
The role of Macedonia in the decline of Aiakid monarchy in Molossia/Epeiros

by Elizabeth D. Carney
Clemson University
elizab@clemson.edu

ABSTRACT This paper examines the reasons for the elimination of Aiakid monarchy in Molossia/Epeiros, a question little addressed in ancient sources and modern scholarship. It suggests that though Macedonian involvement in Molossia/Epeiros weakened Aiakid monarchy in the second half of the fourth century, first under Philip II and then from 317-292, during Kassandros' domination of Macedonia, monarchy recovered under Pyrrhos I (292-272). Toward the end of Alexander II's reign, however, increasing uncertainty about the succession (two minor heirs, a female regency probably happening twice, the deaths in rapid succession of three regnant Aiakids, the last of them an unmarried and childless woman) made both the dynasty and the monarchy vulnerable in a rapidly changing Greek political climate.

KEYWORDS Epeiros, Molossia, Macedonia, Aiakid, Aiakides

Although Macedonian and Epeirate monarchy are often understood as similar¹, monarchy in Macedonia endured until Roman conquest in 168 BC², despite a chaotic period and multiple dynastic changes, while Aiakid monarchy disappeared c. 232, three generations before the Romans destroyed the Epeirate state. Too little attention has been paid to why both Aiakid and monarchic rule ended in Epeiros and, more specifically, to the possible role Macedonia played in this collapse. I will suggest that although Macedonian intervention in the later fourth century did weaken Aiakid monarchy (and led, very briefly, to its abolition), the reign of Pyrrhos restored the prestige of the dynasty and monarchy to considerable degree, but succession problems developed late in the reign of Alexander II and rapidly worsened, generating lack of confidence in monarchic rule. Other factors contributed to the abolition of monarchy as well: the growing power of neighboring entities like the Aitolians, Alexander II's period of exile, and the likely uneven support for continued monarchic rule in some regions of Epeiros. Still, prolonged problems with stable succession seem to have the most important reason for the end of Aiakid rule and the end of monarchy itself in the region.

Despite the glamour of Aiakid genealogy (established in the sixth and fifth centuries BC, if not earlier)³, as well as the international importance of two Aiakids (Olympias I,

¹ See, for instance, CARLIER 2002; HATZOPOULOS 2003.

² All dates hereafter BC unless otherwise stated.

³ See POUZADOUX 1998; CHAPINAL-HERAS 2014 for discussion.

mother of Alexander the Great⁴, and her great nephew Pyrrhos⁵), only a few extant ancient authors offer information about events in Molossia/Epeiros, in good part because this literary evidence about Epeiros fixates on Pyrrhos, scanting rulers and events before and after him. Diodoros (19.36.2-5, 74.3-5) provides a welcome exception, at least for late fourth, early third century BC events.) Pausanias, inspired by the mention of a statue of Pyrrhos, includes a brief account of the Aiakid dynasty of Molossia/Epeiros up to Pyrrhos' reign (1.11.1-5) and provides a much lengthier narrative of Pyrrhos' career (1.11.5-14.1), concluding that the high point of the Epeirotes ended with the death of Pyrrhos. Plutarch's life of Pyrrhos (1.1-2.2) begins with a short history of the Aiakid dynasty up to Pyrrhos' reign. Though Justin briefly mentions events in the kingdom prior to Pyrrhos, Pyrrhos' emergence as an important figure causes Justin to backtrack to present a somewhat more coherent account of earlier Epeirote developments (Just. 17.3.1-22). The final decade (roughly) of Epeirote monarchy remains particularly obscure, events and the identity of dynastic actors disputed, primarily because the sources are so brief and judgmental (see below); none of the ancient sources analyzes causation of these events and scholars have done little better⁶. Justin (28.3.1-8); Ovid (*Ib.* 301-10); Pausanias (4.35.3-5); and Polyainos (8.52) refer to the death of Deidameia, the last regnant Aiakid, but obscure why it happened⁷.

While these extant ancient narratives refer to the acts of kings and rarely mention collective bodies, until recently scholarship did the opposite, focusing on the evolution of federalism in the region, analysis dependent on the then widely accepted dating of many Dodona (site of the famous oracle) inscriptions. In 2013, Elizabeth Meyers down dated these inscriptions by a century, linking the appearance of an Epeirote *koinon* (state) to the end of Aiakid monarchy. Her revised chronology makes Aiakid monarchy central longer and distances the evolution of ethnic identity in the region from constitutional evolution⁸. Granted this new uncertainty about the chronology and nature of constitutional change, I will concentrate my discussion on the reasons for the dissolution of dynastic rule, rather than on the chronology of the development of Molossian/Epeirote federalism⁹.

Now let me turn to the possible role of Macedonia in the end of Aiakid rule. The royal dynasties of these two northern kingdoms married and fought each other for more than a century (c. 358-c. 239). The marriage of Arybbas' niece Olympias I (the daughter of his brother and former co-king Neoptolemos) to Philip II c. 357 first forged an

⁴ See CARNEY 2006.

⁵ See LÉVÊQUE 1957.

⁶ CABANES 1976, 198-200 creates not so much an argument as a laundry list of the causes of the end of monarchy in Epeiros. He blames the demise of Aiakid monarchy on Aitolian pressure, especially Aitolian occupation of the part of Akarnania previously controlled by the Epeirotes and accompanying Aitolian propaganda, on the political alliance with Macedonia which he was understood as once more making it a Macedonian protectorate, and on anti-monarchic revolution. He argues that if Deidameia had had support elsewhere, she could have survived. He understands the Macedonian alliance a reversal of Pyrrhos' policy. He believes concern about northern threats, desire for the rebirth of local power at expense of central, and possible economic and social malaise were also factors. HAMMOND 1967, 590-592 refers to Illyrian pressure, the "unpopularity" of Olympias II but is largely simply descriptive. BERNARD 2007, 22, says that rapid deaths of two young kings, left only women.

⁷ BERNARD 2007, 254 comments that the relevant sources are late, hostile to monarchy, and little interested in its demise.

⁸ See general discussions of her thesis in PICCINI 2015; RAYNOR 2017, 244-246.

