of the Macedonian aristocracy. Cassander appears to have accomplished this, possibly by exploiting the reaction by the aristocracy against the recent purges conducted by Olympias against them in the spring of 316. During these, Olympias eliminated those she believed to be sympathetic towards Cassander. These actions, as well as her treatment of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice prior to their deaths, incited hatred against her.21 Cassander placed Olympias on trial before the Macedonian assembly, leaving it for them to decide her fate.22 In similar fashion to the earlier political executions conducted by Cassander, for instance the execution of his general Nicanor in 317. Olympias’ fate was left, at least nominally, in the hands of a group whose support would be vital for his administration of Macedonia.

The question remains of how Cassander negotiated a delicate balance between securing support from influential elements of internal Macedonian groups while at the same time establishing himself as primary ruler in the region. While the more overtly

19 See below n. 35.
21 D.S. 19.11.8-9: Just. 14.5.10, 14.6.1-2; Paus. 9.7.2.
23 Polygen. 4.11.2; cf. DS. 18.75.1; Trog. Prot. 14; Heckel 2006, 178.
monarchic aspects of his actions would be used against him by rivals among the Diadochoi, it is less clear how significant these were for groups within Macedonia. We do, however, have some insight into how Cassander chose to represent himself to these groups within Greece and Macedonia. Following the conquest of Macedonia, Cassander gained authority over the mints in Macedonia, located at Pella and Amphipolis. By extension, this gave him control over the iconography upon the coins issued from these mints. Coins continued to be issued during this period, and a largely coherent sequence of the issues produced throughout his reign is available, with ongoing production evidenced by the continued issue of posthumous gold and especially silver coinage of Philip II and Alexander III. However, while this is not a new body of evidence, their potential contribution to the discussion of Cassander’s implementation of power over the Macedonian homeland has been largely ignored. Given the availability of untapped material that can aid in our understanding of his actions and position during 316-315, this is worthy of further discussion.

The precedent for regnal coinage early in a new Argead ruler’s reign, marking the transition of power, is a strong one. Soon after beginning their reigns, Philip II, Alexander III, and Philip III all produced a variety of gold and silver coins, marking their ascendance to power. This phenomenon would be continued past the zenith of Argead power in the empire, as the Diadochoi, Cassander included, would mint coinage to mark their transitions from satraps and officers to monarchs as the founders of the Hellenistic dynasties. However, no alteration to the coinage issued by the mints under Cassander’s control would take place at any point during his early implementation of power. These coins stand in stark contrast to previous Argead precedents, later issues by the Diadochoi and Cassander himself, as well as the explicit monarchic implications outlined by the literary sources. Cassander would eventually add his name to bronze coinage (ΚΑΣΣΑΝΔΡΟΥ, and later ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΚΑΣΣΑΝΔΡΟΥ) though these issues appear to have been struck after 310, long after his conquest of Macedonia and as part of a wider adoption of monarchic representations by the Diadochoi following the Peace of 311. We know that it was possible for Cassander to mint coins during

24 Head 1911, 228; Morkholm 1991, 42, 59, 79; Valassiades 2003, 405. Morkholm 1991, 42 raises the possibility of the existence of a third mint located at Aegae which would have come under Cassander’s control at this time. Diodorus reports that Pella and Amphipolis came under Cassander’s control shortly after the conclusion of the siege of Pydna, around the spring of 316 (D.S. 18.50.7-18.51.1).

25 Gardiner 1918, 428; Seltman 1955, 219; Morkholm 1991, 59-60. The posthumous coinage of Philip II may have been initiated by Cassander’s father, Antipater, at some point after 323: Martin 1985, 138; cf. Le Rider 1977, 398-399, 433.

26 One notable exception is Troxell’s survey of Macedonian coinage (Troxell 1997, 96), who has raised a number of useful suggestions that attempt to homogenise the literary and numismatic data sets in relation to Cassander’s new administration. The lack of inclusion of numismatic evidence, and the information it can add to historiographical investigation, is by no means unique to Cassander. As Wheatley 2009, 129-130 notes, this is a common and unfortunate oversight in a period when primary source information is limited.

27 For Philip II, see Gardiner 1918, 422-423; Seltman 1955 199-200. For Alexander III, see Gardiner 1918, 426; Seltman 1995 204-205; Morkholm 1991 42; Troxell 1997, 95. For Philip III Arrhidaeus, see Gardiner 1918 429; Morkholm 1991 56-57; Troxell 1997, 95.

28 Head 1911, 228, 229, 756, 848; Seltman 1955, 219; Price 1974, 21, 24; Morkholm 1991, 27, 59, 60, 65, 71.

29 Head 1911, 228; Seltman 1995, 219 (cf. pl. L.3); Price 1974, 26 (cf. pl. xii. 65); Miller 1991, 53-54; Morkholm 1991, 59-60; Valassiades 2003, 405, 406.

30 D.S. 19.105.1; Price 1974, n. 65, 44; Billows 1990, 159; Shipley 2000, 43; Anson 2008, 139; Kosmin 2014, n. 4, 205; cf. Just 15.2.12-13; Head 1911, 228; Muller – Von Prokesch-Osten – Head.
the intervening period between 316-310, as there appears to have been a continuation of coins produced by these mints, during this period. This means that there was ample opportunity for him to follow the Argead precedent to signal his succession should he have chosen to do so. The reason for this continuation of incumbent numismatic issues may never be known, nevertheless, the lack of change in coinage, in contrast with the otherwise highly public statements of power and succession by Cassander is striking and must be recognised in the discussion regarding his ability to secure his position in Macedonia. Rather than demonstrating aspirations to monarchy, the coins issued by Cassander indicate the complex multifaceted approach he took to power during the early phases of his rule in Macedonia.

