Deconstructing Exclamations*

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Abstract

While it is still not widely accepted that exclamatives are a clause type, exclamations are intuitively considered a speech act comparable to assertions and questions. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the notion of exclamations. In particular, I compare the pragmatic properties of wh-exclamatives with the discourse distribution of other so-called exclamations and argue that they do not have a uniform way to update the Common Ground; by using a series of tests, I show that the sole thing they have in common is an emphatic intonation and a non-neutral attitude on the part of the speaker.

Key words: exclamations, exclamative sentences, speech acts, Common Ground.

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1. Introduction

Usually, the terms exclamative and exclamation are used sloppily to refer to the same kind of phenomenon. Sometimes, though, they are meant to refer to two different phenomena; namely, an exclamative is a syntactic construction and an exclamation is a pragmatic construction whose role is to express the speaker’s feelings. However, even if we agree that this is a meaningful distinction, the term exclamation remains a sloppy concept. That is, it seems reasonable to assume that wh-exclamatives are used to perform exclamations, but it is not clear what these

* I truly appreciate the comments and suggestions of Xavier Villalba. Of course, the remaining errors are all mine.
have in common with other syntactic constructions that are supposed to behave like exclamations. Furthermore, we do not have a formalized description of how an exclamation updates the Common Ground, as opposed to assertions and questions.

The purpose of this article is to review a number of constructions that could fall within the label of *exclamations*, classify them according to their syntactic structure and discuss whether they have a uniform pragmatic behavior. To do so, the characterization of other speech acts such as assertions and questions will be used against exclamations, and a series of tests will be proposed and passed on every relevant construction to show that each construction responds differently to them. Hence, this study not only has important consequences for the description of a series of understudied syntactic constructions that involve a non-neutral intonation, but also for a theory of speech acts.

My first claim is that exclamations are part of the broader group of expressive speech acts, even though exclamations have a special behavior since the expressive meaning is not conveyed by a performative verb. Second, of all the constructions that will be studied in this paper, some of them are not (at least exclusively) used as exclamations. Finally, what they all have in common is not precisely the way they update the Common Ground, but an expressive meaning that, in most of the cases, is conveyed by a non-neutral intonation.

The structure of the paper is as follows: the first section is devoted to briefly review the theoretical background on speech acts and discourse updating. In particular, I summarize the basic ideas about speech acts and the Stalnakerian dynamic approach to discourse. I then present *wh*-exclamatives as an example of exclamation. I analyze their discourse properties and separate out a series of relevant parameters that define their pragmatic behavior. Later on, I classify a number of constructions that may be considered exclamations in Catalan and show that they do not have a uniform pragmatic behavior in light of the parameters that describe *wh*-exclamatives. Finally I discuss the notion of exclamation and exclamatory speech act in view of the facts presented in this article.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Speech acts

The philosopher J. L. Austin established a distinction between constative and performative utterances and coined the term *illocutionary act* (cf. Austin 1962). He introduced the idea that certain utterances were not a mere description of a situation, but they were able to do things. For instance, uttering a sentence like (1) does not describe or report anything, it does not have a truth value, but rather is (or is part of) doing something, if the necessary conditions hold. In this case, the baptism of a ship, if the sentence is uttered when smashing a bottle against it.

(1) I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.
At this point Austin only considers a subset of the utterances as being able to do things, namely those that could be introduced by a performative verb (a predicate on the first person singular, indicative mood and present tense). For example:

(2) a. I advise you to be gentle with this rich woman.
    b. I order you to wash the dishes.
    c. I accuse you of being rude.

However, in subsequent lectures, he extends this performative power to all utterances and proposes that any utterance includes three types of act: a locutionary act (i.e., the pronunciation of a meaningful sequence of words), an illocutionary act (i.e., what we do in saying something) and a perlocutionary act (i.e., what we do by saying something). In a nutshell, a locutionary act has a meaning, an illocutionary act has a force and a perlocutionary act has an effect, and they are performed simultaneously.

Let us now focus on illocutionary acts. Austin lists a few examples of such acts:

asking or answering a question, giving some information or an assurance or a warning, announcing a verdict or an invitation, pronouncing a sentence, making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism, making an identification or giving a description. Austin (1962: 98).

On page 109 he also mentions informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, &c., i.e. utterances which have a certain (conventional) force. That is, we do not find any trace of an illocutionary act that we can identify with exclamations, even though we do find asking a question and informing.

J. R. Searle takes up Austin’s job—even if he rejects Austin’s approach to the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts—and analyzes what he calls speech acts, which are the minimal meaningful unit of study under his framework. According to him, speaking involves performing speech acts, which are governed by specific rules that the speaker must follow in order to communicate successfully. Interestingly, in Searle (1969) he considers eight speech acts under study, namely: request, assert (state, affirm), question, thank (for), advise, warn, greet and congratulate.

In contrast, in Searle (1979: 29), he mentions only five basic actions we can perform with language: “If we adopt illocutionary point as the basic notion on which to classify uses of language, then there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language: we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to doing things, we express our feelings and attitudes and we bring about changes through our utterances. Often, we do more than one of these at once in the same utterance.” Here we can finally find a speech act that could include exclamations, because he considers expressive speech acts (see above “we express our feelings and attitudes”). According to Searle, the point of these
illocutionary acts is to "express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content". Hence, these are illocutionary acts that can be introduced by a performative verb, for instance, thank, congratulate, apologize, condole, deplore and welcome. Additionally, he mentions that the truth of the proposition (i.e., the sentential complement of the performative verb) is presupposed, because the speaker is not trying to introduce the information contained in it as new information. Finally, it is interesting that he accepts the possibility of performing more than one speech act at a time, which may be useful to describe certain utterances that look like exclamations but also like assertions (cf. section 4.1.3).

On the other hand, we are interested in the parameters he uses to differentiate speech acts, so we can capture the essence of exclamations and identify the properties that make them different from other speech acts like assertions and questions. Searle (1969: 77) proposes seven ways to distinguish among speech acts:

— The purpose of the act: statement vs. question.
— The relative positions of speaker and hearer: request vs. order.
— The degree of commitment undertaken: expression of intention vs. promise.
— The propositional content: prediction vs. report.
— The way in which the proposition relates to the interest of the speaker and the hearer: warning vs. prediction.
— The psychological states expressed: promise (i.e., expression of intention) vs. statement (i.e., expression of belief).
— The ways in which an utterance relates to the rest of the conversation: replying vs. objecting.

At this point two basic questions arise: first, can these parameters distinguish between expressive speech acts and, say, assertive speech acts?, and second, does all of the so-called exclamations behave uniformly according to these parameters? Probably, we cannot answer the first question without taking into account the answer to the second one, so let us pretend that expressive speech acts are those represented by sentences that include an expressive performative verb on the first person and in present tense, e.g., I apologize. If we accept that the purpose of expressives is to express the speaker’s feelings and attitudes, we rapidly find a difference with assertions (or statements, in Searle’s terms), because the latter are uttered to tell how things are. However, once we have established this distinction, it might be difficult to make any comments about the rest of the parameters, maybe because it is not easy to judge what is the degree of commitment in an exclamation and in an assertion. In other words, it is likely that the criteria above are useful to distinguish between pairs of speech acts, but all of them might not apply to every speech act. In order to explore the distinction between assertions and exclamations in terms of context change potentials, we will briefly look at Stalnaker’s theory in the following section. But first, let us consider the second question. Even though one of the goals of this paper is to show that the different constructions that can be labeled exclamations do not behave uniformly, there is a quite recent proposal by K. J. Saebø
(Saebø 2005), who claims that exclamatives and other similar constructions belong to the broad group of expressive speech acts. Here is his characterization of these speech acts:

(3) Expression(e)(p)(a)(s): only if $e$ is an utterance of $p$ to $a$ by $s$ designed to communicate to $a$ a modal attitude of $s$ to $p$.

Where $e$ is an utterance, $p$ is the proposition, $a$ is the addressee and $s$ is the speaker.

He includes, among expressive speech acts, the following syntactic constructions in French and English:

(4) a. Que la foudre tombe sur une pareille maison! [French that-clause]
   ‘I wish lightning would strike that house!’

   b. How cold it is! [indirect question]

   c. Comme il fait froid! [French special construction]
   ‘How cold it is!’

In subsequent sections, a number of constructions in Catalan will be taken into account (but not exactly the ones that Saebø mentions). As we will see, if we want all of them to be treated like exclamations, even a broader definition of expressive speech act will be needed.

2.2 Updating the Common Ground

The work by R. Stalnaker (e.g., Stalnaker 1978, 1998) develops P. Grice’s notion of pragmatic presupposition and explores a way of formalizing the effect of assertions in the scenario of a conversation. In particular, he characterizes the effect they have on discourse from a dynamic view and the framework of possible worlds semantics, because he is interested in the context change potentials of such speech acts. According to Stalnaker, when speakers fall into conversation, they have a shared knowledge that he describes as a Common Ground.¹ The Common Ground is characterized as the set of propositions that correspond to the mutual beliefs of the participants, that is, the body of information that every speaker believes that the other speaker(s) believe(s) to be true. Stalnaker approaches the dynamics of a conversation as a process of erasing the worlds that cannot be possible worlds after a speaker has made an assertion and it has been accepted by the rest of the audience. That is why he represents the context as a context set, i.e., the set of possible worlds compatible with the presuppositions of the participants in discourse.

¹. Even if this term has been reviewed in further studies and even been replaced by others such as relevant knowledge in Gauker (2002), I do not think that these precisions have an effect on the account of the context change potential of exclamations, so for the sake of simplicity, I will make use of the term Common Ground.
Here is the formalization of each of these concepts:

(5) From Gunlogson (2001)

a. Common Ground of a discourse = \{ p \in \wp(W): p \text{ is a mutual belief of the participants in the discourse} \}

b. Context set of a discourse = \{ w \in W: \text{the mutual beliefs of the discourse participants are true of } w \}

In this manner, the goal of the participants in a conversation is to exchange information, and this process is characterized as the reduction of the context set: every time a speaker makes an assertion (and it is not rejected by another participant), all the worlds that are incompatible with the truth of the proposition expressed are erased from the context set and, hence, the Common Ground is updated. In other words, when a conversation starts, the context set may contain a huge amount of worlds that are compatible with propositions that have not been rejected so far. For example, when participants A and B begin to talk, the context set may include worlds in which both A and B believe or not believe that The Catalan Journal of Linguistics is a publication devoted to Catalan linguistics. Nevertheless, once B utters: The Catalan Journal of Linguistics is a publication devoted to Catalan linguistics and this statement is accepted by A, then all the worlds in which there is no such thing as The Catalan Journal of Linguistics, or where The Catalan Journal of Linguistics is a publication devoted to Catalan biology are erased from the context set.

Another important contribution of this theory concerns the identification of two different ways by which the Common Ground is updated. First, the linguistic content of the propositions that is conveyed by assertions erases the worlds that are incompatible with the context set at a certain moment of the conversation, as we have shown so far. Second, the Common Ground includes information of various sorts that is not linguistically codified. For example, the sole fact that the participants are speaking or that they all believe to speak the same language are part of the mutual knowledge of the participants in a conversation. Likewise, as Stalnaker (1978: 323) points out:

…any obviously observable change in the physical surroundings of the conversation will change the presumed common knowledge. If a goat walked into the room, it would normally be presupposed, from that point, that there was a goat in the room. And the fact that this was presupposed might be exploited in the conversation, as when someone asks, “How did that thing get in here?”, assuming that others will know what he is talking about.

Given these two ways of updating the Common Ground, we want to find out whether there are any correspondences between assertions and exclamations. That is, when uttering an exclamation what worlds are we erasing? In other words, how does an exclamation update the Common Ground? As will be seen shortly, if we con-
sider an exclamation as a sort of expressive speech act, an exclamation will at least modify the context by virtue of the fact that the speaker is performing the speech act of expressing his/her emotional attitude. Precisely, this is an instance of the second type of information that is taken for granted in a conversation and acknowledged by the participants (cf. Stalnaker 1998).