⁹ I will refer to the area the Aiakids ruled as Molossia until the reign of Pyrrhos I; from his reign on I will speak of it as Epeiros; I do this not because I believe that a constitutional change necessarily happened at this period, but that as MEYERS 2013, 64-79, 124-129, notes, regional identity was growing and in the reign of Pyrrhos, one can see both as meaningful. See further RAYNOR 2019, 309-318.

alliance between two kingdoms and two dynasties, both coping with recent Illyrian invasions. Olympias' younger brother, the future Alexander I, arrived at the court of Philip about 350. Whether he had long planned to or not, Philip –apparently dissatisfied with Arybbas as an ally– drove him out and put Alexander I on the Molossian throne in 343/2¹⁰. In 337, Philip inadvertently precipitated a succession crisis in Macedonia that also complicated his dealings with Alexander I. Attalos, guardian of Philip's latest bride, publicly questioned the legitimacy of Olympias' son Alexander III, yet Philip did not stop or chastise Attalos (Plu. *Alex.* 9.4-5; Satyr. *ap.* Ath. 13.557d). This incident, apart from threatening Alexander III's position as his father's apparent successor, also insulted Aiakid pride, especially their genealogical pride. Responding to the slur, Alexander III left for Molossia with his mother, himself then traveling on to the Illyrians. Olympias may or may not have been urging her brother Alexander I to attack Philip as Justin claims (Just. 9.7.7), but the incident humiliated her, her son, and her brother. Philip, about to invade the Persian Empire, had to act to stabilize the situation at home. He placated Alexander I, Olympias, and his own son by arranging the marriage of Olympias' daughter Kleopatra and Alexander III's full sister, to Alexander I, only to be assassinated at his daughter's wedding festival (Just. 9.7.7-9; D.S. 16.91.4-94.4). Later, when Philip's son and successor went east, Molossian Alexander, possibly in cooperation with his nephew, went west, campaigning in southern Italy. Despite some initial success, Alexander I was assassinated in Italy c. 331¹¹.

At this point, Macedonia and the Argeads had not yet destabilized Aiakid monarchy. Even if some sort of constitutional change happened during this period, as Cabanes and Hammond argued¹², Kleopatra and Olympias, together or sequentially, acted like regents in Molossia (though, so far as we know, they held no formal title as such), apparently steadying the situation, quite possibly aided by their connection to Alexander the Great and his administrator Antipatros¹³. We do not know who, if anyone, was recognized as king between the death of Alexander I and the death of Alexander the Great¹⁴. It was the situation after the latter's death that not only precipitated the end of the Argead dynasty in Macedonia but gradually generated instability in Molossia and its ruling dynasty as well. By c. 322, Aiakides, son of Arybbas by Olympias' sister Troias, served as Molossian king. Olympias, who remained in Molossia for about six years after her son's death, apparently worked

¹⁰ The date of Philip's first campaign against Arybbas is uncertain: CROSS 1930, 38, n. 3 suggests c. 352.

¹¹ Strab. 6.3.4; Just. 12.2.1-15; Livy, 8.17.9-10, 24.1. RAYNOR 2017 argues that initial changes in the direction of a wider state happened under Alexander I who, after his long time at the Macedonian court, was influenced by its values and practices.

¹² See especially HAMMOND 1967 and CABANES 1976.

¹³ Both received grain, presumably for distribution, during a shortage (*SEG IX 2*); at least one of these shipments of grain was probably intended for Epeiros. Kleopatra also shipped grain to Korinthos in 333/2 (Lyk. *Leok.* 26) or earlier and served as *thearodoch* (an official who receives envoys sent to consult oracles or present offerings; *SEG XXIII 198*). Olympias seemed to play a role in both Macedonian and Molossian public policy. Indeed, Hypereides claims that Olympias said that Molossia belonged to her (Hyp. *Eux.* 19-20, 25). Plutarch (*Alex.* 68.3) asserted that late in Alexander's reign, Olympias and Kleopatra formed a faction against Antipatros, with Olympias taking Epeiros and Kleopatra Macedonia, apparently with Alexander's approval. Indeed, Alexander's power and close connections to his mother and sister probably guaranteed the stability of Molossia.

¹⁴ Justin 17.3.16 does say that Alexander I was succeeded by his brother Aiakides, but his confusion about Aiakides' identity does not lend his statement credibility; it may simply be Justin's deduction since Aiakides was clearly recognized as king later; HECKEL 2021, 69-70 accepts the Justin passage as dependable and believes that Paus. 1.11.3 implies that Aiakides succeeded immediately. It is more likely that Aiakides' accession relates to the Lamian war. Quite possibly several people claimed to be king in this period, including Aiakides' brother Alketas II.

closely with Aiakides. Soon after Antipatros brought the non-competent co-kings Philip III Arrhidaios and Alexander IV, along with Adea Eurydike (granddaughter of Philip II and wife of Philip III) and Roxane (mother of Alexander IV) to the Greek peninsula, he died¹⁵. Polyperchon, who replaced him as regent, invited Olympias to return to Macedonia, take control of her grandson Alexander IV, and enjoy some sort of public position there (D.S. 18.49.4, 57.2). She did not act on his offer until Adea Eurydice allied herself and her husband with Antipatros' son, Kassandros (Just. 14.5.1-2). Antipatros had long been Olympias' enemy and she believed that he and his family had poisoned her son¹⁶. In 317, Aiakides and Polyperchon, accompanied by Olympias, marched into Macedonia in support of Olympias and her grandson Alexander IV. Aiakides may have been a loyal nephew, but he also likely considered it in his self-interest to support Olympias. He had probably spent much of his life in exile, thanks to Philip and Alexander III, and he and Olympias had apparently agreed to the engagement or even marriage of Aiakides' very young daughter Deidameia I to the also very young Alexander IV (D.S. 19.35.5; Plu. *Pyrrh.* 4.2). The Macedonian army, abandoning the royal pair of Philip Arrhidaios and Adea Eurydike, went over to Olympias, who subsequently had the couple, one of Kassandros' brothers, as well as many of Kassandros' supporters killed (D.S. 19.11.1-9; Just. 8.5.1-6.1).

What happened next demonstrably did destabilize Molossia. Kassandros, absent during this initial campaign, returned to Macedonia and support for Olympias eroded as his forces kept winning. When Kassandros besieged Olympias at Pydna, Aiakides again tried to bring Epeirate troops to her aid. Some of his troops refused to go, complaining about the "endless" wars with Macedonia (Just. 17.3.16). According to Diodoros, when Aiakides released them, they went home and, in his absence, by a *koinon dogma* (a common decree or opinion; D.S. 19.36.4), dethroned him and replaced him with a Macedonian governor, one of Kassandros' officers, rather than another Aiakid, though some Aiakids were available. Molossian rejection of Aiakides prized peace with Macedonia, even as some sort of Macedonian puppet state, over independence and certainly over Aiakid rule (D.S. 19.36.2-5)¹⁷. Diodoros stresses how unprecedented this decision was. The term *koinon dogma* is ambiguous here; it could refer to a common decree (suggesting a formal decision by some entity) or a common opinion (something more informal)¹⁸. Surviving narratives, when referring to previous

¹⁵ Granted that the elite considered Philip Arrhidaios somehow mentally challenged and that Alexander IV was a newborn, neither ruled in fact. Adea Eurydike, Argead on both sides, often acted independently of the official regents. See CARNEY 2006, 60-87.