So, how can these two seemingly incongruous, aspects of Cassander’s new administration in Macedonia be reconciled? Given the relatively small corpus of available literary source information, the exclusion of the numismatic data in the search to understand Cassander’s implementation of power would be foolhardy. While they do adhere to an overall numismatic tradition among the Diadochoi prior to the Peace of 311, the coins minted under Cassander’s control should equally be included in the discussion of his approach to power. Is it possible that the central actions outlined by the likes of Diodorus, Justin, and the Heidelberg Epitome and their monarchic connotations were regarded as acceptable by Cassander’s support base, while alteration to royal coinage might be seen as an overreach? Could the continuation of the war against Polyperchon and the risk of alienating powerful support groups in Macedonia have been a concern? A glaring possibility for Cassander’s actions that must be acknowledged within the discussion of his new government is the one raised by Hammond and Walbank in the late-1980s. They suggest that a simple and elegant explanation for Cassander’s actions may be consideration of administrative expectations for Cassander during this period and that, as the only eminent officer within Macedonia without any clear alternative, it was “in every way appropriate that Cassander arranged the funeral [of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice], as he had been appointed ‘administrator of the kingdom’ by Philip III and Euridyce…and was acting now in that capacity for the child king [Alexander IV].” This assessment by Hammond and Walbank covers some, but not all of Cassander’s actions, as it does not address the building campaigns, or the marriage to Thessalonice. However, the practical process and necessities of governing the Macedonian homeland does serve as a simple and compelling interpretation of many of Cassander’s early actions after his successful invasion. While there is much to this sentiment, it appears to have gained little traction within understandings of Cassander’s new government, against the monarchic focus found in the works of Diodorus. Certainly, some of Cassander’s actions, as highlighted by Hammond and Walbank, would easily fit into the administrative expectations of Macedonian’s governor, however Cassander’s marriage to Thessalonice and his building program appear to overstep these restrictions, indicating that Cassander’s aims were loftier than coherent stable administration. Regarding the contributions that Cassander’s numismatic production can make to understanding of his implementation of power it is prudent to acknowledge their limit and the tentative nature of the conclusions that can be drawn from them. It seems that Cassander, over the course of his regency, and in spite of his actions in 316, attempted to distance


31 See above n. 25.


33 See above: n. 16.
himself publicly from the position of basileus for a number of years after the invasion in the winter of 317/316. This supports the representation found in Plutarch’s *Life of Demetrius* and highlights a reluctance on the part of Cassander to assume the title of basileus throughout much of his reign as regent and king. Additionally, there may have been some eagerness to apply early monarchic intentions by our chief source Diodorus. As Heckel has noted, Diodorus has also displayed a readiness to bypass periods of transition from regency to monarchic rule within a Macedonian context, which further compounds the complexity of untangling our understanding of Cassander’s implementation of power. This understanding of the intentions underpinnings Cassander’s actions may have had their origins in Hieronymus’ history, or may have been emphasized later by Diodorus. While the sentiment was more likely transferred from Hieronymus into the later work of Diodorus, it is clear that the sentiment has traversed the majority of the literary sources to provide a strong representation of Cassander’s actions as monarchic. Returning to the numismatic evidence, however, it is telling that out of the various records available to us for an evaluation of Cassander’s image, and intentions during the period after his conquest of Macedonia, the only source that bypasses the interpretation and digestion via intermediary writer is that of the coins that were minted under his control. Out of our available records, the only one that does not adhere to the explicit assertion of monarchic succession is that of Cassander’s coins. The numismatic evidence assert that Cassander did not extend his monarchic ambition throughout the entirety of his approach to seizing power.

While this may be seen as a semantic argument over the distinction between the positions of governor, king, and Cassander’s quasi-monarchic endeavors, the lack of alteration from the mints under Cassander’s control suggests that he was, to some extent at least, restricted in his bid for power, forcing him to straddle a nuanced middle-ground between the role of governor and king. Rather than viewing Cassander’s numismatic output as an aberration in his implementation of power, or even as an oversight in his plans, leading to the continuation of early Hellenistic numismatic tradition prior to the Peace of 311, the lack of alteration to the coinage under his control is indicative of the multifaceted approach Cassander made towards securing his position in the Macedonian homeland. It indicates that Cassander was required to balance expansion of power over Macedonia and did so through a variety of avenues. Through each of the four points described by Diodorus, Cassander was able to implement a wide-ranging plan with the goal of securing the Macedonian homeland under his new regime. From each of these actions, the marriage to Thessalonice, the building campaign upon which he embarked, the removal of Alexander IV to Amphipolis and the reburial of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice, it is possible to see the early hallmarks that would one day act as the foundation of the Antipatrid dynasty and Cassander’s eventual ascension to the position of Macedonia’s next king. However, when we include the oft overlooked numismatic evidence from the period, a different image of Cassander emerges, in which his actions appear less distinctly expressive of monarchic ambitions and more like *ad hoc* responses to circumstances. The incorporation of this evidence challenges the understandings found in the literary sources and offers a more nuanced picture of the man who would serve as the ruler of Macedonia for the next two decades.

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36 See Landucci 2017, for more on Hieronymus’ representation of the Antipatrids.
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