So far, we have seen that Stalnaker’s approach nicely represents the way assertions update the Common Ground. Nevertheless, once we try to account for other syntactic constructions, it may be the case that the tools that we used before are not enough. This happens when we want to establish a distinction between falling declaratives and rising declaratives in English. Gunlogson (2001) proposes a few changes to the Stalnakerian framework to account for rising polar interrogatives (6a), rising declaratives (6b) and falling declaratives (6c). Here are the three different clauses that she compares:

(6) From Gunlogson (2001: 1)
   a. Is it raining? (Rising polar interrogative)
   b. It’s raining? (Rising declarative)
   c. It’s raining. (Falling declarative)

The relevant parameters that are employed to draw the distinction presented in (6) are commitment and bias. Intuitively, to commit the propositional content of an utterance to a discourse participant means to confer this belief to this participant. And bias applies to a context that presents a proposition \( p \) as being easier to become a mutual belief than \( Wp \) (the complementary set of worlds, the worlds of which \( \neg p \) is true). In other words, a context is neutral (not biased) when \( p \) and \( \neg p \) are equally eligible as mutual beliefs; and it is biased if only \( p \) or \( \neg p \) can become a mutual belief. Here is how she formalizes this distinction:

(7) a. \( C \) is biased toward \( p \) iff \( Wp \) is controversial in \( C \) and \( p \) is not controversial in \( C \)
   b. \( C \) is neutral with respect to \( p \) iff neither \( p \) nor \( Wp \) is controversial in \( C \).

Briefly, falling declaratives commit the speaker to the propositional content of the sentence and the context is biased; rising polar interrogatives commit the addressee to the propositional content and the context is neutral; finally, rising declaratives commit the addressee to the propositional content, but the context is biased.

In other words, falling declaratives (which are described here as making assertions) commit the speaker (s/he is responsible for the truth of their propositional content) and they bias the context, because only \( p \) or \( \neg p \) can become a mutual belief.

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2. The term noncontroversial will be brought up again in subsequent sections, where I assume that presupposed content should be treated as noncontroversial information, in line with Atlas (2005).
Without the need of revision of one of the participants on his/her previous position.

With an example, if a speaker utters *Dogs make better pets than cats*, s/he treats this propositional content as his/her own belief and if we want this proposition to become mutual knowledge, then the addressee must ratify that dogs make better than cats. On the other hand, polar interrogatives commit the addressee and keep the context neutral. Here is an illustration: *Do dogs make better pets than cats?* The utterer of this sentence confers the truth of this proposition to the addressee and, still, both answers *yes* and *no* (i.e., *p* and *¬p*) are equally able of becoming a mutual belief. Finally, rising declaratives have properties of both assertions and questions. Certainly, the speaker commits the addressee, because s/he is not certain about the propositional content, but, still, this kind of utterance biases the context towards *p*. The example would be: *Dogs make better pets than cats?* (observe that there is not *do*-support).

Now, if falling declaratives (which roughly correspond to assertions) are characterized as involving the speaker’s commitment and a biased context, what is the effect of an exclamation? In the following subsection I argue that commitment and bias are not enough to establish a distinction between the discourse contribution of assertions and *wh*-exclamatives, because the latter also commit the speaker and involve a biased context.

Nonetheless, there is still another relevant question: do all exclamations make the same contribution to discourse? In subsequent sections I will consider what every construction that can be called an *exclamation* has in common, whether we can say something else about the definition of an exclamation and whether the preceding constructions should be treated as performing exclamations. I will begin by spelling out the pragmatic properties of *wh*-exclamatives; I will then present a few tests that characterize their pragmatic behavior and apply them to a series of constructions in Catalan that seem to function as exclamations. This way we will realize that their distribution is only partially symmetric. This section will conclude with a discussion about the characterization of an exclamatory speech act and about the criteria that must define speech acts.

### 3. *Wh*-exclamatives: the control group

In this section I analyze the discourse distribution of *wh*-exclamatives. I will focus on both felicitous and infelicitous cases, and I will describe these contexts in order to understand how they update the Common Ground and in what way they differ from assertions and questions. The assumption I make is that *wh*-exclamatives behave like exclamations, so at least some of their pragmatic properties have to be properties of exclamations. In other words, I treat *wh*-exclamatives as the control group against which I will compare the rest of so-called exclamations to find out which properties coincide in all these constructions and which properties are construction-dependent.

Roughly, two possible contexts are felicitous for exclamatives, both of which are characterized by the fact that there is no participant who commits the speaker to any propositional content. That is, exclamatives are felicitously uttered as a
response to a stimulus, but they do not respond to a request of another participant. This is so because exclamatives do not include any asserted meaning. Instead, they contain a backgrounded descriptive content and an implicated meaning that is identified as an attitude towards a degree, none of which have assertoric power.

### 3.1 Felicity conditions

#### 3.1.1 Infelicity

Grimshaw (1979) first faces the pragmatic difference with respect to assertions and interrogatives that exclamatives exhibit. Specifically, she shows that these clauses are unable to answer a degree *wh*-question:

(8) A: How tall is Bill? B: # How tall he is!

According to Grimshaw, the exclamative includes the semantic content that answers the question (i.e., understanding the previous exclamative involves interpreting that the degree to which Bill is tall is high), but the fact that this does not make an adequate answer leads her to propose that exclamatives include an additional ingredient: factivity. Up to that moment, Elliott (1974) had noticed that exclamatives could only embed in factive predicates, but Grimshaw (1979) first proposes that exclamatives themselves are factive, because they involve the following presupposition:

(9) How tall Bill is! \(\rightarrow\) Bill is tall.

Zanuttini and Portner (2003) treat (8) as a constituency test to identify exclamatives, and they also blame factivity of their inability to function as answers. However, even if factivity is responsible for this behavior, the presupposed content in Grimshaw (1979) and Zanuttini and Portner (2003) is not the same. Very briefly, according to Zanuttini and Portner, the basic ingredients of exclamatives are a [+wh] feature and a factive morpheme FAC. Whenever these two conditions are met, a pragmatic inference called widening arises. Widening is the formalization of a conventional scalar implicature according to which the proposition expressed by the exclamative lies at the extreme end of a scale. Crucially, *wh*-exclamatives have the same denotation of questions – that is why they are both *wh*-clauses –; in other words, they denote a set of alternatives. In the case of exclamatives, alternatives are an ordered set of propositions. The effect of widening is to create a broader set of propositions that correspond to the unexpected answers to the question expressed by the *wh*-clause. Factivity makes sure that Widening arises and that the existence of the propositions that belong to the set of unexpected answers is presupposed. They endorse Grimshaw’s explanation of presupposed content of exclamatives as follows: questions cannot be answered with answers that are already presupposed. Also, they interpret these facts as evidence that exclamatives do not function as assertions.
I agree that wh-exclamatives lack assertoric power, but the test in (8) can treat as non-assertions clauses that do not make good answers for other reasons, and it is not always true that exclamatives are totally useless as answers to questions. Note that wh-exclamatives are felicitous as answers to certain questions, even though they are not straight answers:

(10) a. A: Què et sembla si anem a Cala S’Alguer?
    ‘A: Why don’t we go to Cala S’Alguer?’
    (lit. What seems it to you if we go to Cala S’Alguer?)
   
   b. B: Quina idea tan fantàstica!
      ‘B: What a wonderful idea!’

In (10), the exclamative is the response to the proposal to go to Cala S’Alguer, not to the question. It is felicitous, because the speaker does not exactly expect from the addressee a report on his/her idea, but rather his/her emotional reaction towards the proposal. Moreover, this is probably a conventionalized dialog that does not extend to other less usual situations. Observe that we cannot answer a question that asks about a person with an exclamative:

(11) a. A: Què et sembla la Maria?
    ‘A: What’s your opinion on Maria?’
   
   b. B: # Quina noia tan fantàstica!
      ‘B: What a wonderful girl!’

In the next example we do not have a wh-question, but a polar question that requires a yes/no answer.

(12) a. A: Creus que em donaran la feina?
    ‘A: Do you think I will get the job?’
   
   b. B: Que ingenu que ets!
      ‘B: How naive you are!’

Obviously, an exclamative does not qualify as a yes/no answer, but we implicate that the answer is no by the maxim of relevance and, at the same time, we convey the information that A is naive to even think he will get the job and that we experience an emotional attitude towards the degree to which the speaker is naive.

In other words, the exclamative in (12) is a response to the fact that the speaker believes he has a chance to get the job. That is, the dialog could be the following:

(13) A: I believe I might get the job. B: How naive you are!

Note that a declarative would practically have the same effect, except for the expression of B’s emotional attitude:
(14) a. A: Creus que em donaran la feina?
   b. B: Ets un ingenu.
      '(lit.) You are a naive.'

Observe that it could be the case that the question is asking about a degree and, still, we can use an exclamative as an answer, but, again, it does not give an answer about the degree of ADJ-ness of an individual. Instead, it makes a comment about what B presumes A actually means. For instance, A is not used to dating girls and his aunt has set him up with her neighbor. Everybody thinks A should not go on a blind date, so when A asks (15), B understands that he is planning to meet the girl. A can get many answers, as (16) shows.

(15) A: How pretty is she?

(16) a. B1: Are you crazy?
   b. B2: You have to be kidding.
   c. B3: Get out of here!
   d. B4: Oh, please!
   e. B5: How stupid you are!

To recap, we have two different situations here. On the one hand, it becomes clear that exclamatives cannot answer questions about degree (cf. (8)), and on the other hand, it has been shown that they may occupy the position of an answer to other kinds of questions even and provide non-required information, if we let relevance guide us to infer the answer (cf. (12)). That is why here alternative tests are proposed to understand exactly in what circumstances exclamatives are felicitous.

First, I will use the following test to show that when a speaker utters an exclamative, s/he does not intend to introduce its descriptive and expressive contents as new information:

(17) a. I've got some news / you're going to love this / check this out: Pau is very tall.
   b. I've got some news / you’re going to love this / check this out: #How tall Pau is!

In all the infelicitous cases that we have reviewed, the speaker is committed to the descriptive and expressive content that s/he conveys, but s/he does not treat these contents as new information; that is, the speaker is not trying to satisfy the addressee’s needs by resolving which worlds are possible worlds, even though some worlds are directly erased once the speaker has uttered an exclamative.

3. I use ADJ as a cover term for any gradable predicate. The suffix –ness turns the adjective in question into a noun.
4. This is inspired in the propositionhood test proposed in Ginzburg and Sag (2001).
For this reason, similar situations are also awkward. For instance, imagine a teacher in a class on ancient history. S/he cannot explain the Rise of the Roman Empire by saying *How powerful the Roman Empire was!* Or suppose a situation in which a doctor has bad news about a patient. S/he cannot explain to the patient his/her serious condition by saying *How seriously injured you are!* In both cases this would be interpreted as a lack of empathy, because the speaker would not be taking into account that s/he is expected to provide his/her audience with an information in the appropriate shape. Even if the audience does not publicly commit the speaker, it is conventionally so that students and patients require that teachers and doctors provide them with the information in a specific form.

A second interesting test\(^5\) that distinguishes exclamatives from assertions is the following: exclamatives cannot be naturally inserted in a narration, whereas declaratives that function as assertions can. For example:

(18) a. I looked at the ceiling and I saw an extremely tall boy.
   b. #I looked at the ceiling and what an extremely tall boy I saw!

This contrast shows that we cannot coordinate two types of speech acts naturally. In particular, it is odd to start a narration with the intention to use our discourse to reduce the context set and, suddenly, perform another speech act that involves a change in the speaker’s agenda with respect to his/her discourse.

A final test that highlights the situations in which exclamatives are infelicitous is to see whether they are used to defend the speaker’s position in a discussion. As shall be seen below, one cannot argue by using an exclamative, even though the speaker is committed to the content s/he expresses.

(19) a. A: You don’t like tomato soup.
   b. B1: Yes, I do! I love tomato soup. I think it’s wonderful!
   c. B2: #Yes, I do! How wonderful tomato soup is!