¹⁶ Diodoros (19.11.8-9) and Plutarch (*Alex.* 77.1-3) refer to her public charges against them in context of the events of 317, but Olympias probably blamed them from start. Plutarch does claim her charges weren't made for five years after Alexander's death, but he may refer to public accusation rather than private belief. It is certainly not true, despite Plutarch, that no one considered Alexander's death suspicious for five years. Curtius (10.10.14-18) says rumors began immediately. Plutarch (*Mor.* 849f) claims that Hypereides, in the immediate aftermath, proposed a decree honoring Antipatros' son Iolaos, the king's supposed poisoner (Arr. *An.* 7.27.1-2; Just. 12.14.6-9; Curt. 10.10.14-19; D.S. 17.118.1-2). Granted the frequency of regicide and political assassination in Macedonian history and that Alexander was a still young and healthy young man, suspicion, justified or not, that he was poisoned is unsurprising.

¹⁷ HECKEL 2021, 70 asserts that Kassandros "was certainly behind the change of rulers in Epeiros". This is possible, but there is no evidence for it. Naturally, Kassandros would have supported the removal of Aiakides, but that does not mean that he caused it. Kassandros may simply have taken advantage of the situation in Molossia, as the group hostile to Aiakides would have expected.

¹⁸ GEER 1962, 329 translates "public decree" and WATERFIELD 2019, 271 says that they "officially condemned his to exile". FUNKE 2000, 110 considered the Diodoros passage evidence for the existence of a full federal government and that the decision was that of the *koinon*. RAYNOR 2017, 263, n. 84,

or subsequent actions or views of the Molossians and/or Epeirotes, do not clarify whether they allude to formal decisions made by some collective body, to popular opinion (in the view of the writer or his sources), to popular violence, or to violence later legitimized by deliberative action¹⁹. Diodoros' source is probably Hieronymus who certainly is more credible than Plutarch's likely source, Proxenos, Pyrrhos' court historian²⁰. Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 2.1) describes violent stasis, with Aiakides expelled, his friends killed, and his son Pyrrhos surviving only by a hairsbreadth²¹. Though we do not know all the circumstances surrounding exiles of earlier Molossian kings, Diodoros' insistence that this event was unprecedented deserves serious attention²². One could deduce that previous occasions leading to royal exile involved factions, perhaps only divisions within the royal family itself, or simply that, on previous occasions, when kings were exiled, they were replaced with other Aiakids, as we know was the case on several subsequent occasions. The Molossians, in any event, may simply have made the same decision, formal or not, that others in Greece did in this period: granted that Olympias' supporters were losing out to the forces of Kassandros, it was better to end on the winning side (D.S. 19.36.5). This suspension of Molossian dynastic rule didn't last long but was the first sign that monarchy itself was in trouble; the brief interregnum may have been suggestive to the Molossians and, in a different way, to Aiakides' son Pyrrhos, the most famous and most pugnacious of Aiakid rulers²³. Had monarchy and Aiakid rule failed for good in 316, we could certainly blame it on repeated Macedonian intervention²⁴, but it did not. By 313, Aiakides (and monarchy) made a comeback, even though Kassandros' brother Philip subsequently twice defeated Aiakides, who died in battle or soon after (D.S. 19.74.3-5; Paus. 1.11.4). At that point,

follows MEYERS 2013, 70-72 in thinking that this over interprets Diodoros' language and that Diodoros intends to refer only to a decision of the troops going home making a common decision.

¹⁹ For instance, Alketas I, son of Tharyps, was driven from the throne and lived in exile in Sicily (Alketas was made a Syracusan citizen and adopted by Dionysios' brother), but we know only that Molossians were allies of the Spartans in the period of his absence. In 384 Dionysios of Syracuse helped Alketas get the kingdom back with the aid of Illyrians tribes.; the Illyrians supposedly killed 15,000 Molossians (Thuc. 2.80, D.S. 15.13.1-4). Diodoros gives no reason for Alketas' exile, nor any indication of what group/s drove him out. The use of military force suggests that opposition to him was widespread.

²⁰ I follow HAMMOND 1967, 559, 561-562 and FUNKE 2000, 425 in believing that Hieronymos was the source for Diodoros' book 19, whereas MEYERS 2013, 70, n. 189, following FRANKE 1955, 69, and CATALDI 1991, 182 believe that Proxenos was Diodoros' source. In any event, our source stresses the unprecedented nature of this event.

²¹ Plutarch says that the children of Neoptolemos were then brought in; who these might have been is unclear and much debated. See HECKEL 2021, 70-76 for a discussion of the possibilities, but not necessarily for his conclusions. Justin 17.3.17-21 says that Pyrrhos succeeded him but was immediately driven into exile and not restored for some years.

²² Apart from the case of Alketas I's exile (see above), Alketas' sons Neoptolemos and Arybbas quarreled but came to share rule (Paus. 1.11.3) until Neoptolemos died and Arybbas was driven from the throne by Philip II, who placed his brother-in-law, Alexander I on the throne; Arybbas went into exile in Athens but may or may not have returned briefly as king at the end of his life. D.S. 18.11.1 may or may not demonstrate that he lived long enough to fight in the Lamian war. See discussion in ERRINGTON 1975; HESKEL 1988. His son Aiakides became king in the end but when is unclear. Diodoros' picture of a previously totally stable succession with son succeeding father and untroubled rule is idealized (so also HECKEL 2021, 70) though I do not think we know, *contra* Heckel, that they had never "ousted a sitting king". Alketas I may have been a sitting king.

²³ MEYERS 2018, 72-79 argues that the experience generated greater feelings of regional identity and of Epeirote identity, but she does not equate this feeling with a constitutional change as such.

²⁴ CROSS 1932, 38 asserts that the alliance of Philip II and Arybbas was "ruinous" for the country but there seems little evidence for that after the reign of Pyrrhos I.

the Epeirotes then simply chose another Aiakid, Aiakides' brother Alketas II²⁵. Though Alketas and his sons lost in the end, Kassandros ultimately accepted Alketas as king, choosing not to impose another Macedonian governor (19.89.1). The Epeirotes themselves (or at least one faction) killed Alketas and his sons off (Paus. 1.11.5). In 306, Glaukias, the king of the Taulantians, then installed Pyrrhos, the son of Aiakides and his own foster son, on the throne, though Pyrrhos was still a child (Paus. 1.11.5; Plu. *Pyrrh.* 3. 3). Pyrrhos subsequently endured a second exile when, in his absence, the Epeirotes made the mysterious Neoptolemos king (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 4.1)²⁶. In 297, with the help of Ptolemy, after the death of Kassandros, Pyrrhos first gained recognition as co-king with Neoptolemos and then quickly eliminated him (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 5.1-7). Argead involvement, the end of the Argeads, and antagonism between Aiakids and Antipatrids generated upset that endured more than a generation whereas previous strife had been brief and of internal origin. These conflicts, however, were dynastic in nature, not republican, though they may have stimulated the development of such sentiment²⁷.

Let me now address possible Epeirote factors contributing to the end of Aiakid monarchy. Pyrrhos transformed Epeiros from a traditional monarchy into a Hellenistic one, a transformation that, from 292 on, entailed nearly constant warfare, much of it in Italy or Sicily. Unlike earlier Aiakid rulers, however, starting in 292, Pyrrhos often attacked Macedonia. He invaded or at least raided Macedonia as many as five times; often he was initially successful but was later forced to withdraw or chose to do so²⁸.

²⁵ Pausanias 1.11.5 says his father had banished him because he did not control his *thumos* ('temper' or 'anger') and that as soon as he returned, he immediately began to rage against the Epeirotes and so they killed him and his sons off. Diodoros describes a much saner person, one he characterizes as hostile to Kassandros—that is why Kassandros' general wants to remove him—and who seems like a competent general. Diodoros reports that when Lykiskos' forces got close, Alketas' were frightened and went over to the enemy. Diodoros (19.89.3) says the Epeirotes were ruled by him for a time but then, because he was treating the majority of the people harshly or strictly or savagely, they killed him and two of his young children.

²⁶ No literary source gives him a patronymic; "Neoptolemos" was the name of the founder of the dynasty and the name of Olympias' father. See HECKEL 2021, 70-76 for a recent discussion of the evidence, though not necessarily for his conclusions. I am unenthused by any of the options, primarily because our extant evidence is contradictory.

²⁷ See MEYER 2013, 72-79 and RAYNOR 2017.

²⁸ (1) Alexander, son of Kassandros, requested help against his brother Antipatros from both Pyrrhos and Demetrios and Pyrrhos aided him but took territory, even more than Alexander had offered (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 6.2-3); (2) Demetrios finally arrived, killed Alexander, was proclaimed king of Macedonians then attacked and plundered Epeiros; Pyrrhos invaded Macedonia and defeated Demetrios' general and then went back to Epeiros (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 7.2-5). In c. 289, while Demetrios was ill, he again invaded Macedonia (3), supposedly only planning to raid, but advanced to Aigai until he retreated because Demetrios had appeared with a superior force, and he had come primarily for plunder (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 10.1-2). Demetrios, about to depart for foreign engagements, made peace with his troublesome and difficult neighbor. However, the other kings urged him to attack again before Demetrios could threaten Molossian sanctuaries and tombs, so Pyrrhos once more attacked (4) while Demetrios was busy with Lysimachos, Pyrrhos took much Macedonian territory. The Macedonians lost patience with Demetrios and went over to Pyrrhos; he and Lysimachos divided Macedonia between them, though Lysimachos ultimately drove him out (*Pyrrh.* 11.1-12.1, 6-7). Pyrrhos had to switch sides when Lysimachos turned against him and invaded his part of Macedonia; he withdrew to Epeiros and in the following year Lysimachos plundered Epeiros. By 280, Pyrrhos' attention turned west to southern Italy and Sicily. In 278, offered the kingship of Macedonia, after the death of Ptolemy Keraunos, the previous Macedonian king, Pyrrhos opted for a Sicilian campaign instead; this too, despite early success, failed in the end. After his return to the Greek peninsula, Pyrrhos (5) again invaded Macedonia (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 26.3-7) and again took control of much of Macedonia, but his Gaulic mercenaries plundered the royal tombs at Aigai, costing him support in Macedonia. In 272 he turned to war in the Peloponnese, though his ambitions were to replace Antigonid control of the Peloponnese with his own (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 26.9-11; there he lost his oldest son Ptolemy at

Macedonian troops *c.* 288 offered him Macedonian kingship and he did briefly share rule of Macedonia with Lysimachos (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 11.5-6). After Pyrrhos' western projects failed, back in Epeiros, he again invaded Macedonia *c.* 274, successfully, but once more he stepped back, this time for his ultimately fatal engagements in the Peloponnese. Pyrrhos developed a more aggressive, more typically Hellenistic monarchy, one more closely tied than previously to charismatic military leadership and generation of wealth. Granted that his father had supposedly been driven from the throne because of his endless wars with Macedonia (Just. 17.3.16-17), it is striking that Pyrrhos, who far more frequently engaged with the Macedonians, with mixed results, seems to have been admired and certainly not exiled. His regular use of an Epeirote army probably contributed to the growth of identities more Epeirote, less simply Molossian²⁹.

Plutarch, Justin, and Pausanias say little about the motivation of Pyrrhos' campaigns, though Plutarch implies that pursuit of military glory and his consequent financial need for plunder were his sole motivators (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 10.2, 13.1, 26.2-3)³⁰. Plutarch cannot, of course, have known Pyrrhos' intent and insists on seeing Pyrrhos as an Achilles/Alexander doppelgänger³¹. Political concerns must also have driven him, granted the frequency of his campaigns against the Antigonids³². The Epeirotes acquired plunder and Pyrrhos supposedly entertained ambitions for control of Greece and Asia (Just. 25.4.1), which is to say Alexander's empire. Pyrrhos dedicated shields taken from Macedonian, boasting of having defeated those who had been the victors in Asia, suggesting a kind of nationalistic rivalry as well.

Yet Pyrrhos himself may have triggered further erosion of monarchic rule by generating higher expectations than could be sustained. (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 26.5)³³. Previously, Aiakid kings, excepting Alexander I, had engaged only in defensive military actions or those heavily dependent on allies whereas Pyrrhos' relentless focus on often distant military campaigns could have weakened the position of his less charismatic successors, but if so, the effects were not immediate. (Though his long absences may well have empowered any collective bodies, whatever their exact nature.) Through all the dramatic ups and downs of Pyrrhos' career, however, his army and apparently the kingdom continued to support him, and his son Alexander II succeeded him without difficulty, despite the deaths of his oldest brother Ptolemy (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 30.3-5) and then of his father (Plu. *Pyrrh.* 34.1-4).

Sparta and then committed to a disastrous intervention in Argos where he died in street fighting. See further RAYNOR 2019, 310, n. 19.

²⁹ See MEYER 2013, 72-79, 122-127, followed by RAYNOR 2019, 310.

³⁰ BUSZARD 2008, 199 comments on the narrowness of Plutarch's portrayal of Pyrrhos and his interests.

³¹ See MOSSMAN 1992; ASIRVATHAM 2018 for discussion of this phenomenon. MOSSMAN 1992, 90-92 argues that Pyrrhos himself, like other Aiakids, employed Achilles as a model, but also that he, like other Successors, was something of an Alexander imitator. MONACO CATHERINE 2017 argues that Plutarch presents Alexander imitation in a nuanced way; this is true only in the sense that Plutarch sometimes portrays Pyrrhos' imitation as successful, sometimes not. My point is that Plutarch offers only this motivation. MITCHELL 2012, 16 observes that rulers of the archaic and classical periods not only claimed heroic descent but had to act heroically, especially by leading the army out, thus demonstrating their *arete*.