What we see in the previous example is that, even though B1 and B2 include similar information, it is presented in different manners, such that the information conveyed by an exclamative cannot be used to create a debate about its truthfulness. On the one hand, as shall be seen shortly, the expressive content of an exclamative cannot be negated, because it is a speaker-oriented (subjective) kind of meaning; and on the other hand, the descriptive meaning is understood by the speaker as the cause of the expressive meaning, and, as such, it is not a content whose truth depends on the addressee’s judgement but rather the speaker treats it as noncontroversial information. I refer roughly to the term *noncontroversial* as developed by Atlas and Levinson (1981) and Atlas (2005), who argue that presupposed information does not need to be part of the Common Ground, but is stored

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5. Due to X. Villalba, p.c.
separately and is accessible to use in a conversation. This includes the existence of singular terms and the truth of states of affairs and propositions. For a detailed explanation see the aforementioned references.

Summing up, exclamatives are infelicitous in situations in which assertions are required. These include cases where the addressee commits the speaker to provide a certain information, whether it is in a direct way—as in question-answer pairs—or in an indirect way—as in the doctor-patient scenario--; cases where the speaker commits him/herself to provide new information, and cases where the information conveyed has to be used to argue against another belief (that is, when the speaker wishes that the truth of the proposition expressed be accepted by the audience).

3.1.2 Felicity
So far, we have reviewed the numerous situations in which exclamatives are infelicitous. In this subsection I want to describe the scenarios in which they are felicitous. I have classified the contexts into two depending on whether or not they are compatible with contexts that allow the occurrence of assertions. Crucially, exclamatives never occur in situations in which an assertion is required, but they may co-occur in the rest of the cases. Consequently, exclamatives are not uttered to satisfy the addressee’s need of information or to defend the speaker’s point of view. These two scenarios differ in one single aspect: whether or not the speaker treats the addressee as a participant who is able to make a similar utterance. Specifically, when the addressee is considered to be equally qualified to make a comment about a certain fact, then exclamatives are felicitous, and when this is not the case, then exclamatives are felicitous as long as a participant does not overtly commit the person who utters the exclamative to a certain propositional content. I will name the first case scenario I and the second one, scenario II.

3.1.3 Scenario I
The main characteristic of Scenario I is that it makes compatible exclamatives and declaratives that do not function as assertions. These kind of declaratives are analyzed by Gunlogson (2005), who proposes the examples in (20), which are not uttered to erase the worlds that are incompatible with the proposition uttered by the speaker.

(20) a. It’s a beautiful evening for a walk. [Said to a companion in the same locale.]
    b. That was disappointing. [To a companion exiting a movie.]
    c. He’s very entertaining. [Said about a mutual acquaintance.]

Under the circumstances described in brackets, it becomes pragmatically odd to consider (20) the answers to these questions:

(21) a. What’s the weather like?
    b. How was the movie?
    c. What’s he like?
That is because the following assumptions about the speaker’s view of the addressee hold:

(22) a. The speaker believes that $p$.
   
   b. (The speaker believes that) the addressee believes $p$ or $\neg p$ (or at least is capable of forming such a belief).
   
   c. The speaker does not necessarily know which of $p$ or $\neg p$ the addressee inclines to.

A further diagnostic in favor of considering that these declaratives are not intended to introduce new information is that they can be accompanied by a question tag like *isn’t it?*, which is used to ask for confirmation.

(23) It’s a beautiful evening for a walk, isn’t it? [Said to a companion in the same locale.]

Of course, if the speaker did not consider the addressee knowledgeable, it would not make any sense to ask for his/her confirmation.

Additionally, these declaratives may be answered *yes/no* depending on the addressee’s inclination, because the speaker is making him an authority instead of considering him a participant who seeks unknown information.

(24) a. A: It’s a beautiful evening for a walk.
   
   b. B: Yes/No/Indeed.

Now let us try to apply this characterization to exclamatives. Imagine that Bernat and Maurici are two supporters of F.C. Barcelona. They are both sitting on their seats at the stadium and following the game. At some point, Ronaldinho scores a beautiful goal. Once they have celebrated it, Bernat looks at Maurici and utters:

(25) Quin jugador tan bo!
   ‘What a wonderful player!’

We can use the previous diagnostics and realize exclamatives behave like these particular declaratives in terms of the roles of the participants.6

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6. The confirmation tag *oi?* has to positions when used with declaratives. Aside from occurring at the end of the utterance, it may appear at the beginning, followed by a complementizer. Observe the following data:

   (i) És un jugador molt bo, *oi?*
      is a player very good *oi*
      ‘He’s a very good player, isn’t he?’

   (ii) Oi que és un jugador molt bo?
      *oi* that is a player very good
      ‘Isn’t he a very good player?’
It is particularly interesting to realize that exclamatives are felicitous utterances whenever the speaker considers the addressee to be knowledgeable; that is, when there is no point in introducing information with the aim of narrowing the Common Ground. Of course, the effect is not the same if we utter an exclamative or a declarative. As will be shown very shortly, exclamatives involve two kinds of content: a descriptive one and an implicated one. Hence, by uttering an exclamative, the speaker is able to convey more information with a single utterance. In the case of Ronaldinho, Maurici can make the following inferences:

(27) a. Bernat treats me as a knowledgeable participant.
   b. Bernat believes that Ronaldinho is a good player. In fact, he is good to a high degree.
   c. The degree to which Ronaldinho is good is high enough to provoke an emotional attitude in Bernat.

3.1.4 Scenario II
It has become clear that exclamatives may be uttered when the speaker believes the addressee is equally capable of making such an utterance, but this is not the only case where speakers utter exclamatives. It is the turn to see how these contexts are characterized. These are cases in which the speaker is not expected to erase the worlds that are not possible worlds by means of an assertion. Hence, scenario II includes any situation in which the speaker need not take into account the addressee’s expectations and may reply to a stimulus, where by stimulus I mean any kind of information that has narrowed the Common Ground in the previous moment. As has been exposed in section 2.2, this information may be linguistic (e.g., a proposition that has been uttered by another participant) or extra-linguistic (e.g., the appearance of any salient object in the context of utterance).

To illustrate this with two examples, see first one case of a proposition interpreted by the speaker as a stimulus. This is a situation in which Ernest is engaged in a conversation with Pasqual. The former is informing the latter about the last meeting with the general manager of the company (Josep), which Pasqual could
not attend, because he was sick. Apparently, Josep took his chance to criticize Pasqual’s work so far. When Pasqual learns this, he gets angry and utters:

(28) Que covard que és!
   How coward that is
   ‘What a coward he is!’

The second example illustrates the presence of an extra-linguistic stimulus. Imagine Christmas Day. Since the whole family gathers once a year, it is normally the case that people make comments about other people’s physical changes. For instance:

(29) a. Com has crescut!
    ‘How much you have grown!’

b. Que guapo que t’has fet!
    how handsome that to.you.AUX.you done
    ‘How handsome you have become!’

Here, the physical changes are interpreted as an appealing stimulus by the speaker, because they represent a new state of affairs.

Interestingly, in scenario II a declarative is also possible, but in this case the speaker does not treat the addressee as knowledgeable. Here a declarative like Josep is a coward or You have grown a lot would behave like plain assertions. This means that their descriptive content is intended to divide the worlds from the context set into possible and not possible, and this happens only if the proposition is accepted by the audience. As shall be seen below, even if the effect of such declaratives and the exclamatives in (28) and (29) is apparently the same, the way the information is presented differs, because in the case of exclamatives, there is an expressive meaning that is contributed in the shape of a presupposition, and the descriptive meaning of the clause is understood as the cause of the expressive content, not as a meaning that is intended to reduce the context set.

3.2 Analysis

In this subsection I want to show that exclamatives resemble declaratives in that they both involve commitment of the speaker and a biased context. Their different behavior will, thus, have to arise from a different source, which has to do with how exclamatives update the Common Ground. As proposed in Castroviejo (2006b), I argue that exclamatives involve an expressive meaning identified as an attitude towards a degree, but here I make a step further. Specifically, I side with Schlenker (2007) in treating expressive meaning as a particular case of presupposition, and

7. Abbreviations: APPROX = approximate translation, AUX = auxiliary, CL = clitic, COMP = complementizer, LIT = literal translation, NEG = negation, SUB = subjunctive mood.
hence I will argue that exclamatives contribute an expressive meaning that is accommodated by the addressee and which is similar to that of interjections, the only difference being that exclamatives also include a descriptive meaning, which encodes the cause of the speaker’s attitude.

3.2.1 Commitment and bias
Let us start by taking up again the concepts commitment and bias. We have previously seen that falling declaratives commit the speaker, since s/he is responsible for the truth of the proposition that is uttered. Also, when a speaker utters a sentence that corresponds to the proposition $p$ (recall, for example, *Dogs make better pets than cats*), then the context is biased towards $p$, which means that to achieve mutual knowledge, the addressee can only ratify $p$ unless the speaker revises his/her previous position. In other words, the addressee is forced to accept that dogs make better pets than cats in order not to induce controversy.

Accordingly, when a speaker utters *How tall Pau is!*, s/he is not conferring this belief to the addressee, precisely because the former does not expect the latter to provide him/her with an answer. Furthermore, such an utterance forces the addressee to accept that, for instance, Pau is surprisingly tall if s/he does not want to trigger controversy, which means that the context is also biased. However, it has become obvious that declaratives that function as assertions do not have the same discourse distribution as exclamatives. Therefore, an additional parameter should be described in order to make this distinction clear.

3.2.2 Two types of content
In the previous subsection, we have paraphrased an exclamative like *How tall Pau is!* as roughly *Pau is surprisingly tall*, but here I would like to propose that, even if the addressee can make this inference, exclamatives actually involve two types of content: a descriptive one and an expressive one. In Castroviejo (2006b) I treat *wh*-exclamatives as a special kind of degree construction. They contain a degree word like a regular degree construction, but they do not update the Common Ground like a declarative (whence *special*). I propose that *wh*-exclamatives include a descriptive content that the speaker takes for granted (i.e., a fact) and an implicated content that is described as an emotional attitude towards a degree. Here is an example:

(30) Quina pel·lícula tan entretinguda que vaig veure!
‘What an entertaining movie I saw!’

a. Fact: $\exists x [\text{pel·lícula}(x) \land \text{TAN}(\text{entretinguda}(x))(d) \land \text{veure}(s)(x)]$
Where:
(i) $[[\text{TAN}(d)]] = 1 \iff d \geq d_e$
(ii) $d_e = d_f$
(iii) $d_f$ is a degree recovered from context that is high.

b. Contribution: the speaker experiences an attitude towards $^\text{TAN}(\text{entretinguda}(x))(d_f)$
What we see in (30a) is the descriptive content of an exclamative, which is the verbally codified information of an exclamative that is not presented as an assertion. It is the backgrounded information that represents the cause of the speaker’s emotional attitude. Specifically, it is the high degree to which the movie that the speaker saw was entertaining what provokes an attitude in the speaker. And this high degree derives from the presence of the degree operator \(\tan\), which establishes a \(\geq\) relation between two degrees: a reference degree (here, the degree to which the movie is entertaining) and a standard degree that is recovered from context and that is always high.

In (30b) I represent the implicated meaning that is conventionally associated with exclamative constructions. I adopt the term “attitude toward degree” from Katz (2005), who analyzes a subset of deadjectival manner adverbs whose adjective is interpreted roughly as expressing an emotional attitude towards a degree (e.g., surprisingly empty or frustratingly late). More specifically, I mean any emotional feeling that is caused by a high degree of ADJ-ness, such as surprise, happiness, rage, satisfaction or smugness. As a matter of fact, these attitudes are the ones that also interjections convey. That is why whenever interjections and exclamatives co-occur, the interjection is interpreted emphatically as a reduplication of the expression of the speaker’s attitude; thus, it does not introduce an additional meaning.

Taking into account what has been proposed in the preceding paragraphs, the question is how to establish a difference between (31a) and (31b).

\[
\begin{align*}
(31) & \ a. \ I’m \ amazed \ at \ Pau’s \ tallness. \\
 & b. \ How \ tall \ Pau \ is!
\end{align*}
\]

As has been previously said, both declaratives and exclamatives commit the speaker and bias the context towards \(p\). Certainly, in (31a), the speaker is committed to the content of “I’m amazed at Pau’s tallness”, but in (31b) the speaker is both committed to the descriptive content of the clause (i.e., that Pau is at least as tall as a high degree of tallness that is recovered from context) and to the expressive meaning of the clause (i.e., the emotional attitude towards Pau’s high degree of tallness). Moreover, as we will see shortly, the purposes of assertions and expressives are not the same: the speaker who makes an assertion wants to provide information, and the speaker who utters an exclamative wants to express him/herself.