³² RAYNOR 2019, 310 plausibly comments that his behavior does not suggest long term concern for rule of Macedonia; it does, however, imply that, apart from acquisition of plunder, he also had an interest in harrying the Antigonids and Macedonia. Granted the tribulations of his early years, this would hardly have been surprising, but his motivations may have been political as well.

³³ RAYNOR 2019 points to the ways in which Pyrrhos does and does not play to Epeirote or Molossian nationalism.

Alexander II may not have been as compelling a leader as his father, but he continued his father's war against Antigonos Gonatas, drove him from Macedonia (c. 264-262), only himself to be driven from his own kingdom by Demetrios II, but with the help of his own citizens, the Akarnanians, and Aitolians he regained it c. 259 (Just. 26. 2.9-3.1, 7.9)³⁴. He also defeated an Illyrian king (Trog. *Prol.* 25; Frontin. 2.5.10). Alexander II married his half-sister Olympias II³⁵. they had two sons Pyrrhos II and Ptolemy II and a daughter Phthia (Just. 28.1.1-2). Alexander II seemed as competent and as well-supported as many of his predecessors.

The apparently late births of Alexander II's heirs may have initiated fears about the succession even before his death: both heirs were minors and the prospective regent, Olympias II, was not only a woman but possibly several years older than her brother-husband (assuming Antigone was her mother). After his death, she did indeed assume management of the kingdom (Just. 28.1.1)³⁶. External enemies threatened: Olympias II, fearing that the Aitolians would deprive Epeiros of the part of Akarnania that Alexander II had acquired, went for help to Demetrios II, offering her daughter Phthia II in marriage (Just. 28.1.1-2)³⁷. Demetrios married Phthia but did not help her mother. Olympias II was able to pass the kingdom to her oldest son Pyrrhos II, who had presumably come of age, but he soon died and was succeeded by his brother Ptolemy, possibly after a second regency by Olympias. Justin (28.3.1-3) does not offer a cause for Pyrrhos II's death but does recount that Ptolemy, having set off to engage an unspecified enemy, suddenly died just before battle. Polyainos (8.52) specifies that Ptolemy was murdered, a plausible assertion granted the suspicious circumstances of his death. Justin claims that Olympias then died of grief. Athenaios (13. 5589f; see also Ovid. *Ib.* 308), however, preserves a story about Olympias II poisoning a woman her son Pyrrhos had fallen in love with, yet Photius (Phot. 530 a 27, BEKKER 1824) has young Pyrrhos poisoning his mother. Whatever the literal truth of these charges, they reflect gender stereotypes but perhaps also dynastic conflict³⁸. Assuming that these deaths were suspicious, the enemy must have been domestic, if Polyainos is correct (see below). Moreover, the failure to name an enemy group also suggests that the enemy was domestic. The subsequent murder of the last regnant Aiakid, clearly the work of internal forces, further supports this likelihood.

After the deaths of Pyrrhos II, Ptolemy II, and their mother, the only known Aiakids left closely related to them were women (Just. 28.3.4). Nereis³⁹ had already married Gelon of Syracuse (see below). Another Aiakid woman named Deidameia became ruler

³⁴ His career recalls that of Alketas I (390/385-370 BC) who was forced into exile but restored by Dionysios of Syracuse and the Illyrians, who caused great loss of Molossian life (D.S. 15.13.1-3). KUZMIN 2019, 60, however, thinks Justin exaggerates the degree of Alexander II's success and Antigonos Gonatas' failure.

³⁵ Justin 28.1.1 terms Alexander II her full brother, but he was more likely her half-brother. Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 9.1) says that Alexander II's mother was Lanassa. Olympias II's mother is usually assumed to be Antigone, stepdaughter of Ptolemy (CABANES 1988, 53; BERNARD 2007, 259, n. 37) though CORRADI 1911-1912 believed that Antigone was the daughter of Ptolemy Keraunos.

³⁶ The date of his death is disputed.

³⁷ KUZMIN 2019, 70-72 and D'AGOSTINI 2019, 13-16 both conclude that Justin's testimony is correct and that the marriage happened soon after Demetrios took the throne, c. 239-237.

³⁸ LUCCHERINI 2019.

³⁹ Plb. 7.4.5; Paus. 6.12.3; Livy, 24.6.8 think she is the daughter of Pyrrhos I, but he died in 272; SCHOLTEN 2000, 135, n. 15 considers her father Pyrrhos II and comments that the date of her marriage is a crux but thinks that the tie to Hieron of Syracuse was another response, alongside Phthia's Macedonian marriage, to the Aitolian threat. CROSS 1931, 124 concludes that her birth was no later than 250.

of Epeiros. Justin mistakenly calls her Laodamia⁴⁰ and describes her as the sister of Nereis. Pausanias (4.35.3) says she was the daughter of Pyrrhos II. Although she was the final Aiakid ruler, Deidameia was not on the list of portrait statues of the last Aiakid rulers dedicated by Nereis and Gelon. This omission could mean that Deidameia was not, despite the sources' statements, Nereis' sister or that she was opposed by Nereis and Gelon in pursuit of their own claims (see below).

Three contradictory accounts of the end of Aiakid rule survive, though all seem to blame it on internal strife rather than the intervention of foreign powers. Justin (28.3.5-8) says Deidameia was killed in an attack of the common people (*concurso populi*) after she had sought refuge at the altar of Diana; he clearly describes her death as violent, blames the people, and believes that her murder brought down disaster on the Epeirotes generally and particularly on her assassin. Polyainos' narrative (8.52) begins with Deidameia already involved in a civil war: she takes Ambrakia in revenge for the murder of Ptolemy II (implying that she was indeed closely related to him) but when the Epeirotes send ambassadors, she ends the war on the condition that she possess the land and honors of her ancestors. Polyainos comments that she was deceived in accepting their promises and that some of the Epeirotes then sent a former bodyguard of Alexander II to kill her. He did not and she took refuge in the sanctuary of Artemis Hegemone. Milo then killed her despite her verbal defiance of him. Pausanias (4.35.3) offers an entirely different account from those of Justin and Polyainos. He begins by commenting that Epeiros was ruined by *anarchia*, but then describes a peaceful transfer of power: he says Deidameia was without children and gave over affairs to the people (*demos*) when she died⁴¹.

Hammond's division of these accounts into those "hostile to the monarchy" and those "favourable to the monarchy and hostile to the republic" is neither helpful nor plausible, if one wants to know what happened and why⁴². He assumes that Justin's account is more believable because it features more natural deaths. One has only to recall the number of violent deaths at the end of the Argead dynasty (Kynnane, Adea Eurydike, Philip Arrhidaios, Olympias, Cleopatra, Alexander IV, Roxane, Herakles) to realize how dubious his reasoning is. If anything, so many dynastic deaths of natural causes in a short period of time seems far more unbelievable. Moreover, Justin himself attributes Deidameia's death to popular violence.

Aiakid monarchy did not end simply because the last ruler was female, though that was likely a significant factor⁴³. Royal women did generally have difficulty leading a lengthy military effort and comparatively rarely, at least nominally, ruled alone⁴⁴. Deidameia's apparent position as ruler had, however, some Epeirote precedent. Her grandmother Olympias II apparently administered affairs during at least one son's minority (Just. 28.1.1) and Olympias I had played a similar if less official role, perhaps in concert with her daughter Kleopatra⁴⁵. Moreover, granted that both previous male

⁴⁰ "Deidameia" was the name of Pyrrhos I's sister, once engaged to Alexander IV and later married to Demetrios Poliorketes. The mythic Deidameia was the lover of Achilles and mother of Neoptolemos and so "Deidameia" was an appropriate Aiakid name choice.

⁴¹ As a kind of postscript, Ovid (*Ib.* 303-304) has the people of Ambrakia scattering the ashes of Pyrrhos I himself.

⁴² HAMMOND 1967, 591-592.

⁴³ BERNARD 2006, 266 is incorrect or at least oversimplifies.

⁴⁴ See CARNEY 2004 and BERNARD 2010. SAVALLI-LESTRADE 2015, 215 observes that the deaths of royal women tended to happen at a critical point in dynasty's history: the death of a king, the minority of his successor, dynastic in-fighting, all might lead to the elimination of royal women to prevent them from exercising power. She cites Deidameia as an example.

⁴⁵ CARNEY 2006, 52-53.

rulers may have been assassinated as well, Deidameia II's murder was not necessarily or at least solely gender related. On the other hand, none of these earlier women exercised military leadership.

In any case, rejection of female leadership –if that really was the issue– need not have spelled the end of dynastic rule, had Deidameia II had any children or even a husband, but apparently, she had neither. In that respect, if no other, Pausanias seems to have been correct⁴⁶. Her age, whatever it was, does not sufficiently explain her unmarried state. Pyrrhos' sister, Deidameia I, had been engaged to, possibly actually married to Alexander IV⁴⁷, while still a child, yet Deidameia II was not a child, if Polyainos is to be believed. Even if Olympias II had failed to find a husband for Deidameia II, the victorious opposing groups, rather than killing her, could have found her a husband amongst their own ranks, grafting new onto the old, as Kassandros did with Thessalonike (D.S. 19.52.1-2; Just.14.6.13; HEIDEL *FGrH* 155, F 2.4). An older bride, even one past child-bearing years, could have marked dynastic continuity between the old and the new. Ptolemy's intended marriage c. 309 to Kleopatra, daughter of Philip II (D.S. 20.37.3-6), could have served as a model of that sort of dynastic marriage. The Epeirotes chose to kill Deidameia rather than find her a husband.

Nor is it true that the Epeirotes simply ran out Aiakids. There were male and female Aiakids available in 232. Nereis had married Gelon, son of Hieron II of Syracuse (Paus. 6.12.3), and she had a son (Hieronymos) with him (Plb. 7.4.5); Gelon demonstrated interest in claiming Aiakid heritage by his marriage. Nereis and he dedicated statues at Olympia and Delphi of the “last” Aiakid rulers: Alexander II and Olympias II (possibly Nereis' parents) and Pyrrhos II and Ptolemy (possibly the brothers of Nereis)⁴⁸. Gelon also produced coins effectively claiming to be the inheritor of Aiakid rule⁴⁹. The dedications are usually dated to the period immediately after the end of dynastic rule⁵⁰. Demetrios II married Phthia, daughter of Olympias II and Alexander II (Just. 28.1.2); she may well have been the mother of Philip V⁵¹. No extant evidence confirms that Philip V made a claim on Epeiros based on Phthia's lineage, but he may have⁵². Several Aiakids were part of the court of Alexander the Great in the fourth century and could

⁴⁶ Pausanias 4.35.3 asserts that she had no children. Though the rest of Pausanias' account (she just dies and leave the country to the *demos*) is not plausible, no husband or children are mentioned by any other source.

⁴⁷ Plu. *Pyrrh.* 4.2 comments that, while still a girl (*kore*), she had formally been given in marriage to Alexander IV. WHEATLEY–DUNN 2020, 226 deduce that she was 18 in 303, making her a small child if she married him c. 317.

⁴⁸ *Syll.*³ 393 and 453. COPPOLA 2016, 27 suggests that, just as the Attalids (who also claimed descent from Achilles' son Neoptolemos) placed their monument at Delphi near that of Neoptolemos, Nereis and Gelon may have done so as well. The statue group at Olympia may have been set up by a city not by the royal pair, though such an action would surely have reflected the perceived views of the royal pair.

⁴⁹ On a series of Syracusan coins, Gelon represents himself as the last living male member of the Epeirote royal family and declares himself the rightful successor of the last murdered rulers. See BRINGMANN 2000, 88; FRANKE 1961, 281-282.

⁵⁰ BRINGMANN 2000, 88 suggests a date of 230.

⁵¹ Inscriptional evidence indicates that Phthia was married to Demetrios at the time of Philip V's birth and had children by him; but three late ancient sources give his mother's name as “Chryseis”. Contrary to my earlier views (CARNEY 2000, 192), I now consider it more likely, though hardly certain, that Phthia was the mother of Philip V. See discussion and references in D'AGOSTINI 2019, 13-16, 18-22.

⁵² D'AGOSTINI 2019, 71-72, 166 suggests that he did.

have had descendants⁵³. In any event, funerary inscriptions from Pydna attest that some Aiakids survived in Macedonia into the first century BC⁵⁴.

Moreover, the Epeirotes could have chosen an entirely new dynasty rather than eliminate monarchy, just as the Macedonians accepted the Antigonids and had previously accepted the Antipatrids. A scarce supply of Aiakids –admittedly, none of the males available after 232 apparently had close ties to recent rulers– did not inevitably cause the collapse of dynastic rule, though it may have made such an event more likely. Instead, Epeirotes chose to abolish monarchy itself, not simply to eliminate individual monarchs or the Aiakid dynasty. As I shall argue, this distinction between monarchy and dynasty may not have been a meaningful one in third century Epeiros.

Analysis of the decline and then abolition of Aiakid monarchy has suffered from unstated but, particularly because they are unstated, powerful assumptions about dynastic rule in Molossia/Epeiros, many of which derives from the practices and institutions of other monarchies, ancient, medieval, and modern. There may indeed have been such similarities, but similarity should not simply be assumed. In so many cases, we simply do not know. Let me point to some important areas of our ignorance.