### 3.2.3 An expressive construction

Indeed, a speaker who utters an exclamative does not have the same purpose as a speaker who makes an assertion. Whereas assertions are intended to reduce the context set, a speaker utters an exclamative to express him/herself. It is not relevant if the result of this expression involves erasing worlds in the context set that

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8. The proposed paraphrases would be: the degree to which \(x\) is empty/late is surprising/frustrating and it would be surprising/frustrating were it higher.
9. Thanks to B. Arsenijevic for pointing this out to me.
are incompatible with the speaker experiencing an attitude towards a degree, because this is not his/her goal. That is because the person who utters an exclamative does not take into account what the addressee knows or wants to know. What matters to the speaker is that s/he wants to make his/her own contribution. Probably, one could utter an exclamative without there being an addressee, but in that case, the speaker would not fulfill his/her wish of letting the audience know that s/he experiences an emotional attitude.

Moreover, expressing the speaker’s emotional attitude does not modify the Common Ground like an assertion, but rather the same way as the goat does in Stalnaker’s example above (see section 2.2); it is a nonlinguistic factor that models what mutual knowledge the participants in a conversation have. From the moment that a speaker utters an exclamative, the rest of the participants infer that s/he is emotional because of somebody’s high degree of ADJ-ness, this becomes part of the Common Ground and influences the conversation. The same happens if, instead of uttering an exclamative, the participant smiles at somebody’s comment. The rest of the participants use this information and interpret it, but the participant who has smiled has not performed this action in order to convey to the participants that the previous comment makes him/her smile (provided that we are dealing with an honest smile), but s/he just felt like smiling as a response to a stimulus. Another consequence of this behavior is also analogous to the case of exclamatives: a smile cannot be used to answer a question. Of course, if somebody asks Are you okay?, we can infer from a smile that the person is fine, but the smile does not qualify as a proper answer, because the information is not verbally codified as an assertion. What differentiates a nonlinguistic action such as a smile from an exclamative is that the latter includes the cause of the emotional attitude, which corresponds to what I have treated as the (backgrounded) descriptive content.

Observe in this example that, even if the speaker’s attitude counts as new information, since it is not verbally expressed, it cannot take the place of asserted meaning. Hence, even in cases where A asks about B’s emotional attitude towards a degree, an exclamative is infelicitous:

(32) a. A: How do you feel about Pau’s high degree of tallness?
   b. B: # How tall he is!

I would like to propose that the expressive meaning that is conventionally linked to exclamatives should be analyzed in a similar vein as expressives according to Schlenker (2007), which replies to Potts (2007).\(^\text{10}\) In a nutshell, Schlenker proposes to treat what Potts calls Conventional Implicatures as presuppositions, in order to minimize the technical apparatus of the model. The data Potts works with are adjectives such as damn and bastard in the following contexts:

\(^{10}\) See also Mayol (this volume) for arguments in favor of claiming that exclamatives involve a Conventional Implicature, even if this implicature is identified with a different phenomenon.
a. The damn thing didn’t come with an electric plug!

b. That bastard Kresge is famous.

In his account, *damn* and *bastard* generate a Conventional Implicature (cf. Grice 1989) because they have the following properties (from Potts 2005: 9): (i) CIs are part of the conventional (lexical) meaning of words; (ii) CIs are commitments and, thus, give rise to entailments; (iii) these commitments are made by the *speaker of utterance* “by virtue of the meaning of” the words he chooses; and (iv) CIs are logically and compositionally independent of what is “said (in the favored sense)”, i.e., independent of the at-issue entailments.

Grice devoted his work to analyze Conversational Implicatures, so the properties above aim at establishing a clear-cut distinction between the two types of implicatures (i.e., conversational vs. conventional ones). Property (i) makes sure that the meaning that arises from *damn* or *bastard* does not arise from the rules that govern conversation. Instead, this is inevitably linked to the meaning of the lexical items. What property (ii) suggests is that CIs are not deniable; i.e., one cannot utter *damn* or *bastard* and deny their expressive content without contradicting oneself. Property (iii) makes sure that the meaning expressed is speaker-oriented, which means that this expressive content is interpreted as a side comment invariably added by the speaker. Finally, property (iv) says that the expressive content is not part of the compositional meaning of the clause in which *damn* and *bastard* occur. In Potts’ (2005) framework, CIs are analyzed in parallel to what he calls at-issue meaning, which roughly corresponds to asserted meaning.

Although it is not obvious at first sight that exclamatives are analogous to expressives, we can see that they have crucial similarities. It is certain that the expressive meaning is not attached to a word, but a whole clause. Nevertheless, it is conventionally linked to the construction, which is what matters when it comes to establish a distinction between conventional and conversational implicatures. Crucially, this attitude does not provide from the presence of an emphatic intonation, but stems from the interpretation of this particular syntactic construction. In fact, an exclamative may involve different intonational patterns, each one of them corresponding to a different attitude (e.g., surprise, rage, disappointment, etc.).

Also, this meaning is non-deniable. This has to do with its condition of performative. As Potts (2007) puts it, “they achieve their act simply by being uttered.” The consequence of this property is that this attitude towards a degree cannot be judged false. If the addressee contradicts an exclamative it is because s/he is replying to the descriptive content that the speaker is taking for granted:

(34) a. A: What a nice girl Allison is!

b. B1: That is not true. She’s a harpy!

c. B2: # That is not true. You’re not emotional.
Note that if instead of using a full exclamative we use an interjection—which has no descriptive content—that is a response to the same stimulus, it makes no sense at all to reject the speaker’s contribution.

(35) A: Wow! B: # That is not true.

Precisely, this has to do with the fact that both exclamatives and interjections share the property of expressing the speaker’s emotional attitude. Hence, as previously said, whenever an interjection and an exclamative co-occur, we obtain a reduplicated expressive meaning.

It is also true that the expressive meaning of exclamatives is speaker-oriented. In may never be the case that when a speaker utters an exclamative the attitude towards a degree be attributed to some other participant or referent of the conversation.

As for the last property, it is not possible to test the independence of the at-issue meaning in the case of exclamatives, because I do not assume that exclamatives include asserted meaning. However, it is true that the backgrounded meaning in an exclamative does not semantically compose with the emotional attitude, even if the former is interpreted as the cause of the latter.

So far, it seems reasonable to treat exclamatives as involving an expressive meaning that should be treated as a Conventional Implicature. Assume now that we can reduce the number of objects in our ontology and reduce this expressive meaning to a more wide-spread phenomenon, namely, presuppositions. That is the proposal that Schlenker (2007) makes, and the one that will be explored here.

Interestingly, the claim that expressive meaning is a presupposition is reminiscent of the idea that this content has to be processed in a similar manner as the goat that enters the room in Stalnaker’s example. In both cases, we are dealing with non-asserted meaning that becomes part of the Common Ground without there being the need of acceptance by the audience. It is as much nonsense trying to deny that the speaker has felt an emotional attitude as trying to deny that a goat entered the room. The question is whether expressive meaning considered as a presupposition should count as backgrounded information just like regular presuppositions. That is, the proposal that Schlenker (2007) makes, and the one that will be explored here.

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Let us now go back to scenarios I and II and show how the analysis explains the data. Exclamatives are only allowed in contexts where the information that is introduced in the context set must not be presented by the speaker as controver-
This mode of presentation is that of assertions, because the speaker assumes that in performing such a speech act, his/her proposition is going to be accepted or rejected by the audience before actually updating the Common Ground. Scenarios I and II are suitable contexts because no information is required and, as such, it is not treated as controversial information. In the case of Scenario I, the speaker considers the addressee to be equally qualified to utter an exclamative. It is not that the speaker casts doubts on whether or not s/he is amazed/surprised/bothered about someone’s degree of ADJ-ness (i.e., s/he does not treat the information conveyed as controversial), but s/he wants to make sure that the addressee feels the same way. On the other hand, Scenario II fulfills the felicity conditions of exclamatives because there is no previous specifications as for what propositions should enter the Common Ground.

3.3 Relevant parameters

Once the pragmatic behavior of exclamatives has been described, it is time we go over the relevant parameters that define exclamatives with respect to their discourse contribution, so we are able to determine which ones are common to all exclamations and which ones are construction specific.

1. **Purpose**: the sole purpose of an exclamative is for the speaker to express him/herself.

2. **Updating of the Common Ground**: after an exclamative is uttered the worlds that are incompatible with both the descriptive content and the emotional attitude of the speaker are erased. The descriptive content of an exclamative coincides with the cause of the emotional attitude. Hence, it refers to a high degree.

3. **Attitudes**: exclamatives may express any emotional attitude that is caused by the high degree of ADJ-ness. These include surprise, happiness, rage, irritation, satisfaction and smugness. If an interjection occurs with the exclamative, it emphasizes this attitude (i.e., its expressive meaning). Intonation is conventionally attached to the construction, so it is not uttered intentionally to evoke an attitude.

4. **Commitments**: the speaker who utters an exclamative is both committed to its descriptive content and its implicated meaning. S/he does not commit the addressee to its descriptive or implicated meaning.

5. **Scenarios**: exclamatives are felicitous in scenarios I and II. That is, when the speaker believes the addressee is equally capable to make a similar utterance and when s/he responds to a stimulus. They are infelicitous whenever a participant publicly commits him/her to a certain content that must be treated as controversial information (e.g., the answer to a question). In scenario I, an exclamative may be used to accept the addressee’s capability of make a similar utterance. This possibility is formally realized by the optional use of a request-of-confirmation question tag.
4. Exclamations

In this section a number of constructions in Catalan are analyzed in light of the previous parameters. My purpose is not to make an exhaustive list of the constructions that can be considered exclamations (for this purpose, see for example Alonso-Cortés 1999) or analyze in depth the data I will be working on. Rather, I have the following two goals: on the one hand, highlight the fact that an exclamation cannot be solely defined in terms of commitment and bias (i.e., like questions and assertions) because all these constructions do not have a uniform way of updating the Common Ground. On the other hand, I want to show that the syntactic form of the construction has a bearing on the way utterances update the Common Ground. That is why the classification of the data relies on syntactic criteria.

4.1 The data

4.1.1 Interjections

Interjections are examples of constructions that cannot be considered exclamative clauses, because, as opposed to the latter, the former do not have a clausal structure. Here are a few examples, which may be translated as ‘gee!’, ‘wow!’ or ‘damn!’: Renoi!, Caram!, Òndia!, Vaja! They do not have any descriptive content, but their meaning has to do with the implicature that the speaker experiences an emotional attitude. Intonation accompanies the pronunciation of this type of words; it is conventionally associated with them and it has a different pattern depending on what emotional attitude the speaker is expressing. The sole purpose in uttering these interjections is for the speaker to express his/her emotional attitude towards some salient aspect in the context of utterance. That is, they are not used to convey information that the addressee does not know or is interested in knowing. Hence, one cannot answer a question and receive renoi! (‘wow!’) as an answer.

(36) A: Què et sembla en Pau? B: #Renoi!
    ‘A: What do you think about Pau? B: #Wow!’

As in the case of exclamatives, we cannot claim that interjections are uttered in order to introduce new information. Therefore, they cannot be used to defend one’s position or to spread the news, and they are awkward within a narration.

(37) a. A: You are not mad at your boss. B: #Damn!

    b. #You’re going to love this: wow!

    c. #I was walking down the street and wow!

Certainly, after an interjection is uttered the context set is reduced, because the worlds that are incompatible with this participant being emotional are erased (i.e., they are informative).

As for the attitudes these interjections convey, every one of them has a few meanings that relate to emotional states of mind. According to the Gran Diccionari...
de la Llengua Catalana, renoi expresses admiration and surprise; caram, weirdness, admiration and anger; òndia admiration and irritation, and vaja, quarrel, disappointment, complaint, compassion, appreciation and concession. Since they do not have any descriptive meaning, the speaker cannot be committed to it, although s/he takes for granted the existence and the properties of the stimulus that provokes him/her an attitude. S/he is committed to his/her emotional attitude and does not commit the addressee to any information. On the other hand, the speaker may acknowledge that the addressee is equally qualified to make such an utterance, even though the use of a question tag is rather awkward, maybe because of the lack of descriptive content. Clearly, the context where we mostly find interjections is the one corresponding to scenario II, that is, an environment where the speaker is not publicly committed to a determinate content by any other participant and there is a stimulus that makes him/her react by uttering an expressive construction.