We do not know how kings were chosen or by whom, apart from the fact that they always came from the Aiakid dynasty. Even when a king like Alketas I was exiled, Meyers is probably right to conclude that he was (temporarily in his case) replaced by another Aiakid⁵⁵. The oldest son of the current king, simply because of low life expectancy, doubtless had an advantage. The name of Neoptolemos I, son of Alketas I, appears after that of his father on the inscription (*IG II² 43, l. 109*) listing the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy. This likely means that he was expected to be his father's successor, but not necessarily that he co-ruled with his father. Nor do we know if his father chose him as his successor and, if he did, whether some other entity approved his choice. At some point, Neoptolemos did come to co-rule with his brother Arrybbas (Paus. 1.11.3), after some supposed strife, but we do not know by whom that apparent compromise was worked out. Arrybbas banished his apparently older son Alketas II, in favor of his younger son Aiakides (D.S. 19.88.1; Paus. 1.11.5); this action meant that Alketas II did not initially become king, but it is not clear that a king always chose his heir or at least that it was solely his decision. The exile of Alketas I and his return, the exile and return of Aiakides as well as the apparent co-kingship of Neoptolemos I and Arrybbas indicate that whatever arrangement of the succession happened on the death of a king, it could subsequently be rejected, by whom, what entity, we do not know, but certainly not by the earlier now dead king. This, was, in essence, a somewhat improvisational monarchy, a somewhat improvisational succession.

For a ruling dynasty, the Aiakids demonstrated an unusual amount of coherence and unity. Kings may have gone into exile often, but Pyrrhos I is the only Aiakid known to

⁵³ Apart from Olympias herself and her brother Alexander, three other people at the court of Philip are usually considered Aiakids: Alexander's tutor Leonidas (Plu. *Alex.* 5.4 calls him a relative of Olympias; see CARNEY 2000, 151, n. 62 who points out that Alexander sent gifts of plunder to his mother, sister, and Leonidas); a royal bodyguard named Arrybbas (Arr. *An.* 3.5.5) not specifically named as a kinsman of Olympias but granted his name, likely to have been (HECKEL 2006, 56); and Neoptolemos, an Aiakid (Arr. *An.* 2.27.6) who played a prominent role in Alexander's reign and into the period the Successors (HECKEL 2006, 174-175). None of these are known to have descendants but may well have.

⁵⁴ See CARNEY 2006, 105, ns. 2-9; EDSON 1949; ROBINSON 1954; OIKONOMIDES 1982. Those commemorated claim not only to be Aiakids, but specifically kin of Olympias: we cannot know if they are descendants of the men present in Philip's court (see above) or refugees who arrived in Macedonia after the collapse of Aiakid monarchy or some other branch of the clan.

⁵⁵ MEYERS 2013, 118 supposes that he was probably replaced by another Aiakid.

have killed another Aiakid (Neoptolemos II), whereas the Argeads did it with some frequency. Moreover, excepting the brief interregnum of 316-313, the Molossians/Epeirotes, whichever groups or entities may have been involved in decision making, seem always to have chosen another Aiakid to replace whichever one with whom they were currently dissatisfied. Perhaps it is not then so surprising that they were unable to conceive of monarchy without the Aiakids, or the Aiakids without monarchy.

If we do not assume that female members of the dynasty were not members of the dynasty, even if they married people not part of it, then the hard to define roles of Olympias and her daughter Kleopatra after the death of Alexander I and before the death of Alexander the Great, Olympias' alliance with Aiakides, the regency of Olympias II, the brief rule of Deidameia II, and even the offerings of dynastic portrait statues by Nereis and her husband make more sense. Pyrrhos named his only known daughter "Olympias", despite the fact that "Olympias" was almost certainly the name the daughter of Neoptolemos I acquired in Macedonia, after she had married Philip II; he commemorated the Aiakid who had become the mother of Alexander the Great⁵⁶.

The regency (or regencies) of Olympias II and the brief rule of Deidameia II were destabilizing not because they were understood as somehow invalid, but because they were perceived, at least by some groups, as vulnerable periods. Olympias II does not seem to have had any even figurative military role. Polyainos (8.52) says that Deidameia II captured Ambrakia to avenge the death of Ptolemy II but does not assert that she went into battle herself; his account of her death suggests that she had no troops or guard with her when she was murdered. She died bravely but did not die a warrior's death. The Aiakids, in keeping with their supposed ancestor Achilles, were always, one might almost say compulsively, warrior kings.

Dissatisfaction with monarchy had first appeared in 316 when the Molossians, briefly, preferred an interregnum to Aiakid rule. This dissatisfaction had arisen, primarily, because of Macedonian involvement in Molossian affairs, an involvement, at that stage, initiated by the Aiakids. The troubled period after Aiakides' death likely occasioned further experience with partial self-rule, as did Pyrrhos' frequent absences⁵⁷. A decade or more of uncertainty about the succession toward the end of the reign of Alexander II and in the final (roughly) decade of Aiakid rule paved the way for the apparent decision that monarchs were no longer necessary. Internal forces, not Macedonian intervention or even its failure, caused the collapse of Aiakid monarchy. After the deaths of Pyrrhos I and Alexander II, the monarchy failed, partly because of the absence of leadership as charismatic as that of Pyrrhos I, but more directly because of the chaotic succession pattern of the last decade or more of the dynasty, itself the product of repeated internal actions against Aiakid rule. The Aiakids always had game—one might say they had too much—but could not turn that into stability. The Epeirotes kept killing monarchs and in the end killed monarchy.

⁵⁶ Plu. *Mor.* 401a-b. See CARNEY 2006, 15-16. MEYER 2013, 64, 124 and *passim* is consistently hostile to both Olympias and Kleopatra. Though she often refers to royal wives as "queens" she describes mother and daughter as "Molossian-Macedonian princesses" (124, 125). She also (2013, 69) refers to Olympias as someone who "visited Molossia ... for a prolonged and meddlesome stay..." Her interpretation is clearly not that of Aiakides or Pyrrhos.

⁵⁷ In the third century, following Pyrrhos' glamorous successes and failures, the changing nature of the external political world also worked to weaken Epeirote monarchy: the growing power of the Illyrians, the threat of Gaulic forces, increasing competition from the Aitolians and the Achaians, developed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ASIRVATHAM, S. A. (2018): “The Memory of Alexander in Plutarch’s *Lives* of Demetrius, Pyrrhus, and Eumenes”, in T. HOWE – F. POWNALL (eds.): *Ancient Macedonians in Greek and Roman Sources: From History to Historiography*, Swansea: 215-255.
- BEKKER, I. (ed.) (1824): *Photii Bibliotheca*, Berlin.
- BERNARD, N. (2007): “Reines, regentes: le pouvoir féminin dans l’Épire royale”, in D. BERRANGE-ASSERVE (ed.): *Épire, Illyrie, Macedoine: Melanges offerts au professeur Pierre Cabanes*, Clermont-Ferrand: 253-271.
- (2010): “Reines et princesses au combat dans les Royaumes de Macédoine, d’Épire et d’Illyrie, IV^e-III^e siècles avant notre ère”, in P. NIVET – M. TREVISI (eds.): *Les femmes et la guerre de l’Antiquité à 1918*, Paris: 41-53.
- BRINGMANN, K. (2000): *Geben und Nehmen: Monarchische Wohltätigkeit und Selbstdarstellung im Zeitalter des Hellenismus*, Berlin.
- BUSZARD, B. B. (2008): “Caesar’s Ambition: A Combined Reading of Plutarch’s ‘Alexander-Caesar’ and ‘Pyrrhus-Marius’”, *TAPhA* 138: 185-215.
- CABANES, P. (1976): *L’Épire de la Mort de Pyrrhos à La Conquête Romaine*, Paris.
- (1980): “Société et Institutions dans les Monarchies de Grèce septentrionale au IV^e siècle”, *REG* 113: 324-351.
- (1988): “Les Concours Des Naia de Dodone”, *Nikephoros* 1: 49-84.
- CARLIER, P. (2002): “Homeric and Macedonian Kingship”, in R. BROCK – S. HODKINSON (eds.): *Alternatives to Athens. Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece*, Oxford: 259-268.
- CARNEY, E. D. (2000): *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia*, Norman.
- (2004): “Women and Military Leadership in Macedonia”, *AncW* 35: 184-193.
- (2006): *Olympias, Mother of Alexander the Great*, New York-London.
- CATALDI, S. (1990): “Il giuramento al popolo dei re molossi”, in G. NENCI – G. THÜR (eds.): *Symposion 1988. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Siena-Pisa, 6.8 Juni 1988, Cologne-Vienna: 179-192*.
- CHAPINAL-HERAS, D. (2014): “Genealogía heroica en el mundo epirota: la monarquía molosa”, *Arys* 12: 159-180.
- COPPOLA, A. (2016): “Kings, Gods and Heroes in a Dynastic Perspective. A Comparative Approach”, *Erga-Logoi. Rivista d’istoria, letteratura, diritto e culture dell’antichità* 4: 17-37.
- CROSS, G. N. (1932): *Epirus: A Study in Greek Constitutional Development*, Cambridge.
- D’AGOSTINI, M. (2019): *The Rise of Philip V: Kingship and Rule in the Hellenistic World*, Alexandria.
- EDSON, C. (1949): “The Tomb of Olympias”, *Hesperia* 18: 84-95.
- ERRINGTON, R. M. (1975): “Arybbas the Molossian”, *GRBS* 16: 41-50.
- FRANKE, P. (1955): *Alt-Epirus und das Königtum der Molosser*, Kallmünz.
- (1961): *Die antiken Münzen von Epirus*, I, Wiesbaden.

- FUNKE, S. (2000): "Apeiros 317-272 BC: The Struggle of the Diadochi and the Political Structure of the Federation", in L. MOOREN (ed.): *Politics, Administration and Society in the Hellenistic and Roman World*, Leuven: 107-121.
- GEER, R. M. (1962): *Diodorus of Sicily, vol. IX*, Cambridge, Mass.–London.
- HAMMOND, N. G. L. (1967): *Epirus*, Oxford.
- HATZOPOULOS, M. (2003): "Polis, Ethnos and Kingship in Northern Greece", in K. BURASELIS – D. ZOUMBOULAKIS (eds.): *The Idea of European Community in History*, Athens: 51-64.
- HECKEL, W. (2006): *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great*, Oxford.
- (2020): "The Limits of Brotherly Love: Neoptolemus II and Molossian Dynastic History", in M. D'AGOSTINI – E. M. ANSON – F. POWNALL (eds.): *Affective Relations and Personal Bonds in Hellenistic Antiquity*, Oxford: 63-77.
- HESKEL, J. (1988): "The Political Background of the Arybbas Decree", *GRBS* 29: 185-196.
- LANDUCCI GATTINONI, F. (2003): *L'arte del potere: Vita e opera di Cassandro di Macedonia*, Stuttgart.
- LÉVÊQUE, P. (1957): *Pyrrhos*, Paris.
- LUCCHERINI (2019): "The Genealogy of the last Aiakids of Epeiros" (https://www.academia.edu/41346551/the_genealogy_of_the_last_aiakids_of_epeiros, date of access: 08/4/2024).
- MONACO CATERINE, M. (2017): "Alexander-Imitators in the Age of Trajan: Plutarch's *Demetrius* and *Pyrrhus*", *CJ* 112: 406-430.
- MEYER, E. A. (2013): *The Inscriptions of Dodona and a New History of Molossia*, Stuttgart.
- MITCHELL, L. (2012): "The Women of Ruling Families in Archaic and Classical Greece", *CQ* 62: 1-21.
- MOSSMAN, J. (1992): "Plutarch, Pyrrhus, and Alexander", in P. STADTER (ed.): *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition*, London–New York: 90-108.
- OIKONOMIDES, A. (1982): "The Epigram on the Tomb of Olympias at Pydna", *AncW* 5: 9-16.
- PICININI, J. (2015.): "Past and Present Scholarship on the "Politeia" of the Epirotes and a New Book on the History of Molossia", *AC* 84: 227-235.
- POUZADOUX, C. (1998): "Mythe et histoire des ancêtres royaux de Pyrrhus: formes et fonctions de la généalogie mythique dans l'historiographie de la monarchie épirote", in D. AUGER – S. SAÏD (eds.): *Généalogies mythiques: actes du VIIIe colloque du Centre de recherches mythologiques de l'Université de Paris-X Chantilly, 14-16 septembre 1995*, Paris: 419-443.
- RAYNOR, B. (2017.): "Alexander I of Molossia and the Creation of Apeiros", *Chiron* 47: 243-270.
- (2019): "Pyrrhus, Royal Self-Presentation, and the Nature of the Hellenistic Epirote State", *REA* 121: 307-328.
- ROBINSON, D. M. (1953): "Macedonica: I. the Epigram of Aeacid Alcimachus", in *Geras A. Keramopoulou*, Athens: 149-156.

- SCHOLTEN, J. B. (2000): *The Politics of Plunder: The Aitolians and their Koinon in the early Hellenistic Era 270-17 BC*, Berkeley.
- SAVALLI-LESTRADE, I. (2015): “Les adieux à la basilissa. Mise en scène et mise en intrigue de la mort des femmes royales dans le monde hellénistique”, *Chiron* 45: 187-219.
- WATERFIELD, R. (2019): *Diodorus of Sicily: The Library, Books 16-20*, Oxford.
- WHEATLEY, P.; DUNN, C. (2020): *Demetrius the Besieger*, Oxford.