Interestingly, there are other non-propositional expressions that involve a non-neutral intonation, but which do not behave like interjections. I am referring to the following two cases:

(38) a. I tant!
   and so
   ‘Indeed!’

b. Déu n’hi  do!
   God cl.cl  give.sub
   ‘(approx.) Not bad!’

Observe that, to begin with, they can answer a question, which means that they have assertoric power.

(39) a. A: Creus que li agradarà el regal?
   ‘A: Do you think s/he will like my present?’

b. B: I tant!
   ‘B: Indeed!’

(40) a. A: Ha vingut gaire gent al concert?
   ‘A: Did many people show up at the concert?’

b. B: Déu n’hi do!
   ‘B: Not bad!’

Furthermore, besides the emotional attitude they involve, they include an additional meaning. (38a) is an emphatic way of saying yes, and (38b) makes an evaluation in terms of degree and amount (for a very revealing approach, see Mayol this volume). On the other hand, they have quite different syntactic restrictions. Interjections may precede declarative and exclamative clauses (41), whereas (38a) and (38b) have their own selectional patterns. In particular, (38a) may be followed by a that-clause (42), and (38b) selects for either a DP or a wh-clause (43).
(41) a. Renoi! Quin noi tan alt!
   ‘Wow! What a tall boy!’
   b. Renoi! Has vingut!
   ‘Wow! You’re here!’

(42) a tant que m’ha agradat!
    ‘Of course I liked it!’

(43) a Déu n’hi do la gent que ha vingut!
    ‘(lit.) Not bad the people that came!’
    b. Déu n’hi do quanta gent que ha vingut!
    ‘(lit.) Not bad how many people came!’

Finally, note that when two interjections co-occur they just add more emphasis to
the emotional attitude that the speaker experiences (44). In contrast, when an inter-
jection precedes i tant or déu n’hi do, we can separate out two different meanings.

(44) Òndia, òndia! Quin cotxe tan estilós!
   ‘Wow, wow! What a classy car!’

(45) a. Òndia! I tant!
    b. Òndia! Déu n’hi do!

(45a) could be interpreted as if the speaker is first surprised because s/he reacts
at the kind of question s/he has been asked, and then s/he answers affirmatively
and emphatically. Regarding (45b), the speaker is first shocked at a certain degree
or amount and then s/he evaluates it by asserting that it is high.

4.1.2 DPs
The following types of utterances surface as apparent DPs, but have a clausal sta-
tus. Here are two examples: a DP that contains an alleged relative clause (46a) and
a DP whose head does not select for a NP but an AP (46b).

(46) a. Les coses que diu!
    ‘The things s/he says!’
   b. Lu bonica que és la novel·la!
    ‘How beautiful the novel is!’

For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to these DPs as DPs exclamatives.
Gutiérrez-Rexach (1999) names examples like (46b) degree relatives. In his paper

11. Italics is added to indicate that the determiner l’a is not accepted in Catalan prescriptive grammar.
he considers the semantics of degree relatives in Spanish as arguments of certain predicates, such as (47):

(47) Es increíble lo bonita que es la novela.
    is incredible the beautiful that is the novel
    ‘It’s incredible how beautiful the novel is.’

But he also mentions cases like (46b). He says that they are sentential expressions and calls them *exclamatory sentences* that are uttered by a speaker who is expressing an emotive attitude like amazement or surprise. However, the semantics of both embedded degree relatives and matrix degree relatives is the same: they denote a degree (i.e., a kind of individual); and their special pragmatic status is attributed to their characteristic prosodic contour.

On the other hand, Portner and Zanuttini (2005) study the cases of (46a) – which they name *nominal exclamatives* – in parallel with *wh*-exclamatives and propose that they surface as DPs but contain an additional morpheme that makes them behave like a clause. Roughly, the basic reasons to claim that these DPs do not behave as though they denote an individual are the following: they have an analogous meaning to *wh*-exclamatives in many respects and the latter are analyzed as having a clause-like meaning; these DPs can have a meaning on their own without the need of an embedding predicate, and the *that*-clause they include – which is interpreted as a relative clause – is obligatory and not just optional as happens with regular DPs. Interestingly enough, even though these utterances do not include a *wh*-word – which is a basic ingredient in their theory of *wh*-exclamatives as stated in Zanuttini and Portner (2003) –, Portner and Zanuttini argue that these DPs have the same semantic and pragmatic properties as *wh*-exclamatives, because they are analyzed as being factive and because they generate a conventional scalar implicature. Because it is not directly related to my purposes here, I will not discuss these assumptions here, but I want to show, nonetheless, that the discourse distribution of the above utterances differs from the distribution of *wh*-exclamatives.

To begin with, DP-exclamatives include a descriptive content, which is analyzed differently depending on whether they are treated semantically as an individual (cf. Gutiérrez-Rexach 1999 or as sets of propositions (cf. Portner and Zanuttini 2005). Plausibly, the advocates of the former approach will consider intonation as the source of the DP’s sentential behavior, whereas the followers of the latter approach must consider that intonation is conventionally attached to the construction (i.e., what is responsible for their sentential behavior are other ingredients such as a silent factive morpheme and a silent [+wh] morpheme).

Taking in consideration the pragmatic distribution of DP-exclamatives, I side with the DP-analysis and argue that intonation has a very specific role. Depending on the intonation pattern, we may find two options. One possibility is that of a speaker who is outraged because of an event or state, which are realized by a (concealed) proposition represented by a DP. In this situations, the speaker represents him/herself as an authority who views the addressee as someone who is not completely aware, does not imagine or does not acknowledge what the properties of
N are (in cases like (46a)) or the degree to which a degree of ADJ-ness holds of an individual (in cases like (46b)). Roughly, the emphatic intonation may be paraphrased as you have no idea, you don’t realize or you can’t imagine. Compare for example (48a) and (48b):

(48) a. Les coses que diu!
   ‘The things s/he says!’

   b. Tu no saps/no t’adones/no et pots imaginar les coses que diu.
   ‘You don’t know/don’t realize/can’t imagine the things s/he says.’

The other possibility is one in which the speaker shows his/her emotional attitude towards a certain fact which is expressed by a (concealed) proposition represented by a DP, and, crucially, seeks the complicity of another participant. That is, in contrast to the previous case, here, the speaker does not intend to introduce new information. In the following example I propose a possible paraphrase. Specifically, (49a) would be paraphrased as (49b), and (49c) would be the non-concealed correspondence of (49b):

(49) a. El que s’ha d’aguantar!
   ‘What we have to bear!’

   b. És increïble el que s’ha d’aguantar.
   ‘It’s incredible what we have to bear.’

   c. És increïble que s’hagi d’aguantar el que aguantem.
   ‘It’s incredible that we have to bear what we bear.’

Let us first consider the former situation. Clearly, the speaker intends to provide new information. Hence, they are appropriate as answers to (certain) questions.

(50) a. A: Com ha anat la trobada amb el teu director?
   ‘A: How did the meeting with your supervisor go?’

   b. B: Les coses que m’ha dit!
   ‘B: The things s/he said to me!’

An alternative way to answer (50a) would have been No et pots ni imaginar les coses que m’ha dit ‘You can’t imagine the things s/he said to me’, where relevance leads us to infer that the things the supervisor said to the speaker were prominent in some respect (e.g., unexpected, weird, very bad, very good, etc.). When instead of nominal exclamatives we have degree relatives, the implication is that the degree to which an individual is ADJ is high.

(51) Llu dolent que estava el menjar!
   ‘How bad the food was!’

   (lit.) The bad that the food was!’
Admittedly, they do not make excellent answers to questions, because—as we shall see very shortly—the context of appearance of these utterances involve a special state of mind of the speaker, so that it is not likely that a DP-exclamative is uttered out of the blue (i.e., without a reason for the speaker to feel the need to convey an information in such an emphatic manner). On the other hand, it can be argued that examples like (52) are unacceptable for the same reason why (53) are unacceptable (which could be an interesting topic for future research).

(52) a. A: What things does he say? B: # The things he says!
   b. A: Com és d’alt en Pau? B: # *Lu alt que és!
      ‘A: How tall is Pau? B: * (lit.) ‘The tall he is!’

(53) a. A: What things does he say? B: # You don’t know the things he says.
   b. A: Com és d’alt en Pau? B: # Tu no saps *Lu alt que és.
      ‘A: How tall is Pau? B: # You don’t know how tall he is.’

In other words, the reason why these constructions cannot function as answers to these questions does not necessarily entail that they do not make good assertions. As a matter of fact, they may be included in a narration, which means that they do not differ from assertions drastically:

(54) Vaig anar a veure el degà i les coses que em va dir!
    ‘I went to see the dean and the things he said to me!’

At least, they are meant to convey an information that the addressee ignores. That is why they pass two tests proposed in section 3.1.1.

(55) I encara afegiré una cosa més: les coses que podria dir d’ell i callo!
    ‘And I will add a further thing: The things I could say about him and won’t tell!’

(56) A: En Manel és molt moderat. B: Com? Les coses que diu!
    ‘A: Manel is very moderate. B: What? The things he says!’

Additionally, this interpretation of DP-exclamatives in which they always introduce new information also predicts their incompatibility with question tags that indicate request for confirmation, which is borne out.

(57) Des que el meu marit va morir, les desgràcies que ens han passat!, # oi?
    ‘Since my husband passed away, the misfortunes we have suffered!, # right?’

12. Observe that to obtain the expected unacceptable reading, we have to interpret that the speaker is strongly committed to the descriptive content s/he is uttering. There is another unattested meaning in which the answer of B is a truism.
In fact, this might be an acceptable sentence in a dialog with three people, where A and B have been very miserable and want to tell C about it. In this scenario, A might utter this sentence looking at C and then turn to B and utter the question tag. That is, the addressee is not viewed as someone who is qualified to make the same utterance.

As far as the second case is concerned, the only context in which we find these DP-exclamatives is Scenario I. Hence, they are never meant to introduce new information (they would fail the proposed tests) and they can co-occur with a confirmation question-tag.

(58) a. El que hem de sentir!, (oi?)
   ‘What we have to hear!, (right?)’

   b. Les bestieses que hem de sentir!, (oi?)
   ‘The stupid things we have to hear!, (right?)’

However, what is most interesting of DP-exclamatives is that the proper scenarios for such utterances do not include the response to a direct stimulus as is the case with wh-exclamatives and interjections. Observe the following contrast:

(59) [Greg and Allison enter a movie theater which they expected to be crowded.]
   a. Que buit que està!
      ‘How empty it is!’

   b. #Lu buit que està!

Also, DP-exclamatives are incompatible with interjections:

(60) #Òndia! Lu buit que està!
    ‘Wow! How empty it is!’

On the other hand, if Greg and Allison are having dinner afterwards with Robert and Erik and they are discussing about the amount of people who do not go to the movies anymore because they stay at home watching TV shows, Allison could utter: Lu buit que estava el cinema aquest vespre! (‘How empty the movie theater this evening was!’).

It needs to be seen in future research whether the fact that DP-exclamatives are definite and, in Heim’s (1982) terminology, they do not involve a new card-file (i.e., they are familiar items), has an effect on their felicity conditions. Bear in mind that the wh-phrase in an exclamative may be viewed as an indefinite pronoun plus a wh-feature. This is particularly transparent in Catalan, where quin (‘what’) could be the wh-counterpart of un (‘a’). Be this as it may, it seems reasonable to conclude that DP-exclamatives make the Common Ground update in a different manner than wh-exclamatives.
4.1.3 Declarative clauses

There is a variety of constructions that fall within the broad group of declarative clauses, which include properties that relate them to exclamatives and, hence, might be considered exclamations. I will deal with three classes of declaratives separately: declarative clauses that are uttered with an emphatic prosody, result clause constructions whose that-clause is lacking and predicative constructions that undergo predicate inversion.

Plain declaratives with an emphatic prosody. By that label I refer to declarative clauses that are uttered by a speaker who has a non-neutral attitude at the moment of utterance. For instance:

(61) a. El Barça ha guanyat la Copa d’Europa!
   ‘Football Club Barcelona won the Champions League!’

   b. Fa un fred que fa esgarrifar el món!
   ‘It’s terribly cold!’

In (61a), the attitude may be either happiness or bother depending on whether or not the speaker is a Football Club Barcelona supporter. In (61b) the speaker is clearly bothered by the cold. Whereas in the case of wh-exclamatives I assumed that the speaker’s emotional attitude was addressed towards a degree, in the case of declarative clauses, the speaker may express an attitude towards the situation that is represented by the proposition that is uttered.

Prototypically, these constructions include a descriptive content that describe a certain state of affairs and intonation is interpreted as an additional meaning that corresponds to the speaker’s attitude. I side with Potts (2005) in treating the prosodic contour as a conventional implicature. As such, it is non-asserted meaning (i.e., it is non-verbally expressed), it is non-deniable (i.e., the speaker is committed to what the information this intonation conveys) and it is invariably speaker-oriented. Interestingly, though, unlike intonation in wh-exclamatives, the prosodic contour in declaratives is optional; it is not compulsorily attached to the construction, but it is an additional component that introduces to the context set an information about the psychological position of the speaker with respect to the proposition s/he is uttering. Consequently, these declaratives do not lack their ability to update the Common Ground by erasing the worlds that are incompatible with the proposition expressed by the declarative clause, because this is precisely the speaker’s intention when making such an utterance. As a matter of fact, the Common Ground is also reduced because a few more worlds are erased when the speaker’s intonation is interpreted by the rest of the participants as the speaker’s emotional attitude towards a certain state of affairs. Hence, these constructions may be used to answer a question and to announce an information that s/he considers the rest of the discourse participants not to know (62) (but not to make an assertion about the speaker’s non-neutral attitude (63)): 
   b. I’m sorry to make this announcement: It’s terribly cold outside! We can’t go to the beach today…

(63) A: How do you feel? B: # Football Club Barcelona has won the Champions League!

With respect to commitment, like any other declarative, these constructions involve the speaker’s commitment, but in this particular case, the speaker is both committed to the descriptive content of the clause and to the implicated meaning conveyed by the intonation. As a consequence, the speaker does not commit the addressee to the descriptive content of the clause. Nevertheless, s/he can accept the addressee’s knowledgeability and, then, these clauses can include a question tag to request for confirmation.

(64) [Two friends are contemplating the sea when the sun rises]
   a. A: This is the most incredible view!, isn’t it?
   b. B: Right!

Of course, the options displayed in (62) and (64) are only possible when the attitude that lies beneath the utterance is not the speaker’s astonishment, in which case his/her utterance will probably not be an adequate answer, because in such situations the speaker would not pay attention to another participant asking a question. Aside from the context in which the attitude may be defined as surprise, these declarative clauses are felicitous in every other context. Actually, these constructions usually occur next to interjections, which emphasize the meaning conveyed by the intonational contour: Vaja! Fa un fred que fa esgarrifar! (‘Damn! It’s terribly cold!’).

Summing up, as declarative clauses, these constructions function as assertions, so they have the properties that assertions have. Nevertheless, since they are uttered with an emphatic intonation, this intonation conveys an additional expressive meaning, namely, that the speaker is emotional. As in the constructions that have been previously reviewed, the expressive meaning conveyed by intonation does not count as an assertion, but rather as a presupposition (or a Conventional Implicature, in terms of Potts 2007).

**Degree declaratives with pending intonation.** These are degree clauses that include a degree operator, but whose sentential complement is absent. Instead, the pending intonational pattern suggests that the degree that is reached is high. In Catalan and Spanish this possibility holds for both result clause constructions ((65)) and comparatives (66).
These constructions are particularly attractive for various reasons. To begin with, they are not only treated as exclamations, but also as exclamatives by some (e.g. González this volume). Furthermore, as I argue in Castroviejo (2006, 2007a), they are closely related to wh-exclamatives at least in Catalan and Spanish, because they include the same degree operators (tan ‘so’ and més/más ‘more’). On the other hand, they do not pass the exclamativity tests proposed by Zanuttini and Portner (2003), and that is why they discard them as instances of real exclamatives. Irrespective of whether or not they are exclamative clauses, I want to show that their discourse contribution is similar to that of assertions.

Roughly, the sentential complement that is lacking (spelled out by a clause introduced by the complementizer que ‘that’) represents the standard degree that is surpassed in the case of the comparative, and the standard degree that is reached in the case of the result clause construction (but see for instance Kennedy 1999 and Meier 2003 for a thorough analysis). Interestingly, comparative clauses do not necessarily indicate high degree—although they do in certain fixed constructions (67a)—, but in result clause constructions the degree that is reached must be high (67b).

(67) a. Això és més vell que l’anar a peu.
   ‘(lit.) This is older than going on foot.’

   b. En Pau és tan alt que arriba al sostre.
   ‘Pau is so tall that he reaches the ceiling.’

Zanuttini and Portner (2003) argue that these constructions are not exclamative clauses because they do not include a [+wh] feature and a factive morpheme, which are the basic ingredients of exclamatives (recall from section 3.1.1 that they are responsible for the generation of the scalar implicature that characterizes them and which they formalize as a pragmatic inference called widening). On the other hand, Ginzburg and Sag (2001) consider that these particular constructions do not denote propositions like usual declarative clauses, but facts, because of the presence of non-neutral intonation. Be this as it may, we should consider the idea that these clauses in English do not have the same distribution as in Catalan.
Consequently, we should study them separately. Sticking to the Catalan cases, I propose that when the sentential complement is absent, these constructions continue to be declaratives. The difference is that the standard degree is not determined by the descriptive content of the *that*-clause, but from the interpretation of the pending intonation. In fact, most cases where these clauses occur in Catalan are ones in which the speaker is unable to describe properly the degree to which a property holds of an individual. Note that the prosodic contour is not the same in these constructions as in plain declaratives, and their interpretation differs, too. In the former case, pending intonation suggests that the degree is high (68a), whereas in the latter case, intonation takes scope over the entire proposition, so the speaker experiences an attitude towards a certain state of affairs (68b).

(68) a. La Maria porta un vestit tan bonic! → \( \exists x [\text{wear}(m)(x) \land \text{dress}(x) \land \text{pretty}(x) \geq d] \)
   Where \( d \) is high.

   b. El Barça ha guanyat la Champions! → the speaker experiences an attitude towards \( \wedge \text{Barça}(x) \land \text{Champions}(y) \land \text{won}(x,y) \)

   So far, I have assumed that these degree constructions are declarative clauses whose sentential complement is unpronounced. Does this mean that they behave as assertions? Ideally, this should be the case. However, they are not acceptable answers to degree questions in Catalan (even though, apparently, they are in English, as reported by Zanuttini and Portner 2003). Let us look at a concrete example.

(69) a. A: Com és d’alt en Pau? B: # És tan/més alt!

   b. A: How tall Pau is? B: He’s so tall!

A few comments are in order. First, the intonational pattern in English in such cases might not be that of pending intonation, and this property might have an effect on their ability to work as answers. Second, as a matter of fact, these constructions in Catalan are acceptable answers to other *wh*-questions (70a) and yes/no questions (70b):

(70) a. A: Què t’ha semblat la pel·lícula? B: Ha estat tan emocionant!
   ‘A: How was the movie? B: It was so moving!’

   b. A: Et va agradar el concert de Sant Esteve? B: Va estar tan bé!
   ‘A: Did you enjoy Saint Steve’s concert? B: It was so good!’

13. It is also worth mentioning that these sentences whose degree phrase is headed by *tan* (‘so’) are unacceptable in positive environments without this intonational pattern. I cannot delve into this topic here, but the curious reader may find a temptative analysis of this phenomenon in Castroviejo (2007).
Also, observe that they can be used to broadcast the news:

(71) Feu-me cas: aquesta pel·lícula és tan bona! Jo no me la perdria…
‘Pay attention to me: this movie is so good! I wouldn’t miss it…’

Moreover, they may be included in a narration:

(72) Anava caminant pel carrer i vaig veure un home tan alt!
‘I was walking down the street and saw such a tall man!’

Finally, they can be used as part of an argument:

(73) A: El teu cap treballa molt. B: No, no. És tan gandul!
‘A: Your boss is hard working. B: No, no. He’s so lazy!’

Summing up, it seems plausible to believe that the reason why (69a) is out does not have to do with their lack of assertoric power. Puzzlingly, the full constructions (i.e., with their sentential complements) are perfect in contexts like (69a), so an explanation is called for.

(74) A: Com és d’alt en Pau? B: És tan alt que arriba al sostre.
‘A: How tall is Pau? B: He’s so tall that he reaches the ceiling.’

It may be that, even if we can infer that the degree to which he is tall is high, again we cannot use the expressive meaning of intonation in contexts in which assertive content is required. Crucially, though, intonation does not have scope over the entire construction, but only over the sentential complement, so in cases where we ask about the degree (instead of asking a yes-no question), we are not giving the proper answer if we use intonation to replace an assertion.

With respect to the range of attitudes that these constructions can involve in Catalan, it is almost always that of being speechless because of someone’s high degree of AdJ-ness, rather than being surprised or outraged. That is why, they are not used as a response to a direct stimulus:

(75) [Greg and Allison enter the movie theater. They expect it to be empty because they are going to watch a black and white film. However, when they get in, there are only two seats left.]

a. # Està tan ple!
   ‘It’s so full!’

b. Està molt ple!
   ‘It’s very full!’

c. Que ple que está!
   ‘How full it is!’
It is thus straightforward that degree declaratives will not match with interjections, which occur basically in scenario II.

(76) #Òndia! Està tan ple!
   ‘Wow! It’s so full!’

Interestingly, the English counterpart of (75a) is perfect, and the plain declarative version is also fine. (Naturally, a wh-exclamative is acceptable, because this is an example of scenario II.) As has been mentioned above, the intonational pattern of degree declaratives may be different in English and Catalan. Crucially, in (75a) we have, say, a surprise-intonation instead of a pending intonation; and this prosodic contour is awkward in pending degree declaratives in Catalan, probably because *tan* is not licensed.14

So far it has become clear that these clauses are not acceptable to express surprise. Instead, it has been proposed that the lack of sentential complement and pending intonation is generally understood as if the speaker finds it difficult to find the proper description of the high degree. Therefore, it is rather awkward to utter them with a confirmation question-tag.

(77) #La pel·lícula és tan bona!? Oi?
   ‘The movie is so good!? Right?’

Certainly, it is difficult to attribute the content of a proposition to the addressee if the speaker does not spell out the content. On the other hand, it may be the case that the prosodic contour of a pending intonation is incompatible with the prosodic contour of such particles as *oi?*

**Predicative constructions with predicate inversion.** Here is another declarative construction that apparently performs an exclamation. In its canonical word order, there is a lexical Tº, namely, the verb *to be*; but when the predicate moves to the left, Tº is typically unpronounced. The subject is a DP and the predicate that has the form of a degree phrase. For instance:

(78) a. Deliciosa, la crema!
   ‘(lit.) Delicious, the (Catalan) cream!’

   b. Fantàstica, l’actuació!
   ‘(lit.) Fantastic, the performance!’

The most probable paraphrase of such sentences is the following, where the copula is pronounced at the beginning of the clause:

14. Note that if we use *més* ‘more’ with this intonation the degree that is reached is not necessarily high. Therefore, this would not be the same construction as the one we take into account here, but a plain comparative sentence uttered by a speaker who is emotional.
My claim is that their descriptive content is just the same as their non-inverted counterpart. In this case, the previous sentences have the same denotation as the following:

(80) a. La crema és deliciosa.
    'The (Catalan) cream is delicious.'

b. L’actuació ha estat fantàstica.
    'The performance was fantastic.'

Consequently, I propose that the difference between (78) and (80) has nothing to do with them not having the same way of updating the Common Ground. Rather, sentences like (78) should be viewed as containing a right-dislocated DP and, thus, they must be considered as part of a more general study of right-dislocated phrases in Catalan. Certainly, there is a difference in prosodic contour, since the sentences in (78) are uttered with a non-neutral attitude. However, this intonation pattern is the same as the one depicted for plain declaratives with an emphatic prosody (cf. section 4.1.3), that is, amazement, satisfaction, rage, etc., towards a certain state of affairs. Hence, if the distribution of these sentences is not the same as the distribution of declarative clauses that function as assertions, it is because declarative clauses with a canonical word order and declarative clauses that include a right-dislocated element have a different information structure.

Let us see what these constructions have in common with plain declaratives uttered with an emphatic prosody by looking at their behavior with respect to the proposed parameters. To begin with, these sentences are uttered with the purpose of updating the Common Ground by using the information that is verbally expressed in the clause. Since these constitute a very specific kind of clause – i.e., one that contains an unpronounced copula, an AdjP/a DegP and a DP – they are uttered to evaluate a referent by means of a gradable property. Therefore, the most usual attitude that this content triggers is satisfaction because of the fact that an individual has a property to a certain degree.

Also, intonation is used to express the speaker’s emotional attitude. Hence, when they co-occur with an interjection, the emotion that this conveys must emphasize the one conveyed by intonation, which is borne out, as can be seen in the examples below:

15. It does not seem to be the case that these are focalized predicates, or at least we cannot interpret them as contrastively focalized phrases. This would be an instance of contrastively focalized AdjP:

(i) Bastant bona, ha estat l’actuació (, i no fantàstica.)
    quite good AUX.it been the performance and not fantastic
    'The performance was pretty good, not fantastic.'
a. Caram! Deliciosa, la crema!
   ‘(lit.) Wow! Delicious, the (Catalan) cream!’

b. Ostres! Molt malament, els exàmens!
   ‘(lit.) Damn! Very bad, the exams!’

In (81a), the speaker shows amazement toward the fact that the cream is good, and this meaning is emphasized (not contradicted) by the interjection. Likewise, in (81b) the speaker shows his/her disappointment because the exams are low rated.

Again, since the speaker’s purpose is to update the Common Ground with the new information s/he wants to share, s/he is committed to this content and does not commit the addressee, even if the former may consider the latter equally qualified to make a similar discourse contribution, which justifies that these sentences may occur with a confirmation question tag.

(82) Fantàstica, l’actuació!, oi?
   ‘(lit.) Fantastic, the performance!, right?’

From the previous claims we should predict that these sentences would pass all the assertion tests. This is not totally true, though. Observe the following example:

(83) a. A: Com va ser l’actuació?
    ‘A: How was the performance?’

b. B: # Fantàstica, l’actuació!
   ‘(lit.) Fantastic, the performance!’

However, this can be easily attributed to an information structure mismatch. Observe that the same kind of mismatch occurs in the following example:

(84) a. A: Quin premi ha guanyat la Maria?
    ‘A: What price did Maria win?’

b. B: # Ha guanyat el primer premi, la Maria.
   ‘B: (lit.) Won the first price, Maria.’

That is, if we do not pronounce the phrase that occurs right-dislocated in out-of-the blue utterances, the construction is perfectly acceptable:

(85) A: Com va ser l’actuació? B: Fantàstica!

Admittedly, they cannot be included in a narration, but this might have to do with the fact that the copula is not pronounced because it is inferred from context that it refers to the time of speech.
Also, it is difficult to find this construction in an argument where the speaker wants to defend his/her point of view. Again, this may be a consequence of the particular conditions that trigger the absence of the copula.

Nevertheless, if we use the remaining test proposed in section 3.1.1, we see that these constructions do introduce information that the addressee does not already know, or to defend one’s point of view.

To recap, this is a declarative construction that involves a right-dislocation of a DP, that always includes a qualification of an individual by means of an AdjP or a DegP, and whose copula does not appear, because it is inferred that it indicates the time of speech. Aside from the restrictions that these properties underlie, they behave like plain declaratives that are uttered with a non-neutral attitude from the speaker.16

4.1.4 Exclamatives introduced by a complementizer

The following construction is a peculiar case of exclamative that is somewhat reminiscent of exclamatives in French (89), but which has its very own idiosyncrasies, i.e., it includes an apparent partitive clitic en and an apparent preposition de (‘of’) (cf. Villalba 2003) (90).

(89) Qu’il est charmant!
That-he is charming
‘How charming he is!’

Another set of data which deserves more attention than the one I can give here is the following:

(i) Tan simpàtic que era de jove!
so nice that was of young
‘He was so nice when he was young!’

The degree phrase headed by tan is dislocated to the left periphery and it precedes a complementizer. What is most interesting is that, even if this construction involves movement of the degree phrase to the left periphery, its effect is not that of a wh-exclamative (which also involves movement to the left periphery and may contain a complementizer). It is also intriguing that it resembles a degree declarative, but it does not only denote that the degree of ADJ-ness is high. Rather, it is implied that in spite of the fact that the degree of ADJ-ness is high, the actual world is not as it is supposed to be. For example:

(ii) Tan simpàtic que era de jove i en canvi ara és un malcarat!
so nice that was of young and in change now is a grumbler
‘He was so nice when he was young and now, on the other hand, he’s a grumbler!’
Deconstructing Exclamations

(90) a. Que n’és d’espavilat!
   that cl.is of.smart
   ‘How smart he is!’

b. Que en diu de bestieses!
   that cl says of stupid.things
   ‘How many stupid things s/he says!’

For my purposes here, I will treat the preceding examples in the same fashion as the following (slightly different) constructions:

(91) a. Si n’és d’espavilat!
   COMP cl.is of-smart

b. Que és espavilat!
   that is smart

c. Si que és espavilat!
   COMP that is smart

d. Mira que és espavilat!
   look that is smart

They have essentially the same discourse properties as wh-exclamatives, except for the fact that, surprisingly enough, they can answer certain questions. Compare (92b) (an exclamative introduced by a complementizer) with (92c) (a wh-exclamative).

(92) a. A: Com es troba el capellà?
   ‘A: How is the priest feeling?’

b. B1: Que en fa de temps que no en sé res!
   ‘B1: It’s been such a long time I haven’t heard of him!’

c. B2: # Quant de temps que fa que no en sé res!
   ‘How much time it’s been since I haven’t heard of him!’

Crucially, acceptable exclamatives like (92b) are used to implicate that the speaker does not know the answer, but they cannot be used to answer a question about the degree of ADJ-ness of an individual:

(93) A: Com és d’alt en Pau? B: # Que n’és d’alt!
   ‘A: How tall is Pau? B: # How tall he is!’

Since (92b) is not a straight answer and, still, the utterance is acceptable but (93) is not, this contrast has to be found in other contexts, which means that the implicated meaning in both types of exclamatives is not always analogous. This interesting puzzle and the way we can link the form of these sentences and their
discourse contribution will have to be addressed in future research. For our purposes here, I will treat both types of constructions as exclamatives and, hence, as undertaking the task of making exclamations.

4.1.5 Wh-clauses
Aside from the wh-degree exclamatives that have been considered in section 3, there are a few more wh-clauses that have been treated as exclamatives in descriptive grammars (e.g., Alonso-Cortés 1999, Brucart and Rigau 2002 and Payrató 2002) and in the previous literature (Zanuttini and Portner 2003). In Castroviejo (2006), I propose a series of formal tests that show that wh-degree exclamatives differ from other wh-clauses that do not behave like regular questions. In this subsection I solely aim at highlighting their differences with respect to the parameters that I have used to test discourse contribution. I will deal with two classes of wh-clauses separately. On the one hand, with wh-interrogatives and, on the other hand, with free relatives.

Wh-interrogatives. Wh-interrogatives are generally used as questions, but wh-interrogatives can have other uses depending, basically, on the degree of knowledgability of the speaker and the purpose of the utterance. In plain questions, the speaker commits the addressee to the propositional content of the clause, because the former is not acquainted with this information and believes the latter is. In the case of wh-questions, what the speaker commits to the addressee is the value of the wh-variable. Hence, with *How tall is Pau?* The speaker commits the addressee to the value of *how*, that is, the (maximal) degree to which Pau is tall. In other situations, though, the speaker has some degree of knowledgability. For instance, the speaker might intuitively know or infer what the value of the wh-variable is and s/he is upset by this, so s/he asks for an explanation and shows a non-neutral attitude.

(94) Quina classe d’advocat ets?! ‘What kind of a lawyer are you?’

If we do not use the exclamation mark at the end, it may be interpreted as a regular question that can be answered with the name of a kind of lawyer. However, with the exclamation mark, we interpret that the speaker is angry at the lawyer’s job, so s/he expresses his/her anger. Analogous examples would be the following:

(95) a. Qui s’han cregut que som?! ‘Who do they think we are?!’
   ‘(lit.) Who have they believed we are?!’

   b. How could you do this to me?!

In all these cases, even if the speaker makes use of a question, s/he also wants to express his/her anger or disappointment. Crucially, the fact that s/he
shows a non-neutral attitude involves that s/he intuitively knows or supposes the answer. Nevertheless, since they are syntactically wh-interrogatives, they can be answered.

(96) A: Quina classe d’advocat ets?! B: Doncs sóc l’advocat que et traurà d’aquest mullader!

‘A: What kind of a lawyer are you?! B: I’m the lawyer who is going to solve your mess!’

The use of a marked prosodic contour intends to express the non-neutral attitude of the speaker towards a certain state of affairs, namely the one that induces the speaker to ask for an explanation. That is why when an interjection precedes these constructions, they express the speaker’s emotional attitude towards these facts, not towards the value of the wh-variable. Intonation is, thus, an additional ingredient that makes a contribution to discourse. Specifically, once a speaker makes such an utterance, the worlds according to which the speaker is not emotional are erased from the context set. As far as the possible use of these utterances in scenario I, the status of questions of these sentences makes it quite odd for the speaker to make an utterance accepting that the addressee is equally qualified to make a similar utterance.

Another relevant construction is a rhetorical question, which is not meant to be answered, either. In this case, a marked intonation and other formal devices such as the presence of negative polarity items or the use of an irrealis mood identify these wh-interrogatives as rhetorical questions. Their main characteristic is that they have the interpretation of an assertion of the opposite polarity (see e.g., Han 2002 and references therein for an analysis). When we are dealing with polar interrogatives, if the clause does not include a negation, then the assertion includes negation, and when we are dealing with wh-interrogatives, then the change of polarity affects the wh-quantifier. For instance, assuming that who is an individual variable interpreted as an existential quantifier, considering the following scale: {no one < someone < everyone}, in a rhetorical question it is interpreted as the value at the extreme negative end, that is no one. In (97), it is inferred that no one could have said it, according to the speaker.

(97) Qui ho havia de dir?! who cl. had.s/he of say

‘Who would have said it?!’ (lit.) Who had to say it?!’

Alternatively, if the clause contains negation, then the assertion is one in which the polarity of the wh-element is interpreted as a quantifier that lies at the extreme end of the positive scale. That is, in a scale that includes {nothing < something < everything}, we interpret what as the universal quantifier. In the following sentence, we interpret that the referent of the subject would have done everything to attend the graduation.
Rhetoric questions differ from the preceding type in many respects. Intonation in (97) and (98) is used as a means to express that the same speaker answers the question and that the answer involves a change of polarity, but it does not express any emotional attitude. Actually, only if we add an interjection can we express that the speaker shows an attitude toward a certain state of affairs. The purpose of uttering a rhetoric question is to update the Common Ground by introducing the assertion that is implied in the question. We can confirm this by applying the usual tests:

(99) A: Among your friends, who would come to the party? B: Who would come to a party to celebrate my parent’s wedding anniversary?!

Hence, these questions do not really commit the addressee; note that in situations in which another participant does answer a question, it is not clear whether it is an actual answer or it is a reply to the assertion that is expressed in the question.

(100) Hi ha una cosa que és certa: who would resist this offer?!

Another consequence of their use as assertions is that they can include a question tag when the speaker accepts that the speaker is equally qualified to make the same assertion.

(101) a. A: Who would have said it?! B: Albert had always said it, but no one ever paid any attention to him.

b. A: Nobody would have ever said that. B: Albert had always said it, but no one ever paid any attention to him.

To sum up, we have reviewed two types of wh-interrogatives whose use seems reminiscent of exclamations at first sight. Once we have gone over their properties we can conclude that the first type is a question whose utterer is emotional because of a state of affairs and asks the addressee for an explanation; the second
type is a rhetorical question, which has the form of an interrogative but contains a hidden assertion. Since its use is not that of asking a question, its intonation does not follow the regular pattern, but the speaker does not experience an emotional attitude as in the former case.

**Free relatives.** By this label I refer specifically to a matrix *wh*-construction that cannot be interpreted as an interrogative because it contains subjunctive mood, which is incompatible with the act of asking a question.\(^\text{17}\) As in the case of rhetorical questions, in these constructions there is a presumed content. In particular, the speaker expresses a wish.

(103) Qui tingués vint anys!
who had.SUB.s/he twenty years
‘(lit.) Who were twenty years old!’

In the previous example, it is inferred that the speaker wishes s/he would be twenty years old, but instead of using an assertion, as in *I wish I were twenty years old*, s/he does so in an indirect way. The same could be said about another construction which, incidentally, does not involve a *wh*-structure:

(104) Tant de bo pogués tornar enrere!
so of good could.SUB.I/s/he come back
‘I wish I/s/he could come back where I/s/he was!’

In effect, these are not proper assertions and, thus, they cannot answer questions or introduce the information that can be inferred by the means assertions do.

(105) a. A: Quin desig vols que es faci realitat?
‘A: What wish would you like for it to come true?’

b. B1: # Qui tingués vint anys!
‘B1: ‘(lit.) Who were twenty years old!’

‘B2: I would like to be twenty years old.’

(106) #Hi ha una cosa que és certa: qui tingués vint anys!
‘There is something true: Who were twenty years old!’

In contrast with the other non-assertions that we have considered, rather than an emotional attitude, what we have here is the expression of a wish. (In fact, their intonational contour is not the same as the one we find in exclamatives, degree declaratives or plain declaratives with an emphatic intonation.) Consequently, when

\(^{17}\) As a matter of fact, free relatives can occur in the indicative mood when they are the subject of a clause.
these constructions occur with an interjection, the meaning of the interjection is not emphatic, but it represents an additional content.

(107) Renoi! Qui tingués vint anys!
   ‘Gee! I wish I were twenty years old!’

The previous example could be uttered by someone who is irritated because, say, s/he cannot jog more than five minutes anymore (here is the contribution of the interjection), and then s/he wishes s/he were younger (here is the contribution of the wh-clause).

As has been previously said, these constructions are incompatible with a question interpretation. Hence, the speaker is committed to the content that is conveyed, and s/he does not commit any other participant. However, like the other constructions that involve speaker commitment, they can occur in a scenario in which the speaker considers that the addressee is qualified to make the same utterance.

(108) Qui tingués vint anys!, oi?
   ‘(lit.) Who were twenty years old!, right?’

Besides scenario I, the other contexts in which these free relatives are available are the ones in which the speaker is not publicly required to introduce information by means of an assertion. This makes them very similar to wh-exclamatives, except for the fact that these free relatives do not involve an emotional attitude towards a degree or even towards a certain state of affairs.

4.2 Properties of exclamatory speech acts

So far we have reviewed a number of constructions that could be intuitively considered to perform exclamations, in order to be able to discuss the notion of exclamation, to propose a (preliminary) list of properties that should be attributed to exclamations proper and to evaluate which of these constructions really behave as exclamations. By looking at the data and the tests that we have run, we can draw the following conclusions:

- Exclamations can be considered a subgroup of expressive speech acts. When a speaker performs an exclamation, s/he has a non-neutral attitude (i.e., an emotional attitude) towards a degree or a certain state of affairs.
- Only exclamatives and interjections perform the sole speech act of exclaiming. The rest of the constructions make exclamations as a secondary act besides asserting or asking. Furthermore, this secondary expressive meaning is conveyed and interpreted by the use of a non-neutral intonation.
- To differentiate assertions and exclamations in terms of their way of updating the Common Ground, we can propose that assertions update the Common Ground by the introduction of the propositions they denote after they have been judged true by the audience; on the other hand, exclamations only include a
presupposed content, i.e., the expression of the speaker’s emotional attitude. This information is intended to become part of the Common Ground directly, because the speaker treats it as noncontroversial.

- Related to the previous property, the purpose of exclamations is for the speaker to express him/herself, whereas the purpose of assertions is for the speaker to be able to reduce the context set by managing to contribute propositions that are accepted by the audience.

According to these conclusions, plain declaratives, degree declaratives, DP-exclamatives and requests for an explanation perform exclamations as an additional speech act aside from being assertions and questions, because they include an expressive meaning by means of intonation. On the other hand, rhetorical questions have properties of questions and assertions rather than exclamations; and free relatives in the subjunctive mood may perform an expressive speech act, but not of the exclamatory kind.

Here is the summary of the relevant parameters once I have tested them with all the constructions:

1. **Purpose**: only in exclamatives and interjections does the speaker make an utterance with the sole purpose of expressing him/herself. In the other cases, there is a primary purpose, either making an assertion or asking a question, and the speaker’s attitude is an additional ingredient.

2. **Updating of the Common Ground**: both exclamatives and the declaratives of various sorts that we have reviewed reduce the Common Ground once they are uttered. The speaker’s attitude may be treated as a presupposition (Schlenker 2007) or a Conventional Implicature (Potts 2005). Either way, the context set is reduced after an exclamative or an interjection is uttered, but the expressive meaning is introduced as noncontroversial content. Moreover, in the case of exclamatives, there is a descriptive content that is not introduced as an assertion, either. Instead, it has been proposed that it spells out the cause of the expressive meaning and, hence, it is another content that is treated as noncontroversial.

3. **Attitudes**: a speaker may experience an attitude towards a certain state of affairs or towards a degree (but not towards other types of entities such as regular individuals). Interjections can express both, exclamatives express an attitude towards a degree, and a speaker uttering a plain declarative or an interrogative may show an attitude towards a certain state of affairs. Expressing a wish is not considered an emotional attitude, so free relatives in the subjunctive mood do not perform exclamatory speech acts. Exclamatives can express a variety of attitudes, but there is not a complete overlapping between wh-exclamatives and exclamatives introduced by a complementizer. In exclamatives and interjections intonation is attached to the constructions, in plain declaratives and questions it is added, and in DP-exclamatives and degree declaratives it is needed in order for the utterance to make sense (specifically, a DP-exclamative without the emphatic intonation would be interpreted as a fragment, degree declaratives whose degree operator is tan ‘so’ would be unacceptable, and degree declara-
tives whose degree operator is *més* ‘more’ would not indicate high degree). Crucially, the intonational contour is not the same in every construction and this has an effect on the interpretation of the speaker’s state of mind. In the case of rhetorical questions, intonation is not interpreted as the speaker’s attitude. Rather, it is precisely a rhetoric device to convey that the question does not expect an answer.

4. **Commitments**: only questions commit the addressee to a propositional content. Perhaps rhetorical questions do not actually commit the addressee, but this is because the speaker him/herself proposes the answer to the question. The fact that there is no commitment of the addressee can be considered a pragmatic turn that diverts this default option. In exclamatives and declaratives the speaker’s commitment applies to both asserted or (presupposed) expressive meaning.

5. **Scenarios**: declaratives are felicitous in every context. The problems some declarative constructions exhibit in typical assertive contexts may be accountable on other factors having to do with the interpretation that is given to intonation. Exclamatives are felicitous in scenarios I and II, which are the very contexts in which free relatives in the subjunctive mood are felicitous. This is because they both commit the speaker to the content that is conveyed and they both update the Common Ground by using a (presupposed) expressive meaning. Questions have different felicity conditions by virtue of the fact that they commit the addressee to the descriptive content the speaker wants to find out about.

Admittedly, expressives as conceived by Potts (2005) (or Schlenker 2007) and Searle (1979) constitute a rather heterogeneous kind of entity. Potts considers expressives a class of words that generate a CI, whereas according to Searle, expressives are speech acts. In the middle we find exclamations, which belong to the group of expressives because they convey an expressive meaning that indicates the speaker’s emotional attitude towards a degree or a state of affairs, and which could be treated as a speech act, because they are entire constructions. However, recall that Searle (1979) only treats as expressive speech acts those constructions that may be introduced by a performative verb, and there is no such verb for exclamations. As an alternative, we may want to keep the concept of *speech act*, and attempt to define exclamations in terms of how they update the Common Ground. To do so, we will have to take into account whether the exclamatory act is a primary or secondary function, and whether the speaker’s emotional attitude arises from the very form of the clause (as in exclamatives and interjections, in which case exclaiming is the primary function of the construction) or from an additional device such as intonation. In other words, there is still a chance we can find a way to tie the syntax to the pragmatics, which was Searle’s purpose, but without the need to appeal to the presence of a performative verb.
5. Concluding remarks

The basic idea we have explored here is whether or not there is such thing as an exclamatory speech act. To be able to answer this question, I have analyzed the discourse properties of *wh*-exclamatives, I have extracted a few parameters that are relevant to describe their pragmatic behavior and I have analyzed several constructions that could be called *exclamations*, in view of these parameters.

The conclusions to be drawn from this discussion are multiple. First, exclamations are a subclass of the class of expressive speech acts. They do not contain a performative verb, but their performative nature arises from an expressive presupposition identified as an emotional attitude towards a degree or a state of affairs.

Second, assertions and questions may have exclamations as a secondary speech act thanks to intonation, which also codifies the non-neutral attitude of the speaker toward a state of affairs. This does not apply to rhetorical questions, though. In this case, intonation is a device to divert the default function of *wh*-interrogatives (i.e., asking questions).

Third, if we accept that exclamations are those speech acts whose primary or sole function is to express an emotional attitude, then we might identify a proper group of constructions that update the Common Ground in the same way. Specifically, both interjections and exclamatives reduce the context set by introducing as noncontroversial information the content that the speaker experiences an emotional attitude.

Fourth, it has been proposed that the purpose of assertions and exclamatives differs, because by making an assertion the speaker seeks to reduce the context set, whereas by performing an exclamatory speech act, the speaker wants to fulfill his/her wish of expressing him/herself.

6. Further research

The ambition of this article was to show that perhaps the term *exclamation* was used too sloppily and to highlight what properties should be attributed to this speech act. In doing this, many comments have remained simply as suggestions and they await implementation. This section is devoted to propose a few interesting ways to proceed with this preliminary research.

To begin with, it would be interesting to formalize the different contribution of assertions and exclamations in terms of a dynamic approach to context (e.g., Stalnaker 1978 and subsequent work or Gunlogson 2001). In fact, an attractive line of investigation would be to delimit the amount of existing speech acts and classify them all, if possible, according to this perspective.

Another line of research that is worth pursuing is the link between form and function. As Gunlogson (2001) shows, declaratives commit the speaker and bias their context of utterance towards *p* by virtue of their syntactic form. On the other hand, it is also plausible to think that *wh*-clauses also make a specific contribution to discourse by virtue of their syntactic structure. This could, incidentally, give us a reason to propose a set of common properties for *wh*-exclamatives, *wh*-interrogatives and free relatives.
Also, a thorough analysis of the data that have been presented in this article is in order. I have only highlighted the aspects of the constructions that were relevant for my study, but many others have not been touched upon. For instance, are DP-exclamatives clauses or DPs? Portner and Zanuttini (2005) have made a proposal, but much more needs to be said, not only with respect to their syntax (e.g., if the that-clause that modifies the N is a relative clause, why can’t the subject precede the verb in languages like Catalan, as is customary in relative clauses?), but also their semantics and pragmatics (e.g., how can we define and formalize the contribution of intonation?). Another construction that deserves more attention is the exclamative type in Catalan that is introduced by a complementizer. In particular, how do we explain the slightly different discourse contribution it has with respect to wh-exclamatives? Again, does its different syntactic structure have anything to do with it?

Finally, a cross-linguistic study of exclamatives and constructions that make exclamations would be a very valuable contribution in order to understand better the effect of expressive speech acts on discourse and to be able to establish a plausible link between form and function.

